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 The first chapter demonstrates the prevalence and importance of pledging of shares by 
insiders in the U.S. I create the first comprehensive database of share pledges by insiders in the 
U.S. to reveal the prevalence of this practice and its role in encouraging earnings management. I 
find that, during the fiscal years 2006 to 2014, insiders at one of every three S&P1500 firms 
pledged their ownership in the firm as collateral to obtain loans at least once. I exploit a 2012 
market-wide advisory against share pledges by Institutional Shareholder Services, the largest 
proxy advisory firm, as a quasi-natural experiment. A difference-in-differences estimation 
reveals that, after the shock, insiders curtailed share pledge activity by approximately 40% and 
firms with share pledges reduced earnings manipulation by an average 15% of their reported 
profits. The results suggest that share pledges distort the incentives of insiders and motivate them 
to inflate earnings. 
The second chapter segregates the two types of share pledges and shows that they have 
divergent effects on firm performance and value. Insiders pledge their ownership in the firm to 
offer collateral for not only their personal loans but also the loans to the firm. Pledging of shares 
modifies their payoff structure without altering their control rights. This modification in the 
payoff structure can influence the incentives of controlling shareholders and have real effects on 
the firm's value and performance. Using hand-collected data from India, I find that share pledges 
for personal loans reduce the effective ownership of controlling shareholders and destroy firm 
value. In contrast, share pledges for firm's loans mitigate borrowing constraints for the firm and 
add value to firms with limited access to debt finance or high growth opportunities. 
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The third and last chapter documents that share pledges by insiders create moral hazard 
by motivating them to alter the risk-taking ability of firms and encouraging them to avoid 
reporting small losses. During the years 2009 to 2015, firms in India displayed a higher tendency 
to avoid reporting small losses by converting them to small profits when their controlling 
shareholders pledged shares. Share pledges for personal loans and firm's loans have contrasting 
effects on the aggregate risk-taking ability of firms. Share pledges for personal loans predict a 
decline in the risk-taking ability of firms over the subsequent year. On the contrary, share 
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   CHAPTER 1: THE INSIDE JOB: SHARE
PLEDGES BY INSIDERS AND EARNINGS
MANAGEMENT
1.1 INTRODUCTION
“To the extent that shares beneficially owned by named executive officers, directors and
director nominees are used as collateral, these shares may be subject to material risk or
contingencies that do not apply to other shares beneficially owned by these persons. These
circumstances have the potential to influence management’s performance and decisions.”
Securities and Exchange Commission (2006)
On January 27, 2006, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) published a document
acknowledging that the share pledges of the CEO of WorldCom may have led to the demise
of the company and solicited public feedback on regulating share pledges by insiders.1 The
report stated that share pledges may influence the incentives of insiders and, in turn, their
ability to make optimal decisions. After discussing the feedback internally, on August 29,
2006, SEC enforced disclosure rules for share pledges by insiders at the publicly-listed entities.
Share pledges by insiders have been associated with corporate misconduct across the
world. WorldCom in the U.S., Satyam in India, and Steinhoff in South Africa were the
largest accounting scandals in their respective countries and each of these was perpetrated
by insiders who had pledged their shares to obtain loans. In fact, the accounting scandal
at WorldCom was not the only such incident in the U.S. where share pledges by insiders
may have played an important role (Jennings, 2003). About a year prior to the news of
1A share pledge is a bilateral loan contract where the borrower obtains a loan from the lender by offering
her shares as the collateral. For example, proxy statements of Tesla, Inc. for the fiscal year 2018 reported
that the CEO, Elon Musk, has pledged 13.7 mn shares of the firm to secure personal loans worth a few
billion U.S. dollars.
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accounting misrepresentations at WorldCom, financial irregularities at Enron had become
public. Similar to insiders at WorldCom, insiders at Enron also had pledged their ownership
in the firm to obtain loans. In spite of an abundance of anecdotal evidence linking share
pledges with income-increasing earnings management, I am unaware of studies that establish
a causal relationship in the U.S. context.
The purpose of my study is to explore the practice of pledging of shares by insiders and
understand whether share pledges compromise their decision-making abilities and motivate
them to manage earnings. Insiders use their discretion over accounting of accruals to arrive
at the earnings that are reported by the firm. Share pledges alter the incentives of insiders by
creating a divergence between their cashflow and control rights (Martin and Partnoy, 2005).
If insiders choose to act on these distorted incentives, then the results should be visible in
the accounting of discretionary accruals. Therefore, I focus on the discretionary component
of accruals to pinpoint the association between share pledges of insiders and manipulation
of earnings.
Conceptually, share pledges by insiders may influence earnings management in opposite
ways. Insiders effectively monetize their equity without losing either their voting rights or
private benefits when they pledge their ownership in the firm. Therefore, share pledges may
serve as an instrument for insiders to diversify their personal wealth away from the firm. This
diversification of wealth can attenuate their incentives to account for the income-increasing
accruals.
On the other hand, share pledges may also incentivize insiders to inflate the reported
profits. Share pledges protect the personal wealth of insiders from declines in the firm’s
share price while allowing them to retain their profits from the appreciation. This downside
protection may motivate insiders to engage in earnings manipulation and other similar ac-
tivities that may generate private benefits at a cost to the firm. In addition, share pledges
expose these insiders to the risk of margin calls.2 These margin calls burden insiders with
2The stock of pledged shares comprises the collateral for the margin loan availed by the borrower. Refer
to Section 1.2 for the details.
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financial obligations during adverse circumstances. Moreover, margin calls faced by the in-
siders are public information and therefore harm their reputation and threaten their control
rights. Therefore, these insiders may use their authority to report higher profits, which, in
turn, would increase the share price and prevent margin calls.
I create two novel datasets to analyze the relationship between share pledges by insiders
and earnings management. First, the information on share pledges of insiders is hand-
collected by carefully reading the proxy statements of S&P 1500 firms from the fiscal year
2006 to 2014. Second, I reorganize the MSCI GMI Ratings database (previously GMI Ratings
database) to obtain information on the individual insiders and blockholders. This database
provides unique information on the directors; for example, whether she is the founder of the
firm or if she has been involved in incidents of problematic behavior (financial irregularities,
bankruptcies, regulatory infringements, etc.). Subsequently, I merge the share pledge infor-
mation of insiders with their information in ISS (formerly RiskMetrics), Execucomp, and
MSCI GMI Ratings by carefully hand-matching over 400,000 names of insiders. The precise
identification of insiders across these databases enables me to implement insider fixed effects
while analyzing their share pledge activity.
The exhaustive data collection exercise allows me to establish several important facts
about insider pledging in the U.S. First, I show that the practice of pledging shares is
prevalent: during the fiscal years 2006 to 2014, insiders at about a third of S&P 1500 firms
pledged their shares at least once to obtain loans.3 The share pledge activity of insiders is
spread across firms of different size and industry. Second, share pledges are not persistent
and are created and terminated repeatedly by insiders. In the subset of firms where insiders
pledged their shares at least once, these shares were pledged about half the time. Third, I do
not find strong differences in financial characteristics of the firms with share pledges and those
without. Fourth and last, the insiders who are most likely to pledge shares wield significant
influence over the firm. These insiders possess the ability to affect corporate policies for their
3The proportion of the U.S. firms with share pledges would be substantially higher if we could account
for the share pledges by blockholders, which are not subject to the disclosure requirements.
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personal benefit. The founders, who play a large role in determining the firm’s strategies,
are approximately five times more likely to pledge their shares after accounting for their
individual fixed effects and other characteristics. In addition, the insiders, who are also the
large shareholders of the firm, are much more likely to pledge their shares. The average
ownership of insiders with pledges shares is approximately six times when compared to the
insiders without such pledges (3.50% against 0.61% of the total equity of the firm). This
evidence suggests that the desire of insiders to diversify their personal wealth is an important
determinant of their decision to pledge shares. In general, this diversification of wealth does
not accompany a loss of authority or voting rights and hence may lead to undesirable behavior
by insiders.
Thereafter, I exploit a shock to the practice of pledging shares by insiders as a quasi-
natural experiment to examine the causal relationship between these share pledges and
the inflation of reported profits. Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), the largest proxy
advisory firm, has a strong influence on voting by shareholders. For instance, Malenko and
Shen (2016) shows that negative shareholder recommendations of ISS reduce the support
for the say-on-pay proposals by 25 percentage points. In 2012, ISS denounced the practice
of pledging of shares by insiders and issued an advisory to oppose it (Center for Financial
Research and Analysis, 2012). ISS alleged that insiders use share pledges to ensure that they
get rewarded irrespective of their performance and that corporate boards are abdicating their
responsibilities by allowing this practice. As a result, the practice of pledging of ownership
by insiders began to attract significant attention in the media. The enhanced public and
institutional scrutiny of the practice made these pledges more costly to firms. In addition,
the sharp focus on insiders with share pledges had the ability to discipline them against
engaging in income-increasing earnings management.
The shock had strong repercussions on the pledging behavior of insiders and inflation of
reported profits at firms. Firms discouraged their insiders from pledging their shares. The
fraction of insiders who pledged shares declined by approximately 40% during the fiscal years
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2011 and 2014. In addition, firms clamped down on earnings manipulation if their insiders
still pledged their shares. As a result, the accounting for discretionary accruals was lower by
0.82% of firm’s assets if insiders pledged their shares after the shock. This represents a large
reduction in abnormal profits, amounting to $80 mn or approximately 15% of total profits
of these firms. These results are robust to the use of firm fixed effects and hence cannot
be explained by the entrenched issues of internal governance that are difficult to quantify.
Subsequent tests suggest that if insiders pledged their shares after the shock, the accounting
of total accruals declined by 0.85% of firm’s assets. The decline in the abnormal accounting
of total accruals is similar to the decline in its discretionary component, which shows that
the results are not an artifact of the methodology of accrual estimation.
Furthermore, I find that institutional ownership and strong corporate governance prac-
tices play an important role in intermediating the relationship between share pledges and
earnings management. The founder-controlled firms remained unresponsive to the shock
and did not register a decline in accounting for accruals. Moreover, the decrease in earnings
manipulation was specific to the firms where blockholders held higher than the median level
of ownership, firms had higher analyst coverage, and the industry was highly competitive.
These results suggest that the shock to share pledges was effective only in well-governed
firms and firms with high ownership by blockholders.
My article contributes to the emerging literature on share pledges by demonstrating
their role in encouraging earnings management. To my knowledge, this is the first paper
that estblishes the relationship between share pledges by insiders and inflation of reported
earnings in the U.S. In related work, I find that firms in India avoid reporting small losses (by
converting them to small profits) when their insiders pledge shares. Another similar study,
Chan, Chen, Hu, and Liu (2018) analyzes share pledges in Taiwan and provides evidence
to suggest that share pledges create moral hazard for insiders. This study indicates that
insiders in Taiwan launch share repurchases to support firm’s share price and avoid margin
calls. Dou, Masulis, and Zein (2019) uses data from Taiwan and claims that share pledges
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motivate insiders to avoid risk, which results in a decline in the risk-taking ability of the
firm. In contrast, Anderson and Puleo (2015) randomly selects 500 of S&P 1500 firms and
suggests that share pledges lead to an increase in idiosyncratic volatility of the stock and
hence increase firm-specific risks.
Another contribution of my paper is to show that it is the well-governed firms and not
the poorly governed firms that respond to criticism and strengthen their internal governance
practices. Although the poorly governed firms stand to benefit more from an improvement
in their governance structures, they are less inclined to make the required efforts. It ap-
pears that self-governance fails in firms where it is needed the most. These findings further
support the “quiet life” hypothesis, which suggests that firms in less competitive industries
are not proactive and prone to suboptimal decision-making (Giroud and Mueller, 2010). In
agreement with Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998), my tests suggest that a significant
ownership by blockholders acts as a credible threat against bad behavior by insiders. Leuz
and Wysocki (2008) states that higher coverage by analysts leads to a better availability
of information and improves the governance practices at the firm. While Irani and Oesch
(2016) uses a quasi-natural experiment to establish that analyst coverage leads to earnings
management through accrual manipulation. My analysis extends these findings by demon-
strating a lack of improvement in earnings quality at firms that were ranked in the lowest
quartile of analyst following.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 describes the mechanics
of share pledges in detail. It also uses a simple numerical example to illustrate how share
pledges protect the wealth of insiders during the periods of share price decline. Section 2.3 de-
scribes the data collection exercise and the methodology for estimating accruals. Section 1.4
presents important facts about the prevalence of share pledges by insiders and analyzes the
characteristics that are associated with this practice. Section 1.5 uses the ISS shock to
explore the role of share pledges in encouraging income-increasing earnings management.
Section 2.5 concludes the study.
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1.2 BACKGROUND OF SHARE PLEDGES
Example of a typical share pledge
A share pledge is a bilateral loan contract where the borrower obtains a loan from the
lender by offering her shares as the collateral. My study is restricted to the subset of share
pledges where insiders collateralize their equity in the firm. The pledge of shares by Elon
Musk, the CEO of Tesla, in favor of Morgan Stanley, serves as a relevant example.4 Insiders
like Elon Musk are privy to valuable information and have the authority to make important
decisions at their firms. As a result, a shift in their incentives has the ability to impact the
firm’s performance and affect the rest of the stakeholders.
The standard share pledge contract mandates the insider to provide for a stipulated value
of the collateral of pledged shares. The required collateral is specified in terms of a multiple
of the outstanding loan amount, called the asset cover ratio. An asset cover ratio of 1.5
times implies that insider shall maintain the value of collateral at 1.5 times the value of
loan outstanding. The lender holds the entire stock of pledged shares in a margin account.
In case the share price of the firm appreciates, the surplus collateral is released from the
margin account and is delivered to the insider. However, when the share price declines, the
insider has to either provide for additional collateral of shares or repay a part of the loan.
If the insider fails to do so, then the lender sells a portion of the collateral to recover her
dues.5 Therefore, in order to avoid these margin calls, the insider has to offer additional
resources when her wealth is already declining. This may motivate her to take actions that
can support the share price of the firm temporarily but may prove to be costly later. The
rest of this section explains how share pledges protect the losses for the insiders when share
price of the firm declines.
4The name of the lender is sourced from the prospectus for the public offering of shares of common stock
of Tesla in March 2017 and is available on the SEC website.
5A simple derivation shows that a $1 decline in the value of collateral forces the lender to sell $[1/(asset
cover - 1)] worth of collateral to re-balance the pledge. This implies that, in this example, the lender would
sell $2 worth of collateral for each $1 decline in the value of collateral.
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Share pledges and the mechanism of downside protection
“pledging of shares may be utilized as part of hedging or monetization strategies that would
potentially immunize an executive against economic exposure to the company’s stock, even
while maintaining voting rights.”
Center for Financial Research and Analysis (2012)
Insiders can use share pledges to protect their wealth when the share price of the firm
declines. This downside protection comes at the expense of a decrease in their ownership in
the firm. On the other hand, share pledges do not curtail the appreciation of their wealth
when the share price of firm increases. Therefore, insiders can use share pledges to undo
the high-powered incentives of their compensation contracts and ensure their wealth against
poor performance by the firm. The following example illustrates the impact of share pledges
on the personal wealth of insiders.
Let us assume that, on day 0, an insider pledges $200 of her shares in the firm to obtain
a loan of $100 at an asset cover of 2 times. The insider is obliged to maintain the collateral
of pledged shares at 2 times the value of outstanding loan amount throughout the tenure
of the loan. The excess collateral provides the lender sufficient cover to sell the collateral
and recover her dues without incurring losses. Now, let us extend the illustration to assume
that the price of the share declines by 20% on day 1, which reduces the value of collateral
to $160. At the end of day 1, there is a shortfall of $40 in the value of the collateral. But,
the insider does not provide for this shortfall either willfully or due to the lack of resources.
As a result, the lender is forced to liquidate some of the collateral to recover her dues and
maintain the required asset cover. In order to maintain the asset cover of 2 times, the lender
would sell $1 of collateral for each $1 decline in the value of collateral. By the end of Day 1,
the lender liquidates pledged shares worth $40, thereby lowering the value of collateral from
$160 to $120. The lender uses the proceeds from sale to write-off the outstanding loan. As a
result, the outstanding loan amount declines from $100 to $60 and the asset cover of 2 times
is maintained. It is important to note that if the insider did not pledge her shares she would
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own $160 of shares in the firm at the end of day 1. Now, what would happen if share price
declines further by x% on day 2? The insider would lose $1.2x of her personal wealth ($1.2x
= $120*x%). Had she not pledged her shares, she would have lost $1.6x ($1.6x = $160*x%).
Let us assume that share price continues to decline by 20% on each of the following three
days - day 2, day 3 and day 4. The insider does not provide for the shortfall in collateral and
hence the lender sells the requisite amount of collateral to maintain the asset cover. At the
end of day 4, the lender would be left with a collateral of $25.92 securing an outstanding loan
amount of $12.96. The wealth of the insider would be $112.96 comprising $100 of proceeds
from the loan and $12.96 of equity in the collateral held by the lender. If the insider had not
pledged her shares on day 0, she would be poorer on day 4. Her wealth would only be $81.92
after 4 consecutive days of 20% decline in share price ($81.92 = $200*80%*80%*80%*80%).
In fact, the pledging of shares ensures that the insider would retain $100 of loan proceeds
even if the share price declined to $0. Figure 1.1 shows that share pledges not only make
the personal wealth of insiders less sensitive to a decline in firm’s share price but also ensure
that they retain the loan proceeds at the minimum.
It is interesting to note that share pledges are not a zero-sum game between the insider
and the lender. The lender remains protected by the excess collateral. She manages to
recover her dues by periodically liquidating the required amount of collateral and does not
incur losses. The losses are distributed amongst the investors who buy shares from the
lender. In other words, these investors provide for the downside protection availed by the
insider. In this example, the lender would lose only when the share price drops by more than
50% in an instant. In this improbable scenario, the value of the collateral would fall below
the outstanding loan amount instantaneously and hence the lender would fail to recover her
dues even after selling the entire collateral. To hedge against such unlikely scenarios, the
lenders charge a premium in interest rates while lending against share pledges.
Now, let us consider that the share price increased on the four days after shares were
pledged. The insider would have received the collateral that was in excess of the stipulated
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amount and hence retained the entire upside in the value of shares that she pledged. In a
nutshell, share pledges allow insiders to retain the benefits from the appreciation in the share
price of the firm. At the same time, if the share price of the firm declines then these pledges
lower the rate at which the insider loses her wealth and ensure that her wealth exceeds the
proceeds from the loan.
The insiders have the option to sell an equivalent amount of their shares instead of
pledging them to generate the funds. However, a sale of shares would forfeit their control
rights associated with these shares. Moreover, a large sale of shares reflects poorly on insiders
and invites criticism. In comparison, the pledge of shares provides insiders with the money
while allowing them to retain the control rights. As a result, share pledges create a divide
between the control and cashflow rights of insiders.
The misalignment between control and cashflow rights may create moral hazard for the
insiders who pledge their shares (Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis, 2000). The lowering
of the skin in the game creates incentives for these insiders to benefit at the expense of the
firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Duchin, Goldberg, and Sosyura (2017) shows that insiders
respond to their incentives even if this may reduce firm value. While Almeida and Wolfenzon
(2006) emphasizes that founders self-select firm’s policies and hence founder-controlled firms
may behave differently when compared to the rest of the firms. Along the same lines,
my study proposes that share pledges would create incentives for the insiders to manage
earnings even if this does not benefit the firm. Moreover, this manipulation of earnings may
vary across firms with distinct categories of entrenched insiders.
1.3 DATA AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION
Data sources and sample selection
On August 29, 2006, SEC forced publicly listed firms to disclose the number of shares
pledged by their insiders (directors and named executive officers) in their annual proxy
statements. The disclosure of pledged insider shares is required typically as a footnote to
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the table of beneficial ownership. However, it is common for firms to provide the details
of pledging activity of their insiders while discussing other developments in the main body
of the proxy statement. Therefore, in order to ensure the completeness of information, I
carefully perused through the proxy statements of each S&P 1500 firm from the fiscal year
2006 to 2014. This detailed data collection exercise was undertaken with the objective of
creating a high-quality dataset that could provide robust evidence to pinpoint the role of
share pledges in influencing the incentives of insiders.
I source the information on directors from ISS Directors database (previously RiskMet-
rics) and MSCI GMI Ratings; while the information on named executives is obtained from
Execucomp. MSCI GMI Ratings provides information about the directors that is not avail-
able in the other databases that are used frequently in corporate governance studies. I
find the information on whether the directors are the founders of the firm or if they have
been classified as problem directors (personally involved in corporate scandals, regulatory
infringements, bankruptcies, etc.) particularly useful. However, this database does not have
a unique identifier for the directors. Therefore, I merged the information about individual
insiders across ISS, Execucomp and MSCI GMI Ratings by matching them by their names.
Over 400,000 names across these databases were matched manually and the superfluous ob-
servations were discarded. The painstaking task of manually matching the names of insiders
ensured the accuracy of the merged dataset and made it possible to implement fixed effects
for the individual insiders.
The information on analyst coverage was retrieved from the annual data files at I/B/E/S.
The accounting data and earnings per share of firms are extracted from Compustat and the
stock prices from CRSP. ISS and Execucomp follow different conventions to record the fiscal
year. The fiscal year is matched across these databases by using the dates of proxy filing
and board meeting. The dataset follows the convention of Execucomp to determine fiscal
years for firms. In addition, I use the data from Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2014) to verify
the fiscal years across ISS and Execucomp databases, for the years that are common across
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both the studies. SEC Analytics database is used to match the ticker and CUSIP with the
CIK of firms. Firms corresponding to financial institutions (SIC between 6000 and 7000)
and regulated industries (SIC between 4900 and 5000) have been excluded from the dataset.
The final dataset includes 97,349 insider-year observations form the fiscal year 2006 to 2014.
The count of firms is significantly lower in the fiscal year 2006 when compared to the
subsequent years. The disclosure of share pledges became effective for listed firms with
their fiscal years ending on December 15, 2006, or later. The fiscal year 2006 ended prior
to December 15, 2006, for a significant proportion of S&P 1500 firms. Since these firms
were not required to disclose the share pledges by insiders for the year 2006, they have been
excluded from the dataset for the fiscal year 2006.
1.3.1 Estimation of accruals
I primarily use discretionary accruals to measure income-increasing earnings management.
Discretionary accruals are estimated using the cross-sectional version of the Modified Jones
Model (Jones, 1991). In addition to discretionary accruals, total accruals are used to provide
supporting evidence. The balance sheet method is used to estimate the total accruals for
the firms, which are then divided into discretionary and non-discretionary components. The
process of estimation of Total Accruals and Discretionary Accruals is folows.
Total accruals are calculated as the difference between reported earnings and cashflow





where TAi,t represents total accruals, PATi,t is the reported profit and CFOi,t is the cash
flow from operations of the firm i in year t.
The following equation is used for each industry-year cohort to estimate the parameters
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where for the firm i, ∆REVi,t is change in revenues in year t over year t − 1 and PPEi,t
is gross value of property plant and equipment at the end of year t. α1, α2 and α3 are
industry-year specific parameters.
A part of firm’s total accruals is considered normal in the course of business and varies
with the business cycle and firm’s performance. The parameters estimated in equation (2)

















where ∆RECi,t is change in receivables in year t over year t− 1 of the firm i.
The adjustment for receivables in equation (3) is an improvement over the original Jones
model. It accounts for the managerial discretion in using receivables to influence the re-
ported revenues. Finally, discretionary accruals, DAi,t, are calculated by subtracting non-
discretionary accruals from total accruals of the firm.
DAi,t = TAi,t −NDAi,t (4)
1.4 STYLIZED FACTS ABOUT INSIDER PLEDGING IN
THE U.S.
Share pledges are bilateral loan contracts between the insider and the lender and hence this
information is private in nature. Regulatory authorities avoid forcing firms to disclose this
information if they are not convinced of the detrimental impact of share pledges on firm’s
performance. However, the lack of disclosures creates a hurdle in analyzing the consequences
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of share pledges and providing the required evidence. I undertake an extensive data collection
exercise across multiple sources in an effort to resolve this puzzle.
Fact 1: Pledging of shares has been prevalent amongst insiders
Table 1.1 illustrates the trend of share pledge activity at the level of firms. Approximately,
a third of the firms in the dataset witnessed their insiders pledge shares at least once between
the fiscal years 2006 and 2014. Share pledges were common for insiders across the firms of
different sizes and diverse industries. A survey by ISS in May 2012 revealed that insiders
at 17% of Russel 3000 firms had pledged their shares (Center for Financial Research and
Analysis, 2012). My dataset finds that insiders at 17.9% of S&P 1500 firms had pledged
their shares at the end of the fiscal year 2011, the period corresponding to the ISS survey.
This indicates that the practice of pledging shares is equally prevalent across insiders of both
large and small firms. The persistent effects of the ISS shock are evident after the fiscal year
2012. The proportion of firms where insiders had pledged their shares declined form 17.9%
in the fiscal year 2011 to 12.3% in the fiscal year 2014. The qualitative information from
proxy filings reveals that, after the fiscal year 2012, firms increasingly adopted anti-pledging
policies to restrain insiders from pledging their shares.
The average firm in the dataset has 8 directors, 5 named executives and 1 executive
director each year. Table 1.2 provides an overview of the practice of pledging of shares at
the level of insiders. As expected, the share pledge activity of insiders declined considerably
after the fiscal year 2011. Compared to 2.5% of executives in the fiscal year 2011, only 1.3%
of executives pledged shares in the fiscal year 2014. Similarly, the proportion of directors
who pledged their shares declined from 2.3% in the fiscal year 2011 to 1.4% in the fiscal year
2014.
Although the instances of pledging of shares declined for both the executives and directors
after the fiscal year 2011, the intensity of pledging did not decrease. I define encumbrance
as the measure of the intensity of pledging by insiders. Encumbrance represents the fraction
of ownership that has been pledged by the insider (shares pledged / shares owned). The
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intensity of pledging by insiders in the U.S. is marginally higher than their counterparts in
India (as shown in one of my papers). The average encumbrance in the U.S. was 33% for the
executives and 38.4% for the directors who had pledged their shares. The 90th percentile
values were 76.1% and 90.5% for the executives and directors, respectively. Insiders with
such high levels of encumbrance had monetized most of their cashflow rights over the firm.
For example, consider that the lender stipulates a collateral cover of 1.5 times of the loan
value while lending against a pledge of shares. The insider would obtain a loan worth 50% of
her ownership in the firm by offering 75% of her ownership as collateral. In other words, at
an encumbrance of 75%, the insider would have effectively diversified half of the monetary
value of her ownership in the firm.
Fact 2: Pledging of shares by insiders is not persistent
I analyze the subset of firms where insiders pledged shares at least once. The average
firm, where shares were pledged at least once, was present in 8 of the 9 years of study.
Insiders at this firm pledged shares during 4 of the 8 years on the average and 3 years at the
median. The frequent creation and termination of share pledges provide the variation that
is required to analyze the shifts in the incentives of insiders.
Fact 3: Firms with share pledges and those without share similar characteris-
tics I do not find major differences between the firms where shares were pledged by insiders
and those where shares were not pledged. The first two columns of Table 1.3 show that both
groups of firms operate at similar levels of profitability, capital expenditure and Tobin’s Q.
In addition, the insiders who had a problematic history or did not regularly attend the board
meetings are almost equally likely to be present across both the groups. However, the insiders
own a larger stake in the firms where share have been pledged. Also, these firms are about
60% more likely to be controlled by their founders when compared to the other group of
firms. The third column is a subset of the second column and documents the characteristics
for the firms where shares have been pledged by their founders. These firms have fewer di-
rectors with problematic history on their board. Founders own an average 10% of ownership
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in their firms and hence, not surprisingly, the insider ownership is an average 14% in firms
where the founders pledged their shares. Overall, the firms do not differ substantially on
observable characteristics depending on whether the founders or the other insiders pledged
their shares.
Fact 4: Influential insiders are more likely to pledge shares
The univariate sorts according to the characteristics of the insiders suggest that their
designation and ownership levels are important determinants of their share pledge activity.
The founders and CEOs are more likely to pledge their shares when compared to the rest of
the insiders. The founders comprise only 1.56% of the insider pool but account for 12.66%
of the share pledges by insiders. This implies that, without controlling for other factors, the
founders are about seven times as likely as the average insider to pledge their shares. In
addition, the insiders with a large shareholding in the firm appear more likely to pledge their
shares. The average shareholding of insiders who pledged their shares in the firm is 3.5%
against 0.61% for those who did not pledge their shares.
I use the framework of regressions to further explore the factors that influence the practice
of pledging of shares by insiders. These regressions divide insiders into separate sub-segments
and compare the results. At first, the insiders are divided into the categories of executives
and directors. Then, executives are classified as either the CEOs or the rest of the executives.
Similarly, directors are separated into the outside and the inside directors. The inside direc-
tors are further identified as either the founder directors or the rest of the inside directors.
Firm fixed effects and industry-year fixed effects account for the unobservable characteristics
specific to the firms and their respective industries. In addition, the regressions implement
insider fixed effects to account for the unobservable attributes of the insiders.
Specification 1 of Table 1.4 verifies that executives and directors display similar likelihood
of pledging their shares. Specification 2 shows that CEOs and inside directors have a much
higher propensity to pledge shares than the rest of the insiders. Specification 4 suggests that
the high propensity of CEOs to pledge their shares is on account of their equity and option
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ownership in the firm and not their designation. On the other hand, founders are highly likely
to pledge their shares irrespective of their ownership of equity and options. Specification 6
adds variables to control for the corporate governance standards and financial performance of
firms and implements the industry-year fixed effects. The results suggest that the likelihood
of founders pledging their shares is higher by 7%, or by about 5 times when compared to the
likelihood of the rest of the insiders. In addition, the financial characteristics of firms have a
marginal association with the likelihood of pledging of shares by the insiders. A 1 standard
deviation increase in size, financial leverage and Tobin’s Q of the firm is associated with an
increase in the probability of pledging in the range of 0.20% to 0.50% only. The use of firm
fixed effects and insider fixed effects in specifications 7 and 8 yield similar results.
Interestingly, when compared to the increase in ownership of equity, the increase in
ownership of options has a larger effect on pledging of shares across executives. On the other
hand, ownership of options does not seem to influence the pledging of shares by the directors.
This suggests that the executives, more than the directors, pledge their shares to undo the
high powered incentives that are embedded in their compensation structure. This evidence
supports the claim of ISS that insiders pledge their shares to insure their compensation
against poor performance of the firm and further adds that the executives are more likely to
do so.
In a nutshell, the insiders with share pledges are more likely to be the founders, large
shareholders and entrenched directors with longer tenures. These insiders have the ability
to mold the decision-making at firms. Hence, if share pledges affect the incentives of the
insiders, then it is likely that these pledges would also affect corporate policies.
1.5 INSIDER PLEDGING AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT:
EVIDENCE FROM A QUASI-NATURAL EXPERIMENT
The year 2012 had a longstanding impact on the practice of pledging of shares by insiders.
ISS is the largest proxy advisory firm in the world with a presence in 115 countries and
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over 1,600 institutional clients. Not surprisingly, ISS has a strong influence on voting by
institutional shareholders. In 2012, ISS declared that insiders were avoiding the restrictions
on hedging their ownership by pledging their shares and issued an advisory to against it. This
increased the risk of institutional investors bringing in proposals to oppose the practice at
their investee firms. Moreover, the criticism by ISS was followed by similar communications
from other institutional advisory firms and increased awareness about this practice. This
shock was expected to increase the costs of pledging for insiders and discourage them from
pledging their shares. Further, it was anticipated that the heightened scrutiny of the insiders,
who still managed to pledge shares, would forbid them to inflate earnings.
It is important to note that the advisory against pledging by insiders was not prompted
by a suspicion of earnings management at these firms but by the desire of ISS to bring
consistency to its advisories. ISS had been writing against the hedging of ownership by
insiders for the past few years and held an advisory against it. In the 2012 communication,
ISS announced a change in their internal policy and acknowledged that pledging of shares by
insiders is a substitute to their hedging strategies that lock-in their gains associated with the
share price of the firm. The decision to treat pledging by insiders at par with their hedging
strategies led to the issuance of advisory.
The incidences of pledging by insiders of S&P 1500 firms declined substantially after the
shock. Proxy statements reveal that approximately 1.6% of insiders used to pledge their
ownership in the firm before the shock. This proportion declined to about 1.0% by the end
of the fiscal year 2014, representing a fall of about 40%. However, the founders remained
unaffected by this shock. Firms made exceptions to their policies for their founders and
allowed them to pledged shares. Figure 1.2 illustrates the longstanding effect of the shock on
the practice of pledging of shares for both categories of insiders. The proportion of founders,
who pledged their shares, did not decline after the shock. Prior to the shock, approximately
12% of founders used to pledge their shares. Three years later, the proportion of founders
with share pledges was unchanged at 12%. On the other hand, this proportion approximately
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halved within the subsequent three years for the rest of the insiders. Approximately 1.5% of
the non-founder insiders pledged their shares before the shock. However, three years after
the shock, only 0.8% of these insiders had pledged their shares.
Subsequently, I verify the effectiveness of the shock by analyzing the insider level data
in a regression framework. The precise identification of individual insiders allows the study
to incorporate insider fixed effects. As a result, the regressions account for the persistent
characteristics of insiders while analyzing their pledging behavior. Approximately 12% of
the individuals in the dataset serve as insiders at multiple firms in the dataset. For example,
an individual may be the founder of a firm and an outside director at another. Insiders
may also transition to a different role within the firm. For instance, a CEO may join the
board of directors and become an inside director at the firm. I utilize these variations while
incorporating insider fixed effects in specifications 3, 6 and 9 in Table 1.5. Specifications 2,
5 and 8 use firm fixed effects to account for the enduring aspects of firms, for example, the
entrenched corporate governance issues. The estimation using logit models yields similar
results and is excluded to avoid repetition.
The regressions in Table 1.5 quantify the changes in pledging behavior for the founders
and the rest of the insiders. The dependent variable indicates whether the insider pledged
her shares or not. The coefficients on the variable “Post ISS Shock” quantify the changes in
pledging activity after the shock. Specifications 1 to 3 analyze the pledging behavior of the
founders while specifications 4 to 6 study the rest of the insiders. The results confirm that
there was no decline in the pledging activity of the founders even after accounting for the
fixed effects specific to the firms or these individuals. On the other hand, there was a large
decrease in pledging of shares by the rest of the insiders. Specification 6 suggests that, after
controlling for the unchanging attributes of these insiders, the instances of pledging declined
by approximately 24% after the shock. In order to further explore the divergence in pledging
behavior, the regression uses specifications 7 to 9 to observe the pledging behavior of the
non-founder insiders in the founder-controlled firms. Interestingly, the results show that
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although the founders at these firms continued pledging their shares, the pledging activity
of the rest of the insiders declined by 60% after accounting for their individual fixed effects.
It appears that founder-controlled firms follow separate standards of governance for their
founders and the rest of the insiders.
After establishing the relevance of the shock, I use it to evaluate the impact of share
pledges on earnings management. The regressions in Table 1.6 use the abnormal increases in
discretionary accruals to quantify earnings management. The findings of this test constitute
the main results of this study. Specification 4 uses industry fixed effects along with year
fixed effects and is the most important specification. Specification 5 replaces industry fixed
effects with firm fixed effects as a robustness measure.
The results of the regressions provide strong evidence to suggest that pledging of shares
by insiders leads to earnings management. The coefficient on “Non-founder Pledged Shares
* Post ISS Shock” shows that, after the shock, firms accounted for less discretionary accruals
if their non-founder insiders pledged shares. Specification 4 measures a decline in reported
profits amounting to 0.82% of firm’s assets or 15% of the total profits of the firm. On the
other hand, the coefficient on “Founder Pledged Shares * Post ISS Shock” suggests that,
after the shock, firms did not change their accounting for discretionary accruals if their
founders pledged shares. As a result, when founders are pooled with the other insiders, the
regression does not find statistically significant results for the average insider. Specification
5 uses the harsh constraint of firm fixed effects in the regressions on discretionary accruals
and finds consistent results. The use of firm fixed effects suggests that, after the shock, the
accounting for discretionary accruals reduced by 0.72% of firm’s assets if their non-founder
insiders pledged shares. As anticipated, there was no change in discretionary accruals if
shares were pledged by the founders.
Further, the small and statistically insignificant coefficients on “Post ISS Shock” provide
the evidence to suggest that the shock did not lead to a widespread reduction in earnings
management across the entire set of S&P 1500 firms. Similarly, the coefficients on “Firm
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with Founder * Post ISS Shock” and “Firm with Problem Director * Post ISS Shock” show
that the decline in inflation of profits was not specific to the subset of firms with founders
or directors with a problematic history. These variables are not presented in the tables to
avoid a long list of control variables and maintain the clarity of presentation. The results
of earnings management are specific to pledging of shares by insiders after the shock, in
particular, the insiders who are not the founders. As a robustness test, the regressions are
implemented using 3 digit SIC rather than 2 digit SIC to identify applications and obtain
similar results. Further, the tests are repeated using the original Jones Model, which does
not account for the changes in non-cash revenues, and obtain similar results. In additional
tests, regressions cluster standard errors at the level of industry instead of the industry-year
and find that results retain statistical significance.
In addition to the discretionary accruals, finance and accounting literature relies on total
accruals to quantify earnings management. Total accruals measure the excess of reported
profits over cashflow from operations and comprise both discretionary and non-discretionary
accruals. Table 1.7 uses total accruals rather than discretionary accruals as the dependent
variable. The results extend the evidence obtained by the use of discretionary accruals. The
coefficients on “Non-founder Pledged Shares * Post ISS Shock” in Table 1.7 and Table 6
are almost equal in magnitude. This confirms that the decline in accounting for abnormal
discretionary accruals is not an outcome of their estimation methodology.
To recapitulate, the shock to share pledges reveals that share pledges encourage insiders
to inflate profits. The discretion of insiders is to be blamed for the entire inflation in reported
profits at these firms. However, founders hold a disproportionate influence over the corporate
boards and remained unaffected by the shock. As a result, there was no improvement in the
quality of earnings at the founder-controlled firms.
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1.5.1 Evidence of the underlying channel
The inability of the ISS shock to affect the founders raises an important question: Was the
shock to share pledges more effective at the well-governed firms? It may appear that poorly
governed firms would benefit more by improving their governance standards and hence would
be more receptive to the shock. However, these firms may be poorly governed because they
are not open to implementing strict internal governance policies. As a result, these firms may
not be as proactive as their well-governed counterparts in exploiting the shock to restrain
manipulation of earnings by their insiders. On the other hand, the well-governed firms may
be more receptive to accepting criticism and implementing corrective measures. To find an
answer, I evaluate the strength of the main results across the cross-section of firms.
The first test analyzes the role of blockholder ownership in influencing firm’s respon-
siveness to the shock. Blockholders are defined as the entities who won 5% or more of the
common stock of the firm. (Holderness, 2009) estimates that blockholders are present in
96% of the publicly listed in the U.S., and own an average 39% of the common stock in these
firms. The information on blockholders in the MSCI GMI Ratings dataset conforms with
these findings. Blockholders were the primary clients of ISS and were likely to pressurize
their investee firms to restrict the pledging activities of their insiders.
The analysis divides firms into two categories depending on whether the blockholder
ownership in the firm was above or below the median value. The results of the analysis
are presented in Table 8. The first three specifications analyze firms with high ownership
of blockholders while the following specifications study the rest of the firms. The evidence
form these regressions suggests that the main results of the table were specific to firms with
high ownership of blockholders. The coefficients on “Non-founder Pledged Shares * Post ISS
Shock” are economically large and statistically significant for firms with high ownership by
blockholders. Specification 3 controls for the industry fixed effects and year fixed effects and
finds that the abnormal increase in reported profits declined by 1.48% of firm’s assets after
the shock. In contrast, these coefficients are close to zero and statistically insignificant for
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firms with low ownership by blockholders.
The survey in Leuz and Wysocki (2008) explains the role of analyst coverage in dissem-
inating information about the firm and improving its standards of corporate governance.
Along the same lines, I explore whether analyst coverage plays a role in disciplining insiders
and mitigating earnings manipulation. The tests calculate analyst coverage as the total num-
ber of unique analysts issuing earnings forecasts for the firm, which is available in I/B/E/S
dataset. Firms are divided into the categories of low and high analyst following. The firms
in the lowest quartile of analyst following comprise the category of firms with low analyst
following. The rest of the firms constitute the category of high analyst following. The first
three specifications of Table 1.9 include firms with high analyst following and the rest study
firms with low analyst following. Specifications 3 and 6 use industry and year fixed effects.
The results show that the shock was effective only in firms with better analyst coverage.
Specification 3 shows that inflation of earnings that was associated with share pledges de-
clined by 0.92% of firm’s assets after the shock. On the contrary, the corresponding effect in
specification 6 was small and statistically insignificant.
Finally, I examine whether firms in intensely competitive industries were more open to
control the abnormal increase in earnings associated with share pledges by their insiders.
Giroud and Mueller (2010) among others proposes that insiders at the firms in less compet-
itive industries prefer a quiet life and hence these firms are inefficient and poorly governed.
I follow their paper to divide firms into the categories of high and low industry competi-
tiveness. Market share is calculated for each firm within its industry, where industries are
identified using their 4 digit SIC. Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is used as the measure
of competition in the industry and is calculated as the summation of squared market shares
of firms in the industry. Then, firms are divided into the two sections of highly competitive
industries and less competitive industries depending on whether the HHI for their industry is
lower or higher than the median value. The first three specifications in Table 1.10 correspond
to the industries with high competition and the rest to industries with low competition. The
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regressions specify that firms in highly competitive industries utilized the shock to discipline
their insiders, who had pledged shares, against escalating profits. Specification 3 shows that
the inflation in discretionary accruals that was associated with share pledges of the insiders
decreased by 0.86% of firm’s assets after the shock. On the other hand, there was no evidence
of a corresponding effect for the firms in industries with less competitive intensity.
Overall, the results of the cross-sectional analysis provide credible evidence to suggest
that market feedback improves governance in firms that are already well-governed. These
firms create mechanisms to discipline insiders and thus effectively control their bad behavior.
In contrast, poorly governed firms ignore the feedback provided by the market participants.
These firms prefer to maintain the status quo rather than implement policies that limit the
private benefits of their insiders.
1.6 CONCLUSION
This study makes an attempt to understand the role of incentives in shaping our financial
markets. Poorly designed incentive structures encourage insiders to make decisions that
benefit themselves but are costly to the firm. I use the share pledge activity of insiders as
an instrument to explore the role of incentives in influencing firm performance. Pledging
of shares alters their payoff function but, in general, does not affect their voting rights.
Moreover, even after pledging shares, insiders retain their ability to influence corporate
policy. It is not difficult to see that pledging of shares by insiders can create serious lapses
in corporate governance. The study utilizes ISS advisory against share pledges as a quasi-
natural experiment to examine changes in the behavior of firms and their insiders. The self-
serving behavior of insiders is quantified by estimating the abnormal increase in accounting
for accruals at their discretion. Unlike the relatively indirect channels, the discretion of
insiders in the accounting of accruals is a straightforward mechanism to identify a shift in
their incentives.
The results of my study support the assertion of SEC that pledging of shares distorts the
24
incentives of insiders and affects their performance and decision-making abilities. The tests
provide credible evidence to suggest that share pledges motivate insiders to inflate earnings.
After pledging their ownership in the firm, insiders use their discretion to inflate earnings by
0.82% of assets. This is a large abnormal increase in earnings, amounting to approximately
$80 mn or 15% of the total earnings of the firm. In addition, the cross-sectional analysis
of results draws attention to the limitations of self-governance in financial markets. After
the shock, the abnormal inflation in earnings disappeared at well-governed firms and firms
with high institutional ownership. There was no improvement in the quality of accounting
at firms that were poorly governed, founder controlled or had low institutional ownership;
although, these firms stood to benefit the most from an improvement in internal governance.
The paper highlights the role of share pledges in incentivizing insiders, thereby opening
interesting avenues for future research. Incentives determine the behavior of rational agents.
Therefore, it is plausible that share pledges would affect the performance of insiders through
multiple channels, be it risk-taking, lack of effort and monitoring, or stealing from the
firm. Even though important, these topics have not been explored to their full potential.
Furthermore, insiders are mandated to report margin calls on their share pledges to the SEC
in Form-4 filings. The pattern of margin calls or the lack thereof may present an interesting
backdrop to analyze the mechanism of share pledges in detail.
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1.7 FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 1.1: Share pledges for personal loans protect the wealth of insiders when firm’s
share price declines
The figure illustrates the mechanism behind the downside protection provided by share pledges.
Share pledges protect the value of borrower’s equity in the firm and ensure that it remains
above the proceeds from the loan. In addition, share pledges lower the rate at which controlling
shareholder loses her wealth when the share price of the firm declines. The illustration assumes
that, on day 0, the controlling shareholder obtains a loan of $100 by offering $200 of her shares
as collateral. The lender stipulates that the value of collateral should be 2 times the value of
outstanding loan throughout the tenure of the loan. The share price of the firm declines by
20% on each of the next 10 days and the insider does not provide for the shortfall in collateral.
Therefore, the lender sells a portion of pledged shares on each of these 10 days to maintain
the required amount of collateral. The solid line shows the wealth of the insider who pledged
her shares on day 0 while the dashed line depicts her wealth had she not pledged shares. The
lender manages to recover her dues by selling shares from the collateral and does not bear any losses.
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Figure 1.2: Relevance of the ISS shock to pledging of shares by insiders
The figure illustrates the effect of ISS shock on pledging behavior of insiders at S&P 1500 firms.
The insiders are separated into founders of firms and the rest. The vertical line marks the time of
shock. The graph denotes the fraction of insiders at S&P 1500 firms that pledged their shares in
the respective years.
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Table 1.1: Overview of the practice of pledging of shares by insiders
The following table shows the changes in prevalence of pledging of shares among the insiders
of S&P 1500 firms from the fiscal year 2006 to 2014. The last column represents the fraction
of S&P 1500 firms where insiders pledged their shares that year. The count of firms appears
significantly lower in the fiscal year 2006 when compared to the subsequent years. The disclosure
of share pledges became effective for listed firms with their fiscal years ending on December 15,
2006, or later. The fiscal year 2006 ended prior to December 15, 2006, for a significant proportion
of S&P 1500 firms. Since these firms were not required to disclose the share pledges by insiders for
the fiscal year 2006, they have been excluded from the dataset for that year.
Fiscal Year Count of Firms Firms with share pledges
Count of Firms Proportion (%)
2006 666 104 15.6
2007 987 170 17.2
2008 995 196 19.7
2009 1014 191 18.8
2010 1023 180 17.6
2011 1036 185 17.9
2012 1049 174 16.6
2013 1081 153 14.2
2014 1090 134 12.3
Cumulative 1108 357 32.22
28
Table 1.2: Prevalence of pledging of shares by insiders
The table illustrates the trend of pledging shares by the insiders of S&P 1500 firms during the fiscal
years 2006 to 2014. Panel A presents the details for the executives and Panel B for the directors.
The last four columns show the extent of pledging of shares by the insiders who pledged their
shares.
Panel A: Prevalence of pledging of shares by the executives
Fiscal Year Fraction of All Executives (%) Shares Pledged / Shares Owned (%)
Mean Median 75th %ile 90th %ile
2006 2.8 29.3 19.7 40.8 85.7
2007 2.8 29.6 24.5 42.3 68.2
2008 2.5 34.8 28.1 46.3 86.0
2009 2.6 34.7 29.8 51.4 75.5
2010 2.3 35.3 28.8 50.3 88.1
2011 2.5 30.9 22.8 48.0 68.4
2012 2.2 35.1 25.4 52.2 77.8
2013 2.0 29.4 22.0 44.2 64.9
2014 1.3 37.0 28.7 56.3 78.6
Cumulative 2.3 33.0 25.2 47.6 76.1
Panel B: Prevalence of pledging of shares by the directors
Fiscal Year Fraction of All Directors (%) Shares Pledged / Shares Owned (%)
Mean Median 75th %ile 90th %ile
2006 1.6 39.9 28.0 72.1 99.7
2007 2.3 37.2 27.9 58.5 92.3
2008 2.4 41.4 34.2 64.6 98.6
2009 2.3 37.8 30.0 57.6 89.4
2010 2.0 37.7 29.8 58.2 94.0
2011 2.1 37.1 26.6 61.1 86.3
2012 1.9 39.1 30.4 63.3 91.1
2013 1.5 35.2 26.0 54.9 80.2
2014 1.4 40.0 35.4 62.3 86.1
Cumulative 2.0 38.4 30.1 60.0 90.0
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Table 1.3: Descriptive statistics of firms with pledged shares and without
The table illustrates the descriptive statistics of the firms with pledged shares and those without
pledged shares. The data period corresponds to the fiscal years 2006 till 2014. The last column
presents the statistics for the subset of firms where shares were pledged by their founders. The
first and second rows mention the mean and the median values, respectively, for each variable.
Firms without Firms with Firms with Share
Share Pledges Share Pledges Pledges by Founders
Mean Mean Mean
(Median) (Median) (Median)
Assets ($ bn) 8.50 9.27 9.18
(1.79) (3.06) (3.78)
Equity (Equity to Assets) 0.80 0.71 0.72
(0.82) (0.73) (0.73)
Tangibility (Net PPE / Assets) 0.23 0.27 0.22
(0.17) (0.19) (0.11)
Profitability (EBITDA / Assets) 0.15 0.15 0.12
(0.14) (0.14) (0.11)
Market to Book Value of Assets 1.66 1.55 1.33
(1.34) (1.31) 1.14
Capital Investment (Capital Expenditure / Net PPEt-1) 0.27 0.25 0.25
(0.22) (0.20) (0.19)
Whether firm pays dividend 0.56 0.59 0.54
(1) (1) (1)
Whether Net Debt was issued during the previous year 0.34 0.42 0.38
(0) (0) (0)
Whether one or more directors have problematic history 0.19 0.23 0.12
(0) (0) (0)
Whether one or more directors failed minimum 0.05 0.05 0.04
attendance requirement (0) (0) (0)
Size of the board of directors 8.40 8.90 8.79
(8) (9) (9)
Proportion of outside directors on the board 0.75 0.70 0.66
(0.78) (0.71) (0.67)
Whether one or more founders are present on the board 0.13 0.21 1.00
(0) (0) (1)
Total shareholding of the insiders (Fraction of total 0.07 0.11 0.14
common stock of the firm) (0.03) (0.05) (0.09)
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Table 1.4: Variables that influence pledging of shares by insiders
The following table illustrates the importance of various characteristics of the firm and insiders in motivating
insiders to pledge their shares. The dependent variable indicates whether the insider has pledged her shares.
The coefficients of the explanatory variables represent the probability of pledging of shares by the insiders
that is associated with the variable and are expressed in percentages. Ownership of equity and options is
normalized with the total equity of the firm. Specification 7 employs firm fixed effects to account for the
persistent unobserved characteristics of firms along with year fixed effects. Specification 8 uses insider fixed
effects to absorb the unobserved traits of the individual insiders along with year fixed effects. t-statistics are
provided in the parenthesis. The statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels are represented by
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗, respectively.
.





CEO 1.79*** 1.70*** -1.03*** -0.48 -0.42 -0.30 0.69*
(4.71) (4.59) (-2.65) (-1.24) (-1.04) (-0.75) (1.66)
Executive other than CEO -0.04 -0.07 -1.08*** -0.57 0.06 0.16 1.16***
(-0.10) (-0.17) (-2.88) (-1.56) (0.17) (0.44) (2.59)
Outside Director -0.32 -0.35 -1.20*** -1.72*** -1.45*** -1.26*** -0.69
(-0.79) (-0.89) (-3.21) (-4.45) (-3.58) (-3.28) (-1.59)
Inside Director 2.66***
(8.16)
Inside Director other than Founder 1.97*** 0.39 -0.59* -0.43 -0.32 -0.38
(6.14) (1.29) (-1.89) (-1.33) (-1.05) (-0.98)
Founder Director 9.91*** 10.00*** 6.99*** 7.59*** 7.00*** 6.87**
(9.84) (6.66) (3.34) (3.59) (3.43) (1.99)
Ownership of Equity by Executive 0.64*** 0.59*** 0.51*** 0.55*** 0.95***
(6.66) (6.07) (5.06) (5.74) (5.08)
Ownership of Options by Executive 0.97*** 1.08*** 1.43*** 1.14*** -0.62
(2.90) (3.21) (3.76) (3.11) (-1.11)
Ownership of Equity by Founder -0.35*** -0.37*** -0.31*** -0.30*** -0.05
(-3.13) (-3.29) (-2.85) (-2.86) (-0.19)
Ownership of Options by Founder -0.53 -0.35 0.32 0.05 -2.28
(-0.37) (-0.24) (0.22) (0.04) (-1.19)
Ownership of Equity by Director other than Founder 0.48*** 0.43*** 0.49*** 0.50*** 0.17*
(6.78) (6.13) (6.77) (7.35) (1.66)
Ownership of Options by Director other than Founder 0.40 0.06 0.26 0.25 -0.62
(0.90) (0.13) (0.57) (0.56) (-1.09)
Tenure of Founder Director 0.14** 0.11 0.13* -0.24*
(2.03) (1.64) (1.91) (-1.67)
Tenure of Director other than Founder 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.07***
(10.79) (10.97) (11.59) (3.19)
Director with problematic history -0.75*** -0.70*** -0.27
(-3.40) (-3.30) (-0.65)
Member of a board committee 0.40*** 0.25** 0.15
(3.22) (2.08) (1.38)
Size of the Board of Directors 0.13*** -0.04 0.02
(2.72) (-1.20) (0.49)
Fraction of Outside Directors on the Board -1.00** 0.86** -0.34
(-2.26) (2.34) (-0.85)
log of Assets 0.20*** 0.46*** 0.09
(3.78) (3.06) (1.22)
Leverage (Debt / Assets) 2.63*** 0.73 0.92*
(6.29) (1.16) (1.88)
Profitability (EBITDA / Assets) 1.31 1.24 2.13**
(1.39) (1.23) (2.00)
Standard Deviation of Profitability 0.01 -0.15 -0.01
(0.12) (-1.58) (-0.18)
Market To Book Value of Assets 0.11* -0.02 0.03
(1.65) (-0.27) (0.37)
Capital Investment (Capital Expenditure / Net PPEt-1) 0.08 -0.29 -0.51
(0.22) (-0.99) (-1.62)
Firm pays dividend 0.20 0.30* -0.05
(1.57) (1.80) (-0.32)
Constant 1.07*** 1.10*** 1.90*** 1.40*** -2.22*** -3.64*** -0.80
(2.63) (2.78) (5.16) (3.83) (-3.51) (-2.97) (-1.06)
Fixed Effects None Ind-Year Ind-Year Ind-Year Ind-Year Ind-Year Firm, Year Insider, Year
Cluster Ind-Year Ind-Year Ind-Year Ind-Year Ind-Year Ind-Year Ind-Year Ind-Year
N 97,349 97,323 97,323 91,994 91,953 85,498 85,498 85,498
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.021 0.027 0.045 0.049 0.053 0.125 0.499
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Table 1.5: Relevance of the ISS shock to share pledge activity of insiders
The following table illustrates the effects of ISS shock on pledging behavior of the founders and
non-founder insiders after controlling for the relevant variables and fixed effects. The regression
uses data at the level of individual insiders. Specifications 1 to 3 analyze the change in pledging
behavior of all founders while specifications 4 to 6 include all non-founder insiders. Specifications
7 to 9 assess change in pledging behavior of all non-founder insiders in the firms with founders.
The dependent variable denotes whether the insider has pledged shares or not. The coefficients of
explanatory variables signify the probability of pledging of shares associated with the respective
variable and are expressed in percentages. The coefficients on the variable “Post ISS Shock”
represent the change in pledging of shares by the respective category of insiders after the shock.
Ownership of equity and options is normalized with the total equity of the firm. Specifications 2, 5
and 8 utilize firm fixed effects, while specifications 3, 6 and 9 employ insider fixed effects. Control
variables of ownership comprise Ownership of equity by executive, Ownership of equity by director,
Ownership of options by executive, and Ownership of options by director. Firm financials include
log of Assets, Leverage (Debt / Assets), Profitability (EBITDA / Assets), Standard Deviation of
Profitability, Market To Book Value of Assets, Capital Investments (Capital Expenditure / Net
PPEt-1), Issuance of net debt, Issuance of net equity and whether firm pays dividend on common
stock. Governance Indicators include Tenure of Director, whether Director has a problematic
history, whether director is the member of a board committee, size of the board of directors, and
proportion of outside directors on the board. t-statistics are provided in the parenthesis. The
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels are represented by ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗, respectively.
Founders Non-founders Non-founders in Firms
with Founders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Post ISS Shock 2.17 1.52 1.81 -0.42*** -0.77*** -0.35*** -0.51 -1.01*** -0.88**
(1.04) (0.75) (0.89) (-3.43) (-8.16) (-3.28) (-1.63) (-3.16) (-2.06)
Ownership of Equity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ownership of Options Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Financials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Governance Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects None Firm Insider None Firm Insider None Firm Insider
Cluster Ind-Year Ind-Year Ind-Year Ind-Year Ind-Year Ind-Year Ind-Year Ind-Year Ind-Year
N 1,388 1,388 1,388 84,123 84,123 84,123 10,852 10,852 10,852
Adjusted R2 0.135 0.682 0.720 0.039 0.113 0.472 0.027 0.082 0.422
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Table 1.6: The role of share pledges by insiders in encouraging earnings
management: Discretionary Accruals
The following table illustrates the main finding of the study. The table summarizes the effect of share pledges
by insiders on accounting for discretionary accruals by employing ISS shock in 2012 as a quasi-natural
experiment. The insiders are separated into founders of the firms and non-founder insiders. The dependent
variable represents discretionary accruals estimated using the cross-sectional version of the Modified Jones
Model. Discretionary accruals are normalized by the asset size of firms and expressed in percentages.
Accruals are estimated following the balance sheet method. The variables “Founder Pledged Shares *
Post ISS Shock” and “Non-founder Pledged Shares * Post ISS Shock” are the main variables of interest.
These are indicator variables that denote whether the non-founder insider or founder pledged their shares
after the shock. Control variables have been grouped together in the table for the ease of presentation.
Variables comprising equity and options ownership comprise Ownership of equity by executive, Ownership
of equity by director, Ownership of options by executive, and Ownership of options by director. Ownership
of equity and options is normalized with the total equity of the firm. Firm financials include log of
Assets, Leverage (Debt / Assets), Profitability (EBITDA / Assets), Standard Deviation of Profitability,
Market To Book Value of Assets, Capital Investments (Capital Expenditure / Net PPEt-1), Issuance of
net debt, Issuance of net equity and whether firm pays dividend on common stock. Governance Indicators
include Tenure of Director, whether Director has a problematic history, size of the board of directors,
and proportion of outside directors on the board. Specification 5 uses the strict framework of firm fixed
effects in place of industry fixed effects and finds similar results. t-statistics are provided in the parenthe-
sis. The statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels are represented by ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DA DA DA DA DA
Non-founder Pledged Shares * Post ISS Shock -0.81** -0.83** -0.80** -0.82** -0.72**
(-2.25) (-2.30) (-2.23) (-2.28) (-2.03)
Founder Pledged Shares * Post ISS Shock 1.42* 1.39 1.36 1.34 0.74
(1.68) (1.65) (1.61) (1.58) (0.82)
Ownership of Equity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ownership of Options Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Financials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Governance Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects None Year Ind Ind, Year Firm, Year
Cluster Ind-Year Ind-Year Ind-Year Ind-Year Ind-Year
N 5,522 5,522 5,522 5,522 5,522
Adjusted R2 0.039 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.140
33
Table 1.7: Further evidence on the role of share pledges by insiders in
encouraging earnings management: Total Accruals
The table provides further evidence on the effects of share pledges by insiders on accounting for total
accruals by employing ISS shock in 2012 as a quasi-natural experiment. The table uses total accruals
as the dependent variable without separating the discretionary component. Total accruals are estimated
as the excess of reported profits over cashflow from operations. The insiders are separated into founders
of the firms and the rest of the insiders. The variables “Non-founder Pledged Shares * Post ISS Shock”
and “Founder Pledged Shares * Post ISS Shock” are the main variables of interest. These are indicator
variables the denote whether the non-founder insider or founder pledged their shares after the shock.
Control variables have been grouped together in the table for the ease of presentation. Variables
comprising equity and options ownership comprise Ownership of equity by executive, Ownership of
equity by director, Ownership of options by executive, and Ownership of options by director. Ownership
of equity and options is normalized with the total equity of the firm. Firm financials include log of
Assets, Leverage (Debt / Assets), Profitability (EBITDA / Assets), Standard Deviation of Profitability,
Market To Book Value of Assets, Capital Investments (Capital Expenditure / Net PPEt-1), Issuance
of net debt, Issuance of net equity and whether firm pays dividend on common stock. Governance
Indicators include Tenure of Director, whether Director has a problematic history, size of the board of
directors, and proportion of outside directors on the board. t-statistics are provided in the parenthe-
sis. The statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels are represented by ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TA TA TA TA
Non-founder Pledged Shares * Post ISS Shock -0.75* -0.80** -0.80** -0.85**
(-1.87) (-2.01) (-2.18) (-2.34)
Founder Pledged Shares * Post ISS Shock 1.80* 1.71* 1.37 1.30
(1.73) (1.67) (1.44) (1.39)
Ownership of Equity Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ownership of Options Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Financials Yes Yes Yes Yes
Governance Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects None Year Ind Ind, Year
Cluster Ind-Year Ind-Year Ind-Year Ind-Year
N 6,685 6,685 6,685 6,685
Adjusted R2 0.031 0.031 0.154 0.175
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Table 1.8: Evidence of underlying channel: Institutional Ownership
The following table illustrates the role of blockholders in disciplining the firm against inflating reported prof-
its when their insiders pledged shares. The difference in coefficients on the variable “Non-founder Pledged
Shares * Post ISS Shock” in specifications 1 to 3 against specifications 4 to 6 summarizes the importance
of blockholder ownership. Specifications 1 to 3 pertain to firm-year observations where blockholders had
higher than the median level of ownership. While specifications 4 to 6 correspond to the observations
where blockholders had lower than the median ownership. Blockholders are the investors with greater than
5% ownership of the common stock of the firm. The dependent variable represents discretionary accruals
estimated using the balance sheet approach of the cross-sectional version of the Modified Jones Model.
Discretionary accruals are normalized by the asset size of firms and expressed in percentages. Ownership
of equity by executive, Ownership of equity by director, Ownership of options by executive, and Ownership
of options by director. Ownership of equity and options is normalized with the total equity of the firm.
Firm financials include log of Assets, Leverage (Debt / Assets), Profitability (EBITDA / Assets), Standard
Deviation of Profitability, Market To Book Value of Assets, Capital Investments (Capital Expenditure /
Net PPEt-1), Issuance of net debt, Issuance of net equity and whether firm pays dividend on common stock.
Governance Indicators include Tenure of Director, whether Director has a problematic history, size of the
board of directors, and proportion of outside directors on the board. t-statistics are provided in the parenthe-
sis. The statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels are represented by ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗, respectively.
High Ownership Low Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DA DA DA DA DA DA
Non-founder Pledged Shares * Post ISS Shock -1.43*** -1.47*** -1.48*** 0.05 0.05 0.06
(-2.73) (-2.80) (-2.82) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
Ownership of Equity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ownership of Options Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Financials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Governance Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects None Ind Ind, Year None Ind Ind, Year
Cluster Ind-Year Ind-Year Ind-Year Ind-Year Ind-Year Ind-Year
N 2,749 2,749 2,749 2,709 2,709 2,709
Adjusted R2 0.035 0.032 0.032 0.050 0.053 0.054
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Table 1.9: Evidence of underlying channel: Analyst Coverage
The following table illustrates the role of analyst coverage in disciplining the firm against inflating reported
profits when their insiders pledged shares. The difference in coefficients on the variable “Non-founder
Pledged Shares * Post ISS Shock” in specifications 1 to 3 against specifications 4 to 6 summarizes the
importance of analyst coverage. Specifications 1 to 3 pertain to firm-year observations where the firm
had analyst coverage and specifications 4 to 6 correspond to low analyst coverage. Low analyst coverage
implies the lowest quartile of the count of analysts tracking the firm and is derived from the I/B/E/S
database. The dependent variable represents discretionary accruals estimated using the balance sheet
approach of the cross-sectional version of the Modified Jones Model. Discretionary accruals are normalized
by the asset size of firms and expressed in percentages. Ownership of equity by executive, Ownership of
equity by director, Ownership of options by executive, and Ownership of options by director. Ownership
of equity and options is normalized with the total equity of the firm. Firm financials include log of
Assets, Leverage (Debt / Assets), Profitability (EBITDA / Assets), Standard Deviation of Profitability,
Market To Book Value of Assets, Capital Investments (Capital Expenditure / Net PPEt-1), Issuance
of net debt, Issuance of net equity and whether firm pays dividend on common stock. Governance
Indicators include Tenure of Director, whether Director has a problematic history, size of the board of
directors, and proportion of outside directors on the board. t-statistics are provided in the parenthe-
sis. The statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels are represented by ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗, respectively.
High Coverage Low Coverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DA DA DA DA DA DA
Non-founder Pledged Shares * Post ISS Shock -0.90** -0.90** -0.92** -0.54 -0.43 -0.41
(-2.43) (-2.39) (-2.42) (-0.54) (-0.45) (-0.43)
Ownership of Equity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ownership of Options Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Financials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Governance Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects None Ind Ind, Year None Ind Ind, Year
Cluster Ind-Year Ind-Year Ind-Year Ind-Year Ind-Year Ind-Year
N 4,286 4,286 4,286 1,099 1,099 1,099
Adjusted R2 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.045 0.042 0.039
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Table 1.10: Evidence of underlying channel: Industry Competitiveness
The following table illustrates the role of competition in the industry in disciplining the firm against
inflating reported profits when their insiders pledge shares. The difference in coefficients on the variable
“Non-founder Pledged Shares * Post ISS Shock” in specifications 1 to 3 against specifications 4 to
6 summarizes the importance of industry competitiveness. Specifications 1 to 3 pertain to firm-year
observations where firms belong to industries with high levels of competitiveness and specifications
4 to 6 correspond to industries with low levels of competitiveness. Industries with high competition
correspond to four-digit SIC with higher than the median value of Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).
The dependent variable represents discretionary accruals estimated using the balance sheet approach
of the cross-sectional version of the Modified Jones Model. Discretionary accruals are normalized by
the asset size of firms and expressed in percentages. Ownership of equity by executive, Ownership of
equity by director, Ownership of options by executive, and Ownership of options by director. Ownership
of equity and options is normalized with the total equity of the firm. Firm financials include log of
Assets, Leverage (Debt / Assets), Profitability (EBITDA / Assets), Standard Deviation of Profitability,
Market To Book Value of Assets, Capital Investments (Capital Expenditure / Net PPEt-1), Issuance
of net debt, Issuance of net equity and whether firm pays dividend on common stock. Governance
Indicators include Tenure of Director, whether Director has a problematic history, size of the board of
directors, and proportion of outside directors on the board. t-statistics are provided in the parenthe-
sis. The statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels are represented by ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗, respectively.
Highly Competitive Less Competitive
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DA DA DA DA DA DA
Non-founder Pledged Shares * Post ISS Shock -0.83** -0.82** -0.86** -0.44 -0.09 -0.01
(-2.19) (-2.12) (-2.22) (-0.51) (-0.11) (-0.02)
Ownership of Equity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ownership of Options Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Financials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Governance Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects None Ind Ind, Year None Ind Ind, Year
Cluster Ind-Year Ind-Year Ind-Year Ind-Year Ind-Year Ind-Year
N 4,454 4,454 4,454 1,068 1,068 1,068
Adjusted R2 0.039 0.039 0.038 0.056 0.078 0.079
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   CHAPTER 2: DOES PLEDGING OF SHARES
BY CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS ALWAYS
DESTROY FIRM VALUE?
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Shares of companies can be divided into two broad categories: “unencumbered”, the usual
shares that are free of liabilities; and “encumbered”, the shares that have some sort of liability
(for example, loans) attached to them. Encumbrance changes the payoff of shareholders
owning the composite security comprising the share and the attached liability, but rarely
changes their shareholding rights (Martin and Partnoy, 2005). As a result, the owners of
encumbered shares retain their ability to influence decisions of the firm, even though their
economic interests may be in conflict with that of the unencumbered shareholders. The
encumbrance of ownership by insiders, in particular, can lead to serious issues of corporate
governance. For example, the encumbered controlling shareholders can use their influence
on firms to force policies that benefit them at the expense of the other stakeholders. This
study examines the consequences of encumbrance of ownership by controlling shareholders
on the performance and valuation of firms.
Share pledges are the collateral of insiders’ equity in the firm and are used routinely to
secure loans. In 2012, Center for Financial Research and Analysis reported that the named
executives or directors have pledged shares for loans at approximately 16% of the companies
in the Russell 3000 index.6 Holderness (2009) estimates that 96% of the publicly listed firms
in the U.S. have blockholders, and these blockholders in aggregate own an average 39% of the
common stock. The proportion of the U.S. firms with share pledges would be significantly
6Center for Financial Research and Analysis was a sister concern of Institutional Shareholder Services
(ISS), the leading provider of corporate governance solutions to institutional investors in the U.S.
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higher than 16% if we could account for the share pledges by blockholders, which remain
undisclosed. In another working paper, Singh (2018), the author shows that directors and
named executive officers of 34% of S&P 1500 firms had pledged their shares atleast once
between 2007 and 2015. On average, pledged shares accounted for 38% of their ownership in
the firm. Moreover, the business of lending against share pledges is prevalent not only in the
U.S. but across countries. For instance, this study estimates that controlling shareholders
of approximately half of the publicly listed firms in India pledged their shares atleast once
between 2009 and 2014.
The impact of share pledges on firm value is under active research in academic law and
finance. Dou et al. (2019) analyze share pledges in Taiwan and conclude that share pledges
destroy firm value. Chan et al. (2018) suggest that firms in Taiwan repurchase shares to al-
leviate the margin call pressures on the pledged shares of controlling shareholders. Anderson
and Puleo (2015) randomly select 500 of S&P 1500 firms and find that share pledges increase
firm-specific risks. However, the emerging literature classifies all share pledges as collateral
for personal loans, which is inaccurate. Share pledges are used by controlling shareholders
either to offer collateral for their personal loans or to provide additional collateral for loans
availed by the firm. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that explores both
types of share pledges, thereby providing the complete picture.
Share pledges for personal loans monetize the equity of controlling shareholders without
diminishing their voting rights. These share pledges allow controlling shareholders to retain
the upside in the value of pledged shares while limiting their downside to the amount of
proceeds from the loan.7 Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) calls these pledges a sub-
stitute to the hedging strategies that lock-in gains on share prices for insiders.8 This effective
monetization of equity creates a wedge between the cashflow and control rights of control-
ling shareholders. The divergence between cashflow and control rights, in turn, misaligns
7For an illustration, see the example in Section 2.2 on page 10.
8To create awareness about the influence of share pledges for personal loans on the incentives of insiders,
ISS published the list of companies that prohibit hedging of shares by insiders but allowed them to pledge
shares.
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the incentives of controlling shareholders with those of the minority shareholders (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1997). As a result, share pledges for personal loans have been associated with
instances of serious corporate governance failures across the world. In 2006, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) commented that the share pledges for personal use by
Bernard Ebbers, who was the CEO of WorldCom, may have contributed to WorldCom’s
financial demise. Subsequently, SEC forced publicly listed firms to disclose in their proxy
statements the count of shares that were pledged by their directors and named executive
officers. Similarly, in 2011, the regulator in Taiwan restricted voting rights associated with
shares pledged by the insiders. Also, the regulator in India has enforced multiple disclosure
requirements from 2009 onward.
But, why do lenders to the firm take a collateral of controlling shareholders’ equity when
the dues on their debt are supposed to be paid before the claims on equity? The apparent
contradiction in lenders taking a collateral of equity gets resolved when we consider that
these share pledges can alleviate the problems associated with the limited pledgeability of
cashflows. If a firm defaults on these loans, then the lender not only initiates the recovery
process against the firm but also acquires the ownership of pledged shares. These lenders
may retain their ownership rights to influence the decision-making at the firm during the
bankruptcy resolution process. They may even choose to sell these shares and replace the
controlling shareholders. An expedient transfer of ownership rights upon default increases
the bargaining power of lenders against the controlling shareholders, thereby lowering their
expropriation. In 2013, the chairperson of the largest bank in India9 outlined the role of share
pledges for firm’s loans in strengthening creditor rights: “Everyone in the banking industry
agrees that should the management not perform, they have no right to be there and they
should be changed. At this point, it is very difficult to bring about a change in managements,
partly because earlier we did not take pledge of promoter shares.”10,11
9Arundhati Bhattacharya, the chairperson of State Bank of India, was ranked amongst the 50 greatest
world leaders by Fortune - World’s 50 Greatest Leaders 2017, Fortune Magazine, March 23, 2017
10Promoter implies controlling shareholder in India.
11War on non-performing assets to intensify, new SBI chief says - Times of India, October 09, 2013
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Share pledges for firm’s loans are common for small businesses in the US. These share
pledges have not been associated with notable cases of corporate misdemeanor and have
drawn less attention when compared to share pledges for personal loans. As a result, in
general, the regulators in the US or outside have not forced firms to identify these share
pledges separately. Not surprisingly, I am unaware of studies that examine the effects of share
pledges for firm’s loans on firm value and performance. In contrast, this paper separates the
two types of share pledges and evaluates their distinct effects on firms. The study finds
that, on an average, share pledges by controlling shareholders are detrimental to firm value.
However, while analyzing both types of share pledges separately, I discover that the two
types of share pledges have divergent effects on firms. Share pledges for personal loans can
increase expropriation by controlling shareholders and destroy firm value. On the contrary,
share pledges for firm’s loans can provide firms with better access to external finance and
improve their valuation. The precise effects of share pledges are determined by the type of
pledge and the intensity of pledging by controlling shareholders.
The study begins with the analysis of investor reaction to an unanticipated disclosure
of share pledges in India. On January 07, 2009, the stock price of one of the largest infor-
mation technology companies in India crashed by about 80% on the revelation of a large
corporate fraud involving share pledges for personal loans. On January 28, 2009, the reg-
ulator responded by issuing disclosure guidelines on share pledges of publicly listed firms.
These guidelines mandated disclosure of the existing share pledges by controlling sharehold-
ers within 14 working days. The stock price reaction from the news of fraud to two days
after the end of disclosure period suggests that, on average, share pledges destroy firm value.
Firms with share pledges lost 3.17% of market capitalization, after controlling for common
risk factors, when compared to the firms where controlling shareholders had not pledged their
shares. Further, the value destruction increased with the intensity of pledging by control-
ling shareholders. A 1% increase in the encumbrance (pledged/owned shares) of controlling
shareholder was associated with a 9 basis points loss in market capitalization of the firm.
41
Lastly, the investor reaction was moderated by high levels of ownership by controlling share-
holders. This result suggests that share pledges destroy firm value by reducing the effective
ownership of insiders.
The announcement returns to the new share pledge transactions verify that investors
were concerned about share pledges throughout the period of 2009 to 2014 and not only
during the initial disclosures. The disclosure guidelines, enforced on January 28, 2009, also
stipulated announcement of the new share pledge transactions within 14 working days on
an ongoing basis. Investors responded negatively to the creation of pledges for personal
loans if the controlling shareholders had already pledged a large fraction of their ownership.
In addition, they were particularly worried about the defaults on share pledges, with firms
losing 2.40% of market capitalization during the week following such disclosures.
The study utilizes a regulatory change in November 2011 in India to classify share pledges
into those for personal loans of controlling shareholders and for firm’s loans, respectively.
There were no major differences in the observable characteritics of firms where shares were
pledged for personal loans or firm’s loans. Infact, amongst the controlling shareholders who
pledged their shares for personal loans, about half of them had also pledged their shares
for loans to the firm atleast once during the period. On analyzing investor reaction to the
two types of share pledges separately, it is evident that share price movements contribute
to creation of share pledges for personal loans but not firm’s loans. I observe the share
prices of firms during the week prior to the execution of share pledge transactions to assess
whether changes in share prices generate share pledge transactions. On average, the creation
of pledges for personal loans follows a decline of 1.80% in share prices (relative to the market)
while the release of shares from existing pledges follows an increase of 0.55%. This implies
that, in case of share pledges for personal loans, new transactions are required to manage
the stipulated collateral value on existing pledges. In contrast, the creation and release of
share pledges for firm’s loans are not followed by significant changes in share prices. This
evidence validates that lenders to the firm do not use these share pledges to enforce margin
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calls on controlling shareholders but to discipline them against expropriation.
Further, the regression analysis of announcement returns of share pledge transactions
suggests that share pledges have contrasting effects on the incentives of controlling share-
holders. Share pledges for personal loans distort the incentives of controlling shareholders,
thereby destroying firm value. Firms lose 1.21% of their equity value if these share pledges
are created by controlling shareholders who do not own equity in other publicly listed firms.
This suggests that investors are particularly worried about these share pledges if controlling
shareholders lack financial resources that would be needed to meet margin call requirements.
In addition, firms lose 1.10% of market capitalization on creation of these share pledges if
controlling shareholders are members of a family. This indicates investor concern about poor
corporate governance practices at firms where decision-making is influenced by the interests
of a family. On the contrary, share pledges for firm’s loans may increase firm value. Investors
reward creation of these pledges if firms have been making large investments for capacity
expansion and operating at low levels of financial leverage. The announcement returns to
creation of these pledges were higher by 1.26% for firms with 1 standard deviation higher
growth in assets and 1.72% for firms with 1 standard deviation lower financial leverage. To
rephrase, share pledges for firm’s loans add value to firms that make large investments to
grow their business and do not compromise on financial prudence.
The alternate hypotheses, which ignore the incentives of the controlling shareholders, do
not provide a satisfactory explanation of the evidence presented in the study. The stock
price reaction to share pledge disclosures can not be explained by the investor concerns
regarding the possibility of margin calls. The defaults on share pledges for personal loans of
smaller than the median size comprise only 0.09% of firm’s equity and destroy 2.18% of firm’s
market capitalization. Even if the lender were to sell such a small amount of shares through
open market transactions, it is unlikely that the resultant increase in supply of shares would
lead to such an adverse price impact. The hypothesis that illiquidity of shares drives the
announcement returns to share pledge disclosures is also rejected by the data. Contrary to
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the predictions of this hypothesis, illiquidity of shares is associated with lower announcement
returns to defaults on share pledges for personal loans.
In addition, the hypothesis that share pledges merely signal the quality of controlling
shareholders or the unobservable corporate governance issues at the firm is incompatible
with the investor reaction. The study does not find a stock price reaction to creation of
share pledges for personal loans at low encumbrance of controlling shareholders. However,
the stock price reaction becomes economically and statistically significant at when control-
ling shareholders pledge large portions of their ownership in the firm. This suggests that
the intensity of pledging shares by controlling shareholders affects their incentives. Further-
more, I do not find evidence to suggest that controlling shareholders pledge shares to profit
from investor reaction using derivatives. Futures and options are available for only a small
subset of the listed firms in India. I analyze the information on the issuance of warrants to
controlling shareholders and find that these issuances appear to be unrelated to the pledging
activity of the controlling shareholders. Finally, the alternate hypotheses do not account
for the divergent effects of share pledges for firm’s loans and personal loans. Although both
these share pledges default during the bad periods for the firm, they have contrasting effects
on firm’s performance and valuation.
The study further explores whether the effects of share pledges are evident in firm per-
formance and finds that share pledges affect access to debt and capital expenditure of firms.
Share pledges for firm’s loans are associated with an increase in the supply of credit to firms.
A 1 standard deviation increase in encumbrance for firm’s loans is associated with an in-
crease in financial leverage corresponding to 6% of its average value. Moreover, amongst
the high growth firms, those with share pledges for firm’s loans invest 75% more on capital
expenditure. This finding is in agreement with the prior literature that documents a posi-
tive relationship between creditor rights and lending by banks (La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997; Bae and Goyal, 2009). On the other hand, share pledges for per-
sonal loans do not increase firm’s access to debt or capital expenditure. These result indicate
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that the threat of transfer of ownership rights from controlling shareholders to lenders may
enhance the sustainable debt capacity of firms and provide them with growth capital.
Finally, the study evaluates whether share pledges encourage controlling shareholders to
expropriate from the firm. The change in default risk that is not explained by the known
predictors of default is used as a proxy for the expropriation by controlling shareholders. The
tests find that share pledges for firm’s loans, after accounting for the conventional predictors
of default using the O-score model, do not influence default risk of the firm. On the other
hand, share pledges for personal loans almost double the default risk of the firm over the
subsequent year. Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002) show that a low ownership by
controlling shareholders increases their incentives to expropriate from the firm. Likewise, the
study finds that the relationship between default risk and share pledges for personal loans is
specific to the firms with low levels of ownership by controlling shareholders. These results
suggest that, unlike share pledges for firm’s loans, share pledges for personal loans create a
moral hazard for the controlling shareholders.
This paper contributes not only to the formative studies on share pledges but also to the
extensive literature that explores the role of controlling shareholders on firm performance.
This literature states that the separation between control and cashflow rights destroys firm
value (La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2002) and increases the risk of
bankruptcy (Bebchuk et al., 2000). This article shows that share pledges for personal loans
too create a diversion between control and cashflow rights, in turn, destroying firm value
and increasing the risk of bankruptcy.
In addition, the study adds to the literature on the resolution of bankruptcies and bargain-
ing between shareholders and the lenders. According to this literature, the inefficient process
of bankruptcy resolution imposes significant costs on the lenders (Altman, 1984; Bris, Welch,
and Zhu, 2006). Large shareholders can delay this process and use their ownership rights
to extract more than their fair share (Bebchuk and Chang, 1992). Therefore, the resolution
of bankruptcies can be made fairer and less costly by providing lenders with shareholding
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rights prior to reorganizing the firm (Aghion, Hart, and Moore, 1994; Bebchuk, 1988). In
fact, the transfer of control rights to lenders may obviate the need for filing for bankruptcy
and the subsequent loss to firm value. This paper adds that share pledges for firm’s loans
achieve the same objectives by making lenders the owners of pledged shares. Furthermore,
these share pledges may align the incentives of lenders and controlling shareholders, thereby
improving firm performance and valuation.
Studies in corporate governance face challenges in demonstrating that the relationship
flows from corporate governance to valuation of the firm and not in the reverse direction
(Love, 2010). I believe that this study is robust to these challenges. The study utilizes
the mandatory classification of controlling shareholders in India and thus avoids the use of
ownership levels to measure both cashflow and control rights. Bartlett and Partnoy (2018)
demonstrate the pitfalls of using estimates of Tobin‘s Q to measure change in firm valuation.
The study measures the effects of share pledges on firm value by observing the announcement
returns rather than the long-term changes in share price or proxies of Tobin’s Q. These
announcement returns grow stronger with an increase in the intensity of pledging, signifying
causal nature of the relationship. Furthermore, the divergent impact of share pledges for
firm’s loans and personal loans demonstrate that it is the incentives and not omitted variables
that are driving the results. Lastly, the study demonstrates that share pledges affect not
only the share price of firms but also their debt capacity, capital expenditure and bankruptcy
risk.
The use of data from India is motivated by the changes in Indian regulations that offer a
unique opportunity to understand the effects of share pledges. This hand-collected dataset
includes the dates of execution and disclosure of share pledge transactions – creation of share
pledges, release of shares from existing share pledges and defaults on existing share pledges.
The study also avails the benefit of clean identification of controlling shareholders that are
classified as “promoters” in India. The regulations define promoters as either entrepreneur
of the firm, or entities and their associates that can appoint the majority of directors on the
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board. In essence, promoters are entities that control the firm either directly or indirectly by
mechanisms like cross-holdings and ownership pyramids. Furthermore, the paper exploits
regulatory changes in India to identify the two types of share pledges. In contrast, the
upcoming literature on the topic classifies all share pledges as pledges for personal loans,
possibly due to lack of information about the use of their proceeds.
Although, one would expect that share pledges would create similar incentives for insiders
across countries; but, it is possible that they exert a stronger influence on firm performance
in India than in the U.S. The legal system in India does not allow class action lawsuits
and is less effective in deterring controlling shareholders against the acts of expropriation.
Therefore, share pledges for personal loans may lead to higher expropriation in firms in India
than in the U.S. In addition, unlike the consolidated framework of bankruptcy resolution in
the U.S., the Indian bankruptcy regime was fragmented during the period of study. The
overlapping legislations caused delays and increased the expropriation of lenders by the
controlling shareholders. As a result, the recovery rate on defaulted loans was an average
26%, which was less than half of that in the US.12 In the event of default on share pledges for
firm loans, whether in India or the US, the ownership of pledged shares can be expediently
transferred to lenders without their having to approach the courts of law. As a result, share
pledges for firm loans may be more effective in limiting the expropriation of lenders in India
than in the countries with stronger creditor rights.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 illustrates the hypotheses,
while Section 2.3 describes the dataset and construction of explanatory variables. Section 2.4
presents the empirical evidence and is followed by Section 2.5 that concludes the paper.
12In 2015, India had a score of 6 (0 = weak to 12 = strong) on the Strength Of Legal Rights Index
published by the World Bank. This index measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws
protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending.
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2.2 HYPOTHESIS
The article proposes that share pledges would affect the incentives of controlling shareholders
and impact firm value. Moreover, share pledges for firm loans and personal loans would have
distinct influences on the incentives of controlling shareholders. Controlling shareholders
effectively encash a part of their ownership in the firm by offering it as a collateral for personal
loans. This monetization of ownership increases with their encumbrance (pledged/owned
shares). Murphy (2002) states that insiders perceive the value of their compensation in
firm‘s equity and options at values that are substantially lower than their market value. This
finding implies that share pledges may offer insiders an attractive mechanism to monetize
their ownership in the firm.
The prevalence of portfolio insurance products contributed to the stock market crash in
October 1987. Similar to the portfolio insurance strategies, share pledges for personal loans
force the lender to sell shares when share prices decline. As a result, the prevalence of these
share pledges may lead to downward spirals in stock prices and threaten market stability
during severe downturns. I find that the exposure to market risk for firms with share pledges
is higher by approximately 12% than firms without share pledges.
The following example demonstrates how share pledges for personal loans protect the
downside risk to the wealth of the controlling shareholder. For the purpose of illustration,
consider a scenario where a controlling shareholder pledges 100$ of her shares in the firm for
a personal loan of 50$. The lender stipulates an asset cover (value of collateral / outstanding
loan amount) of 2 throughout the tenure of the loan. The next day the price of the share
declines by 20%, which reduces the value of collateral to 80$. But, the controlling shareholder
does not provide for the shortfall in collateral value either willfully or due to the lack of
resources. This forces the lender to sell some of the collateral to recover her dues and
maintain the required asset cover.13 The lender sells pledged shares worth 20$, lowering the
13For 1$ decline in the value of collateral, lender would sell [1/(asset cover - 1)]$ of collateral to re-balance
the pledge.
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value of collateral to 60$ and the outstanding loan amount to 30$. Now, what would happen
if share price declines further by x% the next day? The controlling shareholder would lose
0.6x$ of her personal wealth (0.6x$ = 60$*x%). Had she not pledged her shares, she would
have lost 0.8x$ (0.8x$ = 80$*x%).
Let us assume that share price declines by 20% on each of the next three days and the
controlling shareholder does not provide for the shortfall. The lender would sell some of
the pledged shares on each of the three days to maintain the asset cover. At the end of
the three days, the lender would be left with a collateral of 12.96$ securing an outstanding
loan amount of 6.48$. The wealth of controlling shareholder would be 56.48$ comprising
50$ of loan proceeds and 6.48$ of equity in the collateral held by the lender. This is higher
than 40.96$, the value of her shares had she not pledged them four days earlier (40.96$
= 100$*80%*80%*80%*80%). Infact, the pledging of shares would ensure that she would
retain 50$ of loan proceeds even if the share price declined to 0$. Figure 2.2 shows that these
pledges not only make personal wealth of controlling shareholders less sensitive to a decline
in firm’s share price but also ensure that controlling shareholders retain the loan proceeds
at the least.
Please note that the lender managed to recover her dues and did not incur losses. The
losses were distributed amongst the investors who bought shares from the lender. The lender
would lose only when the share price drops by more than 50% in an instant. In this unlikely
situation, the value of the collateral would fall below the outstanding loan amount and hence
the lender would fail to recover her dues even after selling the entire collateral. In such cases,
the lender may pursue the controlling shareholder to recover her losses if the loan contract
so allows.
What would have happened if rather than declining, the share price increased after the
pledge was created? In this scenario, controlling shareholder would receive the shares that
are in excess of the required collateral value. As a result, she would retain the entire upside
in the value of shares that she pledged. To summarize, share pledges for personal loans allow
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controlling shareholders to retain the upside in their ownership in the firm while moderating
the downside and restricting it to the proceeds of the loan.
The controlling shareholder could have sold an equivalent amount of her shares instead
of pledging them to generate the funds. However, a sale of shares would have forced her to
forfeit the control rights associated with these shares. In comparison, a pledge of shares for
personal loans provides her with the money while allowing her to retain the control rights.
As a result, these share pledges create a divide between the control and cashflow rights
of the controlling shareholder. This separation between control and cashflow rights may
shift the incentives of the controlling shareholder and adversely affect firm value. However,
as explained in the illustration, the subsequent wealth destruction is usually borne by the
minority shareholders and not the lenders, although these pledges are bipartite contracts
between the controlling shareholder and the lender.
By reducing the skin in the game for controlling shareholders, share pledges for personal
loans may motivate them to expropriate from the firm (Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan,
2002). Besides, controlling shareholders invest a large fraction of the funds raised by these
share pledges in their other businesses. Hence, these share pledges may also encourage them
to lower their efforts in monitoring the firm. Duchin et al. (2017) show that managers
respond to their incentives even if this may reduce firm value. Therefore, the study proposes
that share pledges for personal loans should decrease firm value and this value destruction
should increase with the rise in encumbrance of controlling shareholders.
In contrast to share pledges for personal loans, share pledges for firm loans provide
loans to the firm and not to the controlling shareholders. These pledges do not reduce the
effective stake of controlling shareholders and hence should not destroy firm value. In fact,
these pledges can discipline controlling shareholders against expropriation by expediting the
transfer of control rights to lenders. As a result, it is unlikely that the disclosure of share
pledges for firm loans would lead to an equally adverse stock price reaction. This brings us
to the first hypothesis.
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Hypothesis I: Share pledges for personal loans destroy firm value and hence their disclosure
would cause adverse stock price reaction. Moreover, this stock price reaction would increase
with the rise in encumbrance of controlling shareholders. On the other hand, the disclosure
of share pledges for firm loans is less likely to cause an adverse stock price reaction.
Large shareholders use mechanisms like delaying the resolution of bankruptcy and tun-
neling to expropriate the wealth of lenders post default by the firm. The previous litera-
ture (Aghion et al., 1994; Bebchuk, 1988) advocates modifications in Chapter 11 of the US
Bankruptcy Code to provide creditors with equity in the firm. This proposed restructuring
of capital structure would provide creditors with shareholding rights in accordance with the
seniority and amount of their outstanding claims. These shareholding rights are expected
to lower the expropriation of creditors and assist them in getting their fair share during the
resolution of bankruptcy. Accordingly, the study postulates that by transferring sharehold-
ing rights of controlling shareholders to lenders, share pledges for firm’s loans would increase
the bargaining power of lenders. In economies like India that lack an effective bankruptcy
resolution mechanism, share pledges for firm’s loans facilitate lenders in taking control of
the firm and replacing the management. As a result, these pledges may encourage lenders
to provide larger loans, which would reflect in an increase in the financial leverage of these
firms. The enhanced access to credit may also lead to higher capital expenditure by these
firms. On the other hand, share pledges for personal loans increase the supply of debt to
the controlling shareholder and not the firm. Therefore, these share pledges are unlikely to
increase the debt capacity or capital expenditure of firms. The relationship between access
to credit and share pledges is summarized in the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis II: Share pledges for firm’s loans should increase the supply of credit to firms
and their capital expenditure while share pledges for personal loans are unlikely to do so.
Claessens et al. (2002) observe that it is common for controlling shareholders to expro-
priate from the firm, even more so in countries with poor investor protection. I hypothesize
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that share pledges for personal loans would incentivize controlling shareholders to pay less
attention to monitoring and even expropriate from the firm. The stock price reaction to
news of misappropriation of funds destroys the wealth of controlling shareholders and de-
ters them from stealing from the firm. However, the option to default on share pledges for
personal loans protects controlling shareholders against large declines in share prices. This
reduces the effectiveness of investor reaction in punishing these controlling shareholders for
acts of expropriation and should reflect in higher incidences of bankruptcies. Therefore,
share pledges for personal loans should lead to an increase in the bankruptcy risk for firms
after controlling for the conventional predictors of default. In addition, the low levels of
ownership by controlling shareholders imply that they would internalize a smaller share of
value destruction at the firm. Hence, the increase in bankruptcy risk on account of the
share pledges for personal loans should be stronger for firms with low levels of ownership by
controlling shareholders.
It is unlikely that share pledges for firm loans would increase expropriation by controlling
shareholders. However, it may be argued that controlling shareholders can pledge their shares
to increase the supply of debt to the firm and subsequently siphon off these funds. Therefore,
the study does not have a strong prediction about the effect of share pledges for firm’s loans
on the probability of default. The last hypothesis proposes a relationship between share
pledges and bankruptcy risk of the firm.
Hypothesis III: The firms where controlling shareholders have pledged a large portion of
their ownership to raise personal loans would face a significantly higher probability of default.
In comparison, share pledges for firm’s loans would have a less pronounced effect on the
default probability.
To recapitulate, the study postulates that share pledges for personal loans reduce the
effective ownership of controlling shareholders. Therefore, these pledges would create incen-
tives for controlling shareholders to maximize their wealth at the cost of other stakeholders.
In contrast, share pledges for firm’s loans do not reduce the stake of controlling shareholders
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and may even increase the value of firms and provide them with valuable external finance.
2.3 DATA AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION
Data sources and sample selection
The consideration set for this study comprises firms listed on National Stock Exchange
(NSE) from 2009 to 2015.14 During the initial disclosure period of January – February 2009,
1161 firms were trading on NSE. The dataset excludes the firms with less than $10 mn market
capitalization during the first week of January 2009, which was the week preceding the start
of study. This filter omits 17% of the firms from the initial consideration set. Further,
the firms that traded at a price less than INR1510 during the first week of January are
dropped, which trims 6% of firms in the dataset. The government of India does not pledge
its ownership in firms. So, the firms controlled by the government and the subsidiaries of
these firms are excluded, leading to further reduction of 6% of firms in the dataset. Next,
financial firms and the five firms that did not have a Promoter are discarded, which leaves
the dataset with 692 firms at the beginning of the study. Firms that were listed on NSE at
a later date and met the selection criteria are included in the study, increasing the dataset
to comprise 967 firms by 2015.
I hand-collect share pledge disclosures along with their time stamps from the websites
of stock exchanges for the initial disclosures between January and February 2009. Most of
the firms in the dataset are listed on both Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and NSE. So,
the share pledge disclosures are collected from both BSE and NSE websites and the earlier
disclosure is selected by comparing both the time stamps. Then, the repeat announcements
and the other discrepancies in disclosures are diligently cleaned from the data. Capitaline
is the primary database used by lenders and equity investors in India. The study uses
this database to identify the approximate dates of disclosure of share pledge transactions
14The study excludes firms that are listed on Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) but not on NSE since most
of these firms are small and thinly traded.
15Indian Rupee
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after March 2009. After identifying the approximate dates of disclosure, I located the exact
announcement releases on the stock exchange websites and downloaded them. Lastly, I read
these announcements carefully to collect the relevant information.
Prowessdx database of Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy, the standard database
used in academic studies in India, is used for accounting, ownership and share price data of
firms. The accounting data corresponds to standalone firms and the accounting ratios are
winsorized at their 2.50 and 97.50 percentile values. The key variables used in the study
are defined in the Appendix. Capitaline and Prowessdx databases do not have a common
identifier, so firms are matched by their names across the two databases. Firms are classified
into their respective industries on the basis the National Industrial Classification Code 2008
(NIC-2008) available in Prowessdx. NIC-2008 is the latest industrial classification published
by the Central Statistical Organization, which is responsible for coordination of statistical
activities in India.
The analyst coverage of firms in India is measured using the IBES database. The count of
analysts with EPS targets for the firm over next year is employed as the measure of analyst
coverage. From 2009 to 2015, about half of the firms had one or more analysts covering them
and the median was coverage by three analysts. The abnormal stock returns are calculated
using the Fama-French and momentum factors for Indian markets that are published on the
website of Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad.
Construction of explanatory variables
The paper uses two explanatory variables throughout the empirical analysis – “Firm with
Pledged Shares” and “Encumbrance”. Firm with Pledged Shares is the indicator variable
that takes the value of 1 for firms where controlling shareholders have pledged their ownership
and 0 otherwise. Encumbrance is the ratio of shares that have been pledged by the controlling
shareholder to the shares owned by her and measures her intensity of pledging. This variable
demonstrates the impact of the shift in incentives of the controlling shareholders. These
explanatory variables are created separately for the two types of share pledges. To mitigate
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the concerns of endogeneity, the study controls for the important characteristics that differ
significantly across firms with pledged shares and those without.
Descriptive statistics
In an unexpected series of events, on January 28, 2009, the regulator forced the publicly
listed firms to disclose the total number of shares pledged by their controlling shareholders.
The disclosures revealed that controlling shareholders of about one-third of the firms (232
firms out of the total of 67316) had pledged their ownership. These controlling shareholders
had pledged an average 31.89% of their ownership and the median value was 25.56%. The
study utilizes these disclosures to compare the characteristics of firms with pledged shares
to those without.
Table 2.1 provides the detailed descriptive statistics for firms immediately before the dis-
closure of share pledges. During the week preceding the disclosures, firms with share pledges
traded at valuations (Tobin’s Q) that were comparable to that of the firms without share
pledges. Also, there were no noticeable differences in the age profile, industry concentration,
credit ratings, cost of debt or operating margins of these firms. The differences were signif-
icant in terms of size, financial leverage, payout ratio and ownership structure. Firms with
share pledges were growing at a faster pace and had a lower dividend yield. Further, they
were larger, more likely to be affiliated with business groups and maintained higher financial
leverage including better access to the commercial paper market. Lastly, these firms had
higher institutional ownership and lower ownership by the controlling shareholders.
The regulations published on January 28, 2009, also mandated publicly listed firms to
disclose the details of new share pledge transactions on an ongoing basis within 14 working
days of their execution.17 Share pledge transactions comprise creation of share pledges
(creation), release of shares from existing pledges (release) and transfer of ownership of
16The stocks exchanges disclosed share pledges for 19 firms later than two days after the end of the
disclosure window and hence these firms are excluded them from the current exercise.
17To be accurate, the regulator mandated disclosure of creations and defaults on January 28, 2009, while
the disclosure of releases was enforced at a later date. However, firms started reporting releases on a voluntary
basis from January 28, 2009.
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pledged shares to the lender subsequent to default (default). The disclosures reveal that
out of 967 firms in the dataset, controlling shareholders of 475 firms (amounting to 49.12%
of firms in the dataset) had pledged their shares at least once till 2014, and their average
encumbrance was 35.75% (median: 26.78%). Share pledge transactions were frequent in firms
with pledged shares, with roughly three pledge creations and two pledge releases each year.
On average, creation of a share pledge comprised 2.79% of firm’s equity while release and
default transactions involved 2.24% and 1.31%, respectively. Table 2.3 provides an overview
of the dataset comprising 4589 creation, 3485 release and 667 default disclosures from April
2009 to December 2014. The disclosures are identified as transactions for personal loans and
firm’s loans from January 2012 till December 2014. The transactions for share pledges for
firm’s loans were roughly twice the size of those for personal loans.
It has been a longstanding practice for controlling shareholders to pledge their shares for
both personal loans and loans to the firm. Amongst the firms that reported share pledges
during the period, 90% had made disclosures about share pledges for personal loans and
53% about share pledges for firm’s loans. Table 2.4 provides the descriptive statistics for
firms where controlling shareholders never pledged shares, pledged shares for personal loans
and for firm’s loans, respectively. When compared to the firms where shares were never
pledged, firms with share pledges were larger, grew their revenues faster, paid less dividends
and operated at higher financial leverage. These firms reported similar ebitda margins but
lower net profitability. There were no perceptible differences across firms where shares were
pledged for personal loans or firm’s loans. Infact, the disclosures show that it was common
for firms to have both types of share pledges during this period. Approximately 50% of
firms that disclosed share pledges for personal loans had also reported the existence of share
pledges for firm’s loans. The following subsection explains how the share pledges are classified
into pledges for personal loans and for firm’s loans, respectively.
Identification of the nature of share pledges
As mentioned earlier, the pledge of shares can be offered by controlling shareholders
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either to avail personal loans or to provide collateral for loans availed by the firm. A change
in regulations in November 2011 is utilized to identify whether the subsequent share pledge
transactions were for personal loans or loans to the firm. This regulation mandated listed
firms to disclose the names of lenders to the new share pledge transactions. In India, banks
are not permitted to lend against share pledges for personal loans. If a bank accepts a
pledge of controlling shareholder’s shares, then the loan has to be given to the firm. The
share pledges serve as additional collateral for the loan. Hence, the share pledge transactions
where a bank was mentioned as the lender are classified as transactions for firm’s loans. On
the other hand, the non-bank financial companies can lend against share pledges for both
personal loans and loans to the firm. However, these lenders focus on retail loans and have
negligible presence in lending to firms.18 So, the share pledge transactions where the lender
was a non-bank entity are classified as transactions for personal loans. It is possible that a
few of the share pledges accepted by non-bank financial companies are for the purpose of
firm’s loans and not personal loans to the controlling shareholder. This may bias the study
against finding divergent results across the two types of share pledges.
Unlike the share pledge transactions, the total quantum of share pledges of a controlling
shareholder can not be separated directly into pledges for personal loans and firm’s loans.
The regulations require controlling shareholders to disclose their total quantum of share
pledges at the end of each quarter. But, controlling shareholders are not obliged to report
separately the share pledges for personal loans and firm’s loans. Moreover, the type of
share pledge transactions remains undisclosed if they were created prior to November 2011.
Therefore, the study can not use the cumulative disclosures of share pledge transactions
18In India, deposits are the low-cost source of funds for lenders. The government provides deposit in-
surance to banks but not to non-bank lenders. This has forced non-bank lenders to depend on wholesale
finance and operate at a substantially higher cost of funds when compared to banks. The non-bank lenders
find it difficult to compete with banks in funding corporate loans and hence focus on financing high-yield
retail loans. Moreover, during the period of study, banks had access to superior recovery provisions under
Sarfaesi Act. In the event of default, banks were allowed to take possession of the secured assets, liquidate
these assets, take over the firm and change the management. The non-bank lenders did not have a recourse
to Sarfaesi Act and avoided lending to firms. They preferred lending against share pledges for personal loans
where collateral could be promptly liquidated upon default.
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to arrive at the total quantum of share pledges for firm’s loans and personal loans. This
creates difficulty in distinguishing between the effects of the two types of share pledges on
firm performance. However, the information provided by the disclosures of share pledge
transactions after November 2011 is utilized to work around this issue.
The study uses disclosures of share pledge transactions to create three categories of firms
beginning December 2011: firms where shares were never pledged, firms where shares were
pledged for personal loans only and firms where shares were pledged for firm loans only. If
all share pledge transactions of the firm after December 2011 were for personal loans, then
the firm is classified as one with share pledges for personal loans only. Similarly, if all the
transactions were for firm loans then the firm is identified as one with share pledges for
firm loans only. Lastly, firms that never disclosed any share pledge transactions are called
firms where shares were never pledged. This analysis excludes the firms where controlling
shareholders pledged their ownership for both firm loans and personal loans. This strategy
identifies 492 firms where shares were never pledged, 144 firms where shares were pledged
for personal loans only and 31 firms where shares were pledged for firm loans only.
2.4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
2.4.1 The effects of share pledges on firm value
The main hypothesis of the study proposes that share pledges affect firm value by influencing
incentives of controlling shareholders. Moreover, the incentives associated with share pledges
for personal loans and firm’s loans would be different and at times in conflict with each other.
The study evaluates the effects of share pledges on firm value by observing stock price reaction
to the disclosure of share pledges both old and new. The analysis starts with an event in
which publicly listed firms were unexpectedly forced to disclose the quantum of ownership
that was pledged by their controlling shareholders.
On January 7, 2009, the founder and chairperson of Satyam Computer Services, one of
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the largest and most awarded information technology firms in India, wrote a confession letter
to the stock market regulator. He pleaded guilty to falsifying the accounts and admitted that
the approximately $1.2 bn cash with the firm was a fabrication. He and his wife had pledged
most of their ownership in the firm to raise personal loans. The accused claimed that the
falsification was done to hide the true financial position of the firm so that he could avoid
margin calls on these loans and retain his control over the firm. The share price of Satyam fell
by about 80% and the stock market index declined by approximately 6% by the end of day.
On January 28, 2009, the stock market regulator responded by issuing disclosure guidelines
on share pledges that were applicable to all publicly listed firms. These firms were mandated
to disclose the total quantum of ownership pledged by their controlling shareholders within
14 working days. The event period is defined as the duration between the news of fraud at
Satyam to two days after the end of the disclosure period.
The change in share prices during the event reveals that firms were punished if their con-
trolling shareholders had pledged their ownership in the firm. Furthermore, the stock price
reaction increased with the fraction of ownership that was pledged by controlling share-
holders. Figure 2.1 depicts stock price reaction, while Table 2.2 analyzes the reaction using
regressions on cumulative abnormal returns adjusted for the Fama-French and momentum
factors. Specification (1) shows that firms with pledged shares earned a cumulative abnormal
return of -3.17% from the news of fraud at Satyam till two days after the end of the disclosure
period. According to specification (2), the firms where encumbrance was higher than the
median attracted cumulative abnormal return of -5.62%. On average, a 1% encumbrance
by controlling shareholders was associated with a 9 basis points loss in market capitaliza-
tion during the event. Specification (4) indicates that the investor reaction to pledging of
shares was mitigated by controlling shareholder’s ownership in the firm. That is, investors
were worried that controlling shareholders were using share pledges to reduce their effective
ownership in the firm. Specification (5) uses unadjusted stock returns and reports similar
results after controlling for the characteristics that differ across the firms with pledged shares
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and those without. The investor reaction to disclosure of share pledges indicates that these
pledges lower the effective ownership of controlling shareholders and destroy firm value.
One may question whether share pledges only play the role of signaling the underlying
corporate governance problems at firms. But, this appears unlikely. The study discovers that
share price of the firm reacts when the controlling shareholder pledges more of her shares.
This evidence demonstrates that share pledges do not reflect the permanent attributes of
firms or their controlling shareholders. Moreover, the descriptive statistics in Table 2.1 show
that the firms where shares were pledged by controlling shareholders do not significantly
differ with the rest of the firms. This similarity in observable characteristics suggests that
we may need a better understanding of the thought process of controlling shareholders to
explain why some of them pledge their shares while others do not. Such a study can lead to
valuable insights but is outside the scope of the present article. For those who would like to
explore this further, a related work of the author (Singh, 2018) studies S&P 1500 firms and
identifies the insiders who are most inclined to pledge their shares.
The analysis of announcement returns to share pledge transactions post the initial disclo-
sures shows that investors have been concerned about share pledges throughout the period
of 2009 to 2014 and not only during the initial disclosure period in January – February 2009.
The disclosure guidelines of January 28, 2009, forced the publicly listed firms to also disclose
the new share pledge transactions on an ongoing basis. The study takes advantage of this
regulation to observe announcement returns to the new share pledge transactions. Table 2.5
shows that investors react negatively to the creation of pledges by the highly encumbered
controlling shareholders (18 cents of market value lost on each dollar of share pledged by
high encumbrance controlling shareholders), but do not react positively to the reduction in
pledges. The stock price reaction to the defaults is particularly intense, resulting in a loss of
about two dollars of market value on each dollar of shares taken over by the lender.
Thereafter, the study examines whether large changes in share prices lead to share pledge
transactions. The process of disclosure of share pledge transactions comprises sequential
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steps of controlling shareholders informing the firms about share pledge transactions, these
firms passing on the information to stock exchanges and the stock exchanges disclosing it
on their websites. As a result, these disclosures usually take place a few days after the
transactions. In November 2011, the regulator ordered publicly listed firms to reveal the
dates when the new transactions were being executed. The study uses these disclosures to
observe the stock returns during the week prior to the execution of share pledge transactions.
The share price changes during the week before execution of share pledge transactions
indicate that large changes in share price contribute to these transactions. Table 2.5 suggests
that these transactions are needed to maintain the stipulated collateral on existing share
pledges. The release of shares from existing pledges follows an of increase of 0.55% in share
prices of the firm during the preceding week. While, the creations and defaults follow a
decline of 1.65% and 4.77%, respectively. An increase in share price would raise the value
of pledged shares beyond the required value of collateral and lead to the release of surplus
collateral of pledged shares. Similarly, a decline in share prices would lower the value of
pledged shares below the required value of collateral and lead to either an addition of shares
to the pledge (creation of share pledge) or a default on the pledge. The investor reaction to
disclosures of creations and defaults on share pledges lead to a further decline in share prices
and increase the probability of follow-up transactions.
In addition, there is strong evidence to suggest that the relationship between share price
movements and share pledge transactions varies according to the nature of share pledges.
Table 2.6 summarizes this evidence. During the week prior to the release of shares from ex-
isting pledges for personal loans, share prices of firms increase by an average 0.55% relative
the market. In contrast, the creations and defaults on share pledges for personal loans are
preceded by declines in share prices of 1.80% and 4.91%, respectively. These sharp declines
in share prices indicate that margin calls on the existing share pledges for personal loans
contribute to defaults and creations of additional share pledges. Moreover, the disclosure
of these transactions, particularly by highly encumbered controlling shareholders, attracts
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investor reaction and further lowers the share prices. Firms with highly encumbered con-
trolling shareholders lose an average 0.60% of their market capitalization when they disclose
creations of share pledge for personal loans. In contrast, transactions for share pledges for
firm’s loans do not seem to be caused by margin calls. Furthermore, the price reaction to
the creation of these pledges is statistically insignificant. This evidence implies that the risk
of margin calls and follow-up transactions are concentrated in the firms where controlling
shareholders have pledged a large fraction of their ownership for personal use.
Next, the study analyzes the characteristics that interact with share pledges by sorting
disclosure returns according to the characteristics of the firms and their controlling share-
holders. Panel A of Table 2.7 provides the univariate sorts of the announcement returns.
Investor reaction appears to be particularly adverse to the creation of share pledges for
personal loans if the firm is family controlled or a standalone entity rather than part of a
business group. On the other hand, the creation of pledges for firm’s loans seems to be
rewarded substantially if the firm maintains low levels of financial leverage. Both types of
share pledges are at higher risk of default if the firms have high financial leverage or low
market to book. However, if these characteristics are highly correlated, then they would not
add new information. The Panels B and C of Table 2.7 show that the correlations are at
moderate levels.
The study further appraises the characteristics that appear to interact with share pledges
by employing regressions on announcement returns with industry-quarter fixed effects. The
results for share pledge transactions for firm’s loans are presented in Table 2.8. Specifications
(1) to (6) assess whether announcement returns to creation of these pledges vary across firms
with different characteristics. Specification (7) employs all of these characteristics together as
explanatory variables. The results in specification (7) show that investors react positively to
the creation of pledges for firm’s loans if the firm was growing at a fast pace or operating with
low financial leverage. One standard deviation higher growth in assets was associated with
disclosure returns of 1.26%, while one standard deviation lower financial leverage attracted
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announcement returns of 1.72%. This shows that investors meaningfully reward the creation
of share pledges if the loan proceeds are likely to be used to support growth in business and
the firm is not excessively indebted. Specification (8) does not find announcement returns
to release of these share pledges across firms with different characteristics.
Table 2.9 identifies the characteristics that interact with share pledges for personal loans.
Specifications (1) and (2) suggest that investors react strongly against the creation of these
pledges by family controlled firms (-1.42% of market capitalization) and firms that are not
associated with business groups (-1.78% of market capitalization). Specifications (3) to (6)
suggest moderate reaction against creation of these pledges at firms with high growth, high
financial leverage, low market to book and low operating profitability. A 1 standard devia-
tion change in these variables affects announcement returns by 0.20% to 0.60%. Specification
(7) uses Amihud Illiquidity Ratio to measure the illiquidity of shares and rejects the hypoth-
esis that lack of liquidity drives the announcement returns to share pledge transactions for
personal loans. Specification (8) uses all these characteristics as explanatory variables and
finds that investor reaction to creation of these pledges was focused on family controlled
firms (-1.10% of market capitalization) and standalone firms (-1.21% of market capitaliza-
tion). These results indicate that when share pledges are created for personal use, stock
markets are apprehensive about the background of controlling shareholders. Investors seem
to be particularly worried about the issues of accountability in family controlled firms. The
reaction against firms that are not associated with business groups suggests that investors
are concerned about the lower reputation of these firms and the lack of wealth of controlling
shareholders outside the firm that would be needed to avoid margin calls. Specification (9)
does not find announcement returns to release of these pledges across any of the character-
istics. Specification (10) analyzes investor reaction to the defaults on these share pledges.
These defaults were punished severely for high growth firms and family controlled firms.
The family controlled firms lost 2.55% of market capitalization while firms with 1 standard
deviation higher growth in assets lost 2.63% of market capitalization post announcement of a
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default. It is worth noting that firms with illiquid shares suffered less adverse announcement
returns to defaults when compared to firms with liquid shares. This evidence suggests that
illiquidity of shares mitigates the announcement returns to defaults rather than inflate it.
The study briefly examines whether controlling shareholders pledge their shares for per-
sonal loans primarily to purchase additional shares of the company and if it is followed by
an increase in the share price of the firm. The available data suggests otherwise. In such
pledge+buy cases, controlling shareholders seem to use a small fraction of about 20% of the
proceeds from the pledge of shares to purchase more shares in the company. The rest of the
loan proceeds are utilized for other personal purposes. This implies that these transactions
reduce the skin in the game for controlling shareholders rather than increase it. Not surpris-
ingly, the share price changes following these transactions are similar to that for the average
share pledge for personal loans.
Alternate explanations
An alternate hypothesis is that share pledges do not destroy firm value by influencing
incentives of controlling shareholders but by increasing floating stock of the company. The
defaults on loans secured by a pledge of shares may lead to the sale of these previously
untraded shares by the lender and increase the floating stock of the firm. This appears to
be an unlikely explanation since the average default involves only 1.25% of firm’s equity and
leads to 2.40% decline in market capitalization during the week after the disclosure. This
hypothesis is explored further through an analysis of the stock market reaction to defaults of
smaller than the median size. On average, these defaults involve 0.09% of firm’s shares and
can only marginally increase the floating stock; still, they lead to a destruction of 2.18% of
market capitalization during the week after the disclosure. Moreover, the increase in floating
stock should lead to smaller value destruction for firms with highly liquid shares. On the
contrary, upon disclosure of defaults on share pledges for personal loans, firms with highly
liquid shares undergo larger value destruction. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the threat
of an increase in floating stock after defaults is driving the investor reaction to share pledge
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transactions.
In addition, the study finds evidence that does not support the hypothesis that share
pledges merely signal the quality of controlling shareholders or their predetermined intentions
to expropriate from the firm. The study identifies 144 initiations of pledges, the transactions
where controlling shareholder pledges shares for the first time, and examines the stock price
reaction to their announcements. If the reactions to creation of pledges were restricted
to the initiations, then it would imply that share pledges signal the quality of controlling
shareholders. The announcement returns to these transactions were positive (0.40%) and
statistically insignificant, which indicates that share pledges are not a signal of the quality of
controlling shareholders. The initiation of a pledge implies that the controlling shareholder
had no prior encumbrance. Hence, the lack of investor reaction to initiation transactions
is in agreement with the observation that stock markets do not punish creation of share
pledges at extremely low levels of encumbrance. On the other hand, there is strong evidence
suggesting that the effects of share pledges grow stronger with an increase in encumbrance.
This result suggests that share pledges drive incentives of controlling shareholders and not
merely reveal them.
Finally, it is difficult to devise plausible alternate hypotheses that illustrate contrasting
effects of the two types of share pledges on firm performance and value. The investor
reaction varies qualitatively across share pledges for firm loans and share pledges for personal
loans, although these share pledges are not specific to firms with distinct sets of financial
characteristics or controlling shareholders. In addition, the following tests show that the two
types of share pledges have divergent effects on the fundamental drivers of firm value, like
availability of credit and expropriation from the firm.
2.4.2 The effects of share pledges on access to credit and capital expenditure
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) provide a theoretical framework to demonstrate that lenders would
respond to poor enforcement of contracts by rationing credit to borrowers. Through their
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empirical work, La Porta et al. (1997) show that poor investor protection lowers access
to external finance across 49 countries. The relationship between improvement in creditor
rights and increased lending by banks in these countries has also been documented by Bae
and Goyal (2009). Likewise, hypothesis II states that share pledges for firm’s loans improve
the enforceability of debt contract and hence should increase the availability of credit for the
firm. Furthermore, share pledges for personal loans provide funds to controlling shareholders
and hence are unlikely to improve firm’s access to debt.
The results of regressions analyzing the relationship between share pledges and access
to credit are documented in Table 2.10. The financial leverage is measured by the ratio of
debt to assets of the firm for a given year. From the year 2009 to 2015, the average value
of financial leverage was 28% for firms in the dataset. Specification (1) of the table shows
that an increase of 1% in encumbrance is associated with an increase of 6.8 basis points in
financial leverage of the firm, after controlling for the financial leverage for the previous year.
The use of control variables in specification (2) moderates the effect on financial leverage
to an increase of 2.8 basis points. Specification (3) explores within industry-year variation
and finds a similar effect of 3.1 basis points. This implies that a firm with average level
of encumbrance has 1.3% higher financial leverage, which corresponds to 4% of the average
value of financial leverage. To rephrase, on account of share pledges, the debt capacity of
the firm increases by 4% at the average level of encumbrance . The use of firm fixed effects
alongwith year fixed effects in specification (4) finds stronger results corresponding to an
increase of 4.8 basis points for a 1% rise in encumbrance. This amounts to 6% higher access
to credit for firm with average level of encumbrance. Firms in India rarely witness a change
in their controlling shareholders and hence the firm fixed effects can also be interpreted
as controlling shareholders fixed effects. The results of firm fixed effects suggest that the
impact of share pledges on firm performance increases with encumbrance irrespective of the
controlling shareholder.
On exploring the effects of both types of share pledges separately, it becomes evident
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that share pledges for personal loans do not affect firm’s debt capacity while share pledges
for firm’s loans increase it. Specification (5) shows that, unlike share pledges for personal
loans, share pledges for firm’s loans increase the financial leverage of firms by 2%, which
amounts to a rise of 7% in the average debt capacity of firms. While identifying share
pledges for firm’s loans and personal separately, the dataset gets restricted to 4 observations
per firm, corresponding to the years from 2012 to 2015. It would be ambitious to expect
that the regressions employing firm fixed effects would identify the coefficients for both a
constant (indicator variable for the share pledge) and a slope (encumbrance for the share
pledge) using 4 observations. So, the next two specifications estimate the coefficients for the
indicator variable and encumbrance separately. These specifications verify that the increase
in access to debt is restricted to share pledges for firm’s loans. Specification (7) shows that
on average share pledges for firm’s loans increase the debt capacity of firms by 6% while
share pledges for personal loans do not affect the access to debt.
Next, the study evaluates whether the increase in debt capacity varies with firm char-
acteristics. The results in Table 2.11 suggest that share pledges for firm’s loans enhance
access to debt for both high growth and financially constrained firms. Specifications (3)
and (5) show that these pledges increase the debt capacity for high growth firms and firms
with high operating profitability by an average 9%. While, specifications (2) to (5) find that
these pledges improve the access to debt for financially constrained firms - firms with high
financial leverage, low growth in assets, low Tobin’s Q and poor operating profitability - in
the range of 8% to 12%.
The study further explores whether the increase in debt capacity leads to an increase
in capital expenditure of firms. Capital expenditure is measured by change in gross fixed
assets normalized by the total assets of the firm at the beginning of the year. The results are
presented in Table 2.12. Specification (1) suggests that, on average, share pledges for both
firm’s loans and personal loans do not influence capital expenditure of firms. Specifications
(2) to (5) explore whether share pledges for firm’s loans affect capital expenditure for firms
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with specific characteristics. Specification (3) finds that high growth firms incur additional
capital expenditure corresponding to 3.75% of their assets each year. This represents a large
increase of 75% of the average value of capital expenditure. However, there is no evidence
to suggest that share pledges for firm’s loans increase capital expenditure for financially
constrained firms. This evidence is in agreement with the positive investor reaction to
creation of these pledges by high growth firms but not financially constrained firms. In
untabulated results, similar regressions for share pledges for personal loans find that these
pledges do not influence capital expenditure of firms across any of these characteristics.
To summarize, the test of Hypothesis II finds that share pledges for firm’s loans enhance
the debt capacity of firms and provide high growth firms with access to growth capital. On
the other hand, share pledges for personal loans do not increase firm’s access to debt or
capital expenditure.
2.4.3 The effects of share pledges on expropriation
Hypothesis III proposes that the aggregate effects of share pledges should be evident in the
changes in bankruptcy risk of the firms. The changes in bankruptcy risk would include
the impact of expropriation from the firm, which is difficult to measure. Share pledges for
personal loans reduce the skin in the game for controlling shareholders without curtailing
their control rights. This may incentivize them to lower their efforts in monitoring the
firm and even indulge in misappropriation of funds, thereby increasing the risk of default.
Moreover, default risk should increase with the encumbrance for personal loans and low
ownership levels of controlling shareholders.
The study collates credit rating announcements across all major credit rating agencies in
India to identify defaults. The borrowers are obligated to inform the rating agency within
15 days of a default. The date of default is assumed to be 15 days prior to the date of
announcement by credit rating agencies to account for the lag. The dependent variable is
1 if firm defaults on its debt obligations over the next year and 0 if it does not. The firms
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that default on debt once are excluded in the subsequent years.
Ohlson’s O-score model is used to control for the usual predictors of default. The predictor
variables of the O-score model are created for the firms that are listed in India. These
predictor variables are:
1. Adjusted Size = log(Total Assets/GNP price level index19), measures firm’s total assets
adjusted for inflation.
2. Leverage Measure = Total Liabilities/Total Assets, represents total leverage of the
firm.
3. Working Capital Measure = Working Capital/Total Assets, measures working capital
intensity of the firm.
4. Inverse Current Ratio = Current Liabilities/Current Assets, indicates availability of
liquidity at the firm.
5. Return on Assets = Net Income/Total Assets, is an indicator of firm profitability.
6. Funds to Debt Ratio = Funds from Operations/Total Liabilities, where Funds from
Operations = Pretax Income + Depreciation. This variable measures firm’s ability to
finance its debt using its operational income.
7. Discontinuity Correction for Leverage Measure: equals 1 if Total Liabilities exceed
Total Asset and 0 otherwise. This variable corrects for the extremely leveraged position
of firms.
8. Discontinuity Correction for Return on Assets: equals 1 if net income was negative for
the previous two years and 0 otherwise. This variable corrects for the persistent losses
of the firm.
9. Change in Net Income = (Net Incomet – Net Incomet−1) / (|Net Incomet| + |Net
Incomet−1|), where Net Incomet represents the Net Income of the most recent year.
This variable takes into account the change in earnings of the firm.
19GNP denotes Gross National Product. The study does not have access to a reliable Gross National
Product price level index for India, and hence, uses the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) price level index.
The difference between GNP and GDP for India is not material.
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The results suggest that share pledges increase the probability of default over the following
year. Specification (1) of Table 2.13 shows that firms with share pledges were about three
times more likely to default than the firms without. Specification (2) uses the O-score model
alone. In the subsequent specifications, the share pledge information is added to O-score
model to assess whether share pledges retain their predictive power. It is worth noticing
that the share pledge information remains a significant predictor of defaults when added to
O-score model and improves the explanatory power of the composite model. Specification (3)
shows that in the composite model, share pledges correspond to an increase in the probability
of default by 2.3% over the next year. O-score model has been criticized for not accounting
for the factors specific to industry and time. The industry-year and firm,year fixed effects
are utilized in specifications (4) and (5) to address this concern. These use of these fixed
effects yields stronger results. The average firm with share pledges reports an increase in the
probability of default of 3.6% and 4.4% in specifications (4) and (5) respectively. Overall,
the tests find strong evidence to suggest that share pledges affect not only the firm valuation
but also its performance.
Next, the relationship between the default probability and the nature of share pledges
is examined. Specification (6) demonstrates that the default probability increases with con-
trolling shareholder’s encumbrance if pledges were created for personal loans, but not if they
were created for loans to the firm. Specification (7) employs industry-year fixed effects and
suggests that share pledges for personal loans do not increase bankruptcy risk at extremely
low levels of encumbrance (less than 8%). Finally, the study interacts share pledges with
ownership of controlling shareholders. Firms with higher than the median value of owner-
ship by controlling shareholders are classified as Firms with High Ownership by Controlling
Shareholders and the rest as Firms with Low Ownership by Controlling Shareholders. The
acts of expropriation from the firm destroy controlling shareholders’ wealth in proportion of
their ownership in the firm. Therefore, the low ownership of controlling shareholders would
encourage them to expropriate more from the firm. The results in specification (8) suggest
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that the increase in bankruptcy risk on account of share pledges for personal loans is lim-
ited to the firms with low ownership by controlling shareholders. These results verify that
pledging a large portion of ownership for personal loans creates suboptimal incentives for
the controlling shareholders and destroys firm value.
To recapitulate, share pledges are an important predictor of default risk and improve the
predictive power of the O-score model. On average, over the next year, the probability of
default for firms with share pledges is approximately double of that for firms without share
pledges. In addition, the risk of default further rises with an increase in encumbrance of the
controlling shareholder. However, this relationship between encumbrance and probability
of default is restricted to firms with share pledges for personal loans and low ownership
by controlling shareholders. The results suggest that only share pledges for personal loans
create a moral hazard for controlling shareholders.
2.5 CONCLUSION
The practice of raising debt by offering a collateral of equity may be as old as the existence
of equity itself. It is quite common for insiders across countries to pledge their shares as
a collateral for loans, and yet the effects of such share pledges are relatively unexplored.
This article provides credible evidence to suggest that share pledges influence incentives of
controlling shareholders, which, in turn, affects the performance and valuation of firms. The
paper also emphasizes that all share pledges are not the same. The incentives associated
with share pledges for personal loans are different from those for firm’s loans. In fact, share
pledges for personal loans and firm’s loans may have conflicting effects on firm performance
and valuation. Share pledges for personal loans create a diversion between control and
cashflow rights of controlling shareholders. On the other hand, share pledges for firm’s loans
improve creditor rights and may align incentives of the lenders and controlling shareholders.
As a result, share pledges for personal loans may lower firm value while share pledges for
firm loans may add value to firms.
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Moreover, the influence of share pledges is evident in the changes in firm performance.
Share pledges for firm loans increase the debt capacity for both high growth and financially
constrained firms. These high growth firms utilize their improved access to external finance
to further invest in increasing their production capacity. In contrast, share pledges for
personal loans do not enhance the debt capacity or capital expenditure of firms but sharply
increase their risk of bankruptcy. This increase in bankruptcy risk is specific to firms where
controlling shareholders have low levels of ownership and hence partake small share of value
destruction at the firm. This evidence suggests that the effective monetization of ownership
by share pledges for personal loans creates a moral hazard for controlling shareholders.
The incentives created by share pledges are universal in nature. Therefore, the qualitative
findings of the study are likely applicable across countries even though the data is specific
to India.
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2.6 FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 2.1: Stock returns +– 60 days around the event
The figure illustrates investor reaction to disclosure of share pledges after the fraud at Satyam
Computer Services was announced in the news. The two lines display market capitalizations
of portfolios of firms with share pledges and without. The portfolios are equal-weighted and
normalized on January 06, 2009, the day prior to the revelation of fraud at Satyam. The graph
begins 60 days prior to the news of fraud and ends 60 days after the end of disclosure period.
The vertical lines in figure represent the revelation of fraud at Satyam, the issuance of disclosure
guidelines and a week after end of the initial disclosure period, respectively.
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Figure 2.2: Share pledges for personal loans protect the wealth of controlling
shareholders when firm’s share price declines
The figure shows that share pledges for personal loans lower the rate at which controlling shareholder
loses her wealth when share price of the firm declines. These pledges also protect her downside
beyond the proceeds from the loan. The graph assumes that, on day 0, the controlling shareholder
pledges 100$ of her shares in the firm to avail of personal loans of 50$. The loan contract specifies
that the lender would maintain an asset cover (value of collateral / outstanding loan amount) of
2 throughout the period of loan. The share price declines by 20% on each of the next 10 days.
Lender sells a part of collateral on each of these 10 days to maintain the asset cover. The solid line
in the figure depicts the wealth of controlling shareholder while the dashed line shows her wealth
had she not pledged her shares on day 0. The lender manages to recover her dues by selling shares
from the collateral and does not bear any losses.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of firms with pledged shares vs firms without
pledged shares prior to disclosures in January – February 2009
The table illustrates the descriptive statistics of the firms with pledged shares and those without
pledged shares. The first and second rows mention the mean and the median values, respectively,
for each variable. Stars in the first column represent levels of significance of the difference between
the two groups. The last column compares the firms with pledged shares with those without
pledged shares. The statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels are represented by






Firms with Pledged Shares
Age: mean 32 32
: (median) (25) (23)
Business Group Firm∗ 59.33% 66.23%
(business group firm) (business group firm)
Ownership of Controlling Shareholder∗∗∗ 55.50% 49.00% Lower ownership by
controlling shareholder(54.90%) (48.40%)
Market Capitalization ($mn) 413.00 371.90
(48.80) (76.40)
Total Assets ($mn)∗ 398.60 607.90
Larger firms
(125.00) (225.20)
EBITDA Margin 23.20% 25.00% Similar operating profit
margins(18.50%) (20.10%)
Profit Margin 11.40% 10.60%
(8.80%) (8.30%)
RoA∗∗∗ = Net Profit / TAbook 12.70% 10.30%
(11.20%) (8.60%)
Current Ratio 2.10 2.21
(1.57) (1.76)
Collateral = (PPE+Inventory) / TAbook 0.40 0.38
(0.41) (0.39)




Dividend Yield∗∗∗ 3.60% 3.10%
Lower dividend payouts
(2.99%) (2.07%)
Tobin’s Q 1.27 1.18
Similar Tobin’s Q
(0.97) (0.98)
Firms with Credit Rating History 70% 74%
Interest Rate 8.90% 8.60%
Similar cost of debt
(8.60%) (8.20%)
Short Term Credit Rating∗ 1.86 2.19
Similar credit ratings
1 or A1+ 2 or A1
Long Term Credit Rating∗∗ 5.09 5.73
5 or A+ 5 or A+
Firms with Access to Commercial Paper Market 15% 21% Better access to CP
Growth in Income from 2005 to 2008∗∗ 200% 284%
Higher growth in business
(93%) (117%)
Growth in Assets from 2005 to 2008∗∗∗ 250% 404%
(116%) (171%)
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Table 2.2: Cumulative abnormal returns during the event
The table provides the investor reaction to share pledges from the news of fraud at Satyam
(January 07, 2009) till two days after the end of disclosure period (February 18, 2009). The
dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return for individual firms, adjusted for the
three Fama-French factors and the momentum factor, expressed in percentages (%). However,
specification (5) uses unadjusted stock returns and controls for the characteristics that vary across
the firms with pledged shares and those without. Each firm comprises an observation. t-statistics
are provided in the parenthesis. The statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels are
represented by ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)




High (> median) Encumbrance −5.62∗∗∗ −4.14∗∗
(−2.90) (−2.17)
Low (<= median) Encumbrance −0.77 0.44
(−0.40) (0.23)
Ownership of Controlling Shareholder 10.93∗∗
(2.13)
Encumbrance * Ownership of Controlling Shareholder 26.33∗
(Total Pledged Shares in the Firm) (1.66)
Growth in Assets over Previous Two Years −1.11∗∗∗
(−2.74)
Size (Log of Market Capitalization) 1.97∗∗
(2.55)
Family Controlled Firm −3.86∗∗
(Ownership of Controlling Shareholder Family > 20%) (−2.43)








Number of Analysts Following the Firm −0.20
(−1.10)
Constant −1.46∗ −1.46∗ −1.61∗∗ −1.62∗∗ −18.00∗∗∗
(−1.66) (−1.66) (−2.00) (−2.02) (−3.17)
Observations 673 673 673 673 669
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Table 2.3: Overview of share pledge transactions on an ongoing basis
The following table provides the basic details of share pledge transactions that were disclosed on
an ongoing basis after the initial disclosures in 2009 upto 2014. Share pledges for firm’s loans and
personal loans are identified from 2012 to 2014.
All Personal Loans Firm’s Loans
Count Average Size Count Average Size Count Average Size
(% of firm’s equity) (% of firm’s equity) (% of firm’s equity)
Creation 4,589 2.79 2197 2.41 392 5.02
Release 3,585 2.24 1883 2.07 244 3.73
Default 667 1.31 570 0.96 41 2.62
77
Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics of firms according to the type of share pledges
The table illustrates the descriptive statistics of the firms where shares were never pledged, pledged
atleast once for personal loans and pledged atleast once for loans to the firm. The financial data
comprises firm-year pairs from 2012 to 2014. The first and second rows mention the mean and the
median values, respectively, for each variable.
Shares were never pledged
Shares were pledged for
personal loans
Shares were pledged for
loans to the firm
Age: mean 35 31 28
: (median) (28) (25) (23)
Business Group Firm 55.87% 55.54% 57.20%
(business group firm) (business group firm) (business group firm)
Ownership of Controlling Shareholder 58.56% 50.08% 54.57%
(59.85%) (50.08%) (55.74%)
Market Capitalization ($mn) 835.75 917.29 1007.35
(90.18) (101.17) (83.63)
Total Assets ($mn) 656.03 976.03 1000.12
(146.81) (381.17) (364.95)
EBITDA Margin 17.90% 18.56% 19.14%
(14.43%) (15.47%) (15.09%)
Profit Margin 5.93% -1.60% -1.60%
(5.72%) (3.10%) (2.85%)
RoA = Net Profit / TAbook 5.66% 1.68% 1.19%
(5.12%) (1.72%) (1.33%)
Current Ratio 1.69 1.19 1.22
(1.32) (1.06) (1.06)
Collateral = (PPE+Inventory) / TAbook 0.41 0.38 0.40
(0.41) (0.39) (0.41)
Total Liabilities / TAbook 0.51 0.71 0.72
(0.48) (0.72) (0.75)
Dividend Yield 1.86% 1.31% 1.17%
(1.42%) (0.87%) (0.67%)
Tobin’s Q 1.69 1.43 1.40
(1.17) (0.98) (0.99)
Growth in Income over previous year 11.11% 16.89% 17.86%
( 1.56%) (1.45%) (1.25%)
Growth in Assets over previous year 11.70% 11.57% 12.84%
(9.34%) ( 8.66%) (10.35%)
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Table 2.5: Excess stock returns and share pledges transactions
The following table illustrates the relationship between changes in firm’s share price and share
pledge transactions. The second column displays stock returns in excess of market returns (in
percentages) during the week prior to the execution of share pledge transactions. The subsequent
columns display the excess stock returns in percentages during the week post the disclosure of
transactions. High encumbrance transactions imply the transactions where encumbrance is higher
than the median value. Large transactions involve higher than the median shareholding of the
firm. The use of market adjusted returns or returns adjusted for the four risk factors yields similar
results. t-statistics are provided in the parenthesis. The statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent levels are represented by ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗, respectively.
Week before Transaction Week after Disclosure
All Transactions All Transactions High Encumbrance High Encumbrance and
Transactions Large Transactions
Creation −1.65∗∗∗ −0.15 −0.48∗∗∗ −0.66∗∗∗
(−10.53) (−1.20) (−2.75) (−2.86)
Release 0.55∗∗∗ 0.15 −0.08 −0.12
(3.15) (1.17) (−0.43) (−0.50)
Default −4.77∗∗∗ −2.40∗∗∗ −2.60∗∗∗ −2.78∗∗∗
(−8.74) (−4.79) (−4.59) (−3.37)
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Table 2.6: Excess stock returns according to the nature of share pledge
transactions
The following table illustrates the relationship between changes in firm’s share price and share
pledge transactions separately for both types of share pledges. The column “Week before
Transaction” displays stock returns in excess of market returns (in percentages) during the
week prior to the execution of share pledge transactions. The other columns display the
stock returns in excess of market returns (in percentages) during the week after the disclosure
of transactions. High encumbrance transactions imply the transactions where encumbrance
was higher than the median value. The use of market adjusted returns or returns adjusted
for the four risk factors provides similar results. The dataset has only 40 observations of
defaults on share pledges for firm’s loans. As a result, the stock price reaction to defaults
on these pledges is statistically insignificant. t-statistics are provided in the parenthesis. The
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels are represented by ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗, respectively.
Share Pledges for Personal Loans Share Pledges for Firm’s Loans
Week before Transaction Week after Disclosure Week before Transaction Week after Disclosure
All All High Encumbrance All All High Encumbrance
Creation −1.80∗∗∗ −0.22 −0.60∗∗ −0.11 −0.04 −0.71
(−10.80) (−1.17) (−2.17) (−0.23) (−0.08) (−1.01)
Release 0.55∗∗∗ 0.14 −0.16 −0.24 −0.11 −0.38
(3.05) (0.72) (−0.55) (−0.40) (−0.22) (−0.49)
Default −4.91∗∗∗ −2.36∗∗∗ −2.55∗∗∗ −2.65 −2.91 −2.72
(−8.72) (−4.52) (−4.31) (−1.00) (−1.12) (−0.95)
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Table 2.7: Variables that interact with share pledges
Panel A: Univariate sorts of investor reaction to disclosure of share pledge transactions
The following panel provides the univariate sorts of stock returns in excess of market returns (in
percentages) during the week after disclosure of share pledge transactions. The high values for
variables correspond to values that are greater than the median and the low values correspond
to values that are smaller than the median, unless stated otherwise. The panel extends to the
next page. Log values of Amihud Illiquidity Ratio ares used as to measure illiquidity. t-statistics
are provided in the parenthesis. The statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels
are represented by ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗, respectively. The row after t-statistics denotes the count of
observations.
All Share Pledges Share Pledges for Personal Loans Share Pledges for Firm’s Loans
High Growth Low Growth High Growth Low Growth High Growth Low Growth
in Assets in Assets in Assets in Assets in Assets in Assets
Creation −0.24 0.09 −0.37 0.28 0.27 0.09
(−1.51) (0.53) (−1.41) (1.12) (0.46) (0.11)
2,911 1,678 1,311 886 261 131
Release 0.01 0.25 0.01 0.37 0.02 −0.22
(0.07) (1.38) (0.07) (1.44) (0.05) (−0.27)
2,076 1,509 1,052 831 141 103
Default −3.14∗∗∗ −1.16 −3.00∗∗∗ −1.14 −3.55 −3.70
(−5.41) (−1.46) (−4.55) (−1.39) (−1.35) (−1.07)
456 211 373 197 33 8
Family Not Controlled Family Not Controlled Family Not Controlled
Controlled by Family Controlled by Family Controlled by Family
(>20% equity) (<=20% equity) (>20% equity) (<=20% equity) (>20% equity) (<=20% equity)
Creation −0.40∗ 0.03 −0.94∗∗ 0.33 −0.31 0.53
(−1.74) (0.14) (−2.44) (1.64) (−0.33) (1.04)
1,694 2,895 793 1,404 137 255
Release 0.34 0.003 0.74∗ −0.17 −0.15 −0.04
(1.27) (0.02) (1.91) (−0.77) (−0.15) (−0.08)
1,149 2,436 658 1,225 66 178
Default −2.39∗∗∗ −2.61∗∗∗ −2.27∗∗∗ −2.48∗∗∗ −2.79 −3.61
(−3.42) (−4.12) (−3.01) (−3.52) (−0.93) (−0.92)
340 327 307 263 22 19
Business Group Standalone Business Group Standalone Business Group Standalone
Creation 0.14 −0.52∗∗ 0.40∗ −1.04∗∗∗ 0.33 0.10
(1.04) (−2.25) (1.93) (−2.70) (0.68) (0.11)
2,833 1,756 1,440 757 251 141
Release 0.01 0.33 −0.04 0.60 −0.06 −0.11
(0.09) (1.19) (−0.21) (1.43) (−0.14) (−0.09)
2,544 1,041 1,320 563 189 55
Default −2.35∗∗∗ −2.55∗∗∗ −2.50∗∗∗ −2.31∗∗∗ −1.74 −5.48
(2.72) (−4.59) (−2.66) (−3.75) (−0.63) (−1.42)
167 500 145 425 15 26
High Leverage Low Leverage High Leverage Low Leverage High Leverage Low Leverage
Creation −0.20 0.07 −0.22 0.12 −0.34 2.28∗∗
(−1.36) (0.34) (−0.96) (0.40) (−0.64) (2.27)
3,293 1,296 1,589 608 316 76
Release 0.09 0.15 0.20 0.08 −0.002 −0.32
(0.59) (0.74) (0.83) (0.27) (−0.00) (−0.45)
2,424 1,161 1,280 603 186 58
Default −2.71∗∗∗ −0.80 −2.54∗∗∗ −0.91 −3.15∗ −5.97
(5.58) (−0.48) (−4.77) (−0.48) (−1.73) (−0.64)
586 81 505 65 33 8
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Table 2.7: Panel A (cont.)
All Share Pledges Share Pledges for Personal Loans Share Pledges for Firm’s Loans
High M/B Low M/B High M/B Low M/B High M/B Low M/B
Creation −0.17 −0.14 −0.28 −0.07 0.47 −0.13
(−0.94) (−0.81) (−0.97) (−0.29) (0.67) (−0.21)
2,159 2,328 993 1,127 168 206
Release 0.36∗∗ −0.17 0.61∗∗ −0.27 −0.03 −0.23
(2.28) (−0.81) (2.54) (−0.83) (−0.05) (−0.33)
1,931 1,586 959 868 142 88
Default −2.90∗∗ −2.50∗∗∗ −1.25 −2.44∗∗∗ −8.01 −3.56
(−2.14) (−4.91) (−0.79) (−4.39) (−2.80) (−1.35)
63 590 46 511 4 36
High Operating Low Operating High Operating Low Operating High Operating Low Operating
Profitability Profitability Profitability Profitability Profitability Profitability
Creation 0.02 −0.22 −0.20 −0.08 0.77 −0.18
(0.13) (−1.38) (−0.77) (−0.31) (1.12) (−0.28)
1,828 2,761 992 1,205 164 228
Release 0.13 0.06 0.35 −0.06 −1.00 0.63
(0.88) (0.34) (1.66) (−0.18) (−1.40) (1.01)
1,676 1,909 962 921 114 130
Default −2.75∗∗∗ −2.45∗∗∗ −2.23∗∗ −2.43∗∗∗ −0.15 −4.76
(−3.13) (−4.39) (2.38) (−3.93) (−0.03) (−1.62)
148 462 150 420 12 29
High Liquidity Low Liquidity High Liquidity Low Liquidity High Liquidity Low Liquidity
Creation −0.15 0.11 −0.06 −0.24 0.35 0.25
(−1.09) (0.48) (−0.29) (−0.56) (0.72) (0.27)
3,245 1,191 1,718 433 260 105
Release 0.19 −0.11 0.18 0.04 0.22 −0.32
(1.39) (−0.38) (0.86) (0.09) (0.46) (−0.26)
2,747 750 1,458 380 195 43
Default −3.39∗∗∗ −1.76∗∗∗ −3.27∗∗∗ −1.72∗∗ −3.36 −3.61
(−4.89) (−2.64) (−4.45) (−2.30) (−0.79) (−1.28)
309 341 264 296 15 25
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Table 2.7 (cont.)
Panel B: Correlations between variables – Creation of share pledges for firm’s loans
The following panel provides the correlations between the variables at the time of creation of share
pledges for firm’s loans. p-values are provided in the parenthesis.
Family Controlled Standalone Growth in Assets Leverage M/B Operating Profitability
Family Controlled Firm 1
(>20% ownership)
Standalone Firm 0.45 1
(0.00)
Growth in Assets 0.10 0.22 1
(Over Previous Two Years) (0.03) (0.00)
Leverage −0.21 −0.14 −0.05 1
(Debt to Assets) (0.00) (0.00) (0.30)
M/B −0.03 −0.11 0.00 −0.35 1
(Market to Book) (0.54) (0.02) (0.91) (0.00)
Operating Profitability −0.04 −0.16 −0.09 −0.02 0.24 1
(Ebitda/Assets) (0.33) (0.00) (0.05) (0.58) (0.00)
Panel C: Correlations between variables – Creation of share pledges for personal loans
The following panel provides the correlations between the interaction variables at the time of
creation of share pledges for personal loans. p-values are provided in the parenthesis. Log values
of Amihud Illiquidity Ratio are used as a measure of Illiquidity.
Family Controlled Standalone Growth in Assets Leverage M/B Operating Profitability Illiquidity
Family Controlled Firm 1
(>20% ownership)
Standalone Firm 0.35 1
(0.00)
Growth in Assets −0.02 0.28 1
(Over Previous Two Years) (0.28) (0.00)
Leverage 0.09 0.12 0.10 1
(Debt to Assets) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
M/B −0.23 −0.17 −0.02 −0.48 1
(Market to Book) (0.00) (0.00) (0.28) (0.00)
Operating Profitability −0.10 −0.05 −0.03 −0.32 0.57 1
(Ebitda/Assets) (0.00) (0.01) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00)
Illiquidity 0.21 0.34 0.13 0.05 −0.37 −0.25 1
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
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Table 2.8: Characteristics that interact with share pledges for firm’s loans:
Announcement returns to disclosure of share pledge transactions
The following table quantifies the interaction of variables with investor reaction to share pledge
transactions for firm’s loans. The dependent variables in the Creation and Release columns are
the stock returns of firms during the week after disclosure of these transactions, expressed in
percentages. The dataset has only 41 observations of defaults on share pledges for firm’s loans. As
a result, the regression for defaults is not tabulated. The regressions use Huber-White standard
errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity. Standard errors are clustered at Industry-Quarter
level. t-statistics are provided in the parenthesis. The statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent levels are represented by ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Creation Creation Creation Creation Creation Creation Creation Release
Family Controlled Firm −1.39 −1.63 0.87
(−1.25) (−1.33) (0.60)
Standalone Firm −0.34 −0.51 0.51
(−0.29) (−0.39) (0.27)
Growth in Assets 1.31∗ 1.63∗∗ 0.76
(Previous two Years) (1.85) (2.13) (0.67)
Leverage −5.87∗ −8.24∗∗ 1.29
(Debt to Assets) (−1.88) (−2.20) (0.42)
Market to Book 0.32 −0.01 0.29
(M/B) (1.64) (−0.05) (1.65)
Operating Profitability 5.00 3.59 −10.53
(Ebitda/Assets) (0.67) (0.42) (−1.40)
Constant 0.84 0.42 −1.89 2.85∗ −0.35 −0.23 1.53 −1.84
(1.38) (0.70) (−1.39) (1.95) (−0.55) (−0.21) (0.61) (−0.79)
Observations 392 392 384 392 374 392 366 228
Fixed Effects Ind-Qtr Ind-Qtr Ind-Qtr Ind-Qtr Ind-Qtr Ind-Qtr Ind-Qtr Ind-Qtr
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Table 2.9: Characteristics that interact with share pledges for personal loans:
Announcement returns to disclosure of share pledge transactions
The following table quantifies the interaction of variables with investor reaction to share pledge
transactions for personal loans. The dependent variables in the Creation, Release and Default
columns are the stock returns of firms during the week after disclosure of these transactions,
expressed in percentages. Standard errors are clustered at Industry-Quarter level. The regressions
use Huber-White standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity. t-statistics are provided in
the parenthesis. The statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels are represented by
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Creation Creation Creation Creation Creation Creation Creation Creation Release Default
Family Controlled Firm −1.42∗∗∗ −1.10∗∗ 0.38 −2.55∗∗
(−3.19) (−2.20) (0.83) (−2.05)
Standalone Firm −1.78∗∗∗ −1.21∗∗ 0.01 −0.50
(−4.06) (−2.37) (0.03) (−0.35)
Growth in Assets −0.77∗∗∗ −0.45 −0.63 −3.40∗∗∗
(Previous two Years) (−2.62) (−1.32) (−1.60) (−4.36)
Leverage −2.25∗∗ −1.77 −2.39∗ −2.22
(Debt to Assets) (−2.52) (−1.32) (−1.75) (−0.51)
Market to Book 0.12∗∗ −0.08 0.08 0.36
(M/B) (1.98) (−0.70) (1.01) (1.17)
Operating Profitability 4.74∗∗ 4.70 −0.97 18.01
(Ebitda/Assets) (1.96) (1.26) (−0.30) (1.62)
Log of Amihud −0.06 0.07 0.11 0.71∗∗
Illiquidity Ratio (−0.78) (0.76) (1.17) (2.54)
Constant 0.79∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 1.50∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.28 −0.08 2.67∗∗∗ 3.06∗∗∗ 8.01∗∗∗
(3.37) (4.00) (2.99) (2.90) (0.02) (−0.75) (−0.15) (2.64) (3.02) (2.64)
Observations 2,197 2,197 2,168 2,197 2,120 2197 2,151 2,068 1,782 552
Fixed Effects Ind-Qtr Ind-Qtr Ind-Qtr Ind-Qtr Ind-Qtr Ind-Qtr Ind-Qtr Ind-Qtr Ind-Qtr Ind-Qtr
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Table 2.10: Share pledges and debt capacity
The following table estimates the relationship between share pledges and financial leverage of
the firm. The dependent variable is financial leverage (debt/assets) of the firm. Observations
comprise Firm-Year combinations. Specifications (5) to (7) analyze share pledges for personal
loans and firm’s loans separately. Specifications (1) to (4) use data from March 2009 to March
2015 while the following specifications use data from March 2012 to March 2015. The regres-
sions use Huber-White standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity. Standard errors
are clustered at the level of industry*year. t-statistics are provided in the parenthesis. The
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels are represented by ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Firm with Pledged Shares 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004
(0.71) (1.29) (1.02) (1.18)
Encumbrance 0.068∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(6.37) (3.79) (4.64) (5.13)
Firm with Pledged Shares: −0.002 −0.009
Personal Loans (−0.38) (−1.24)
Encumbrance: Personal Loans 0.021 0.005
(1.57) (0.26)
Firm with Pledged Shares: 0.022∗∗ 0.001
Firm’s Loans (2.54) (0.16)
Encumbrance: Firm’s Loans 0.011 0.044∗∗
(0.53) (2.26)
Operating Profitability −0.29∗∗∗ −0.29∗∗∗ −0.43∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ −0.34∗∗∗ −0.34∗∗∗
(−12.07) (−13.80) (−17.98) (−6.68) (−9.43) (−9.23)
Log of Assets 0.011∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.004∗ 0.015 0.015
(4.99) (4.18) (3.72) (1.81) (0.79) (0.76)
Tobin’s Q 0.0005 −0.001 0.001 0.001 −0.002 −0.002
(0.38) (−0.54) (0.22) (0.72) (−0.67) (−0.65)
Lagged Growth in Assets −0.084∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ −0.013 −0.012
(−3.47) (−2.34) (−3.73) (3.54) (−1.13) (−1.01)
Institutional Ownership −0.087∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.045 −0.16∗∗ −0.16∗∗
(−4.14) (−2.96) (−4.57) (−1.28) (−2.40) (−2.46)
Ownership of Controlling Shareholder −0.028∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗ −0.061∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ −0.083 −0.087
(−3.33) (−2.51) (−2.59) (−3.10) (−1.58) (−1.62)
Family Controlled Firm 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ −0.006 0.0048∗∗ 0.0021 0.0017
(3.52) (3.34) (−0.92) (2.10) (0.12) (0.10)
Size of Board 0.0004 0.0002 0.0010 0.0001
(0.76) (0.40) (0.24) (0.13)
Business Group Firm −0.010∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.005
(−3.76) (−3.26) (−1.20)
Lagged Financial Leverage 0.80∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗
(15.50) (22.04) (22.35) (12.59) (76.13) (4.21) (4.21)
Constant 0.037∗∗∗ 0.013 0.034∗∗∗ −0.17 0.037∗∗ 0.15 0.15
(4.67) (1.21) (2.70) (−1.48) (2.56) (0.85) (0.89)
Fixed Effects None None Industry- Firm, Industry- Firm, Firm,
Year Year Year Year Year
Observations 5,483 5,331 5,331 5,331 2,319 2,319 2,319
Adj. R2 0.791 0.830 0.840 0.896 0.883 0.925 0.925
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Table 2.11: Share pledges for firm’s loans and debt capacity
The following table further explores the relationship between debt capacity of firms and share
pledges. The first specification outlines the relationship for both share pledges for personal
loans and firm’s loans. The subsequent specifications interact firm characteristics to further
explore the relationship for share pledges for firm’s loans. Specifications (2) to (5) use median
values of firm characteristics to separate the firms with share pledges for firm’s loans into high
and low categories. The dependent variable is financial leverage (debt/assets) of the firm.
Observations comprise Firm-Year combinations and use data from March 2012 to March 2015.
The regressions use Huber-White standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity. Standard
errors are clustered at the level of Industry-Year. t-statistics are provided in the parenthesis. The
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels are represented by ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firm with Pledged Shares: Personal Loans 0.0048 0.0048 0.0047 0.0048 0.0047
(1.14) (1.16) (1.14) (1.16) (1.13)
Firm with Pledged Shares: Firm’s Loans 0.026∗∗∗
(3.55)
Firms with Low (Lagged) Financial Leverage 0.0076
(0.61)
Firms with High (Lagged) Financial Leverage 0.032∗∗∗
(3.82)
Firms with Low (Lagged) Growth in Assets 0.025∗∗
(2.02)
Firms with High (Lagged) Growth in Assets 0.028∗∗∗
(4.32)
Firms with Low Tobin’s Q 0.035∗∗∗
(4.22)
Firms with High Tobin’s Q 0.001
(0.06)
Firms with Low Operating Profitability 0.025∗∗
(2.47)
Firms with High Operating Profitability 0.029∗∗
(2.56)
Operating Profitability −0.28∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗
(−6.72) (−6.70) (−6.72) (−6.73) (−6.61)
Log of Assets 0.0041∗ 0.0042∗ 0.0041∗ 0.0041∗ 0.0041∗
(1.86) (1.89) (1.86) (1.82) (1.85)
Tobin’s Q 0.0016 0.0015 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016
(0.83) (0.81) (0.83) (0.85) (0.83)
Lagged Growth in Assets 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(3.48) (3.51) (3.44) (3.52) (3.49)
Institutional Ownership −0.049 −0.049 −0.049 −0.048 −0.049
(−1.34) (−1.35) (−1.33) (−1.33) (−1.34)
Ownership of Controlling Shareholder −0.036∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗
(−3.36) (−3.38) (−3.39) (−3.33) (−3.34)
Family Controlled Firm 0.0048∗∗ 0.0048∗∗ 0.0048∗∗ 0.0050∗∗ 0.0048∗∗
(2.09) (2.06) (2.08) (2.14) (2.05)
Size of Board 0.000020 0.0000040 0.000016 0.000051 0.000013
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02)
Business Group Firm −0.0057 −0.0057 −0.0058 −0.0056 −0.0058
(−1.29) (−1.29) (−1.29) (−1.29) (−1.28)
Lagged Financial Leverage 0.91∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗
(78.61) (80.53) (77.33) (78.38) (79.26)
Constant 0.039∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(2.71) (2.73) (2.71) (2.70) (2.72)
Fixed Effects Industry-Year Industry-Year Industry-Year Industry-Year Industry-Year
Observations 2,319 2,319 2,319 2,319 2,319
Adj. R2 0.883 0.883 0.883 0.883 0.883
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Table 2.12: Share pledges for firm’s loans and capital expenditure
The following table evaluates the relationship between capital expenditure and share pledges. The
first specification outlines the relationship for both share pledges for personal loans and firm’s loans.
The subsequent specifications interact firm characteristics to further explore the relationship for
share pledges for firm’s loans. Specifications (2) to (5) use median values of firm characteristics to
separate the firms with share pledges for firm’s loans into high and low categories. The dependent
variable is change in gross fixed assets normalized by the total assets of the firm at the start of the
year. Observations comprise firm-year combinations and use data from March 2012 to March 2015.
The regressions use Huber-White standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity. Standard
errors are clustered at the level of industry-year. t-statistics are provided in the parenthesis. The
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels are represented by ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firm with Pledged Shares: Personal Loans −0.38 −0.38 −0.42 −0.38 −0.40
(−1.42) (−1.42) (−1.58) (−1.42) (−1.46)
Firm with Pledged Shares: Firm’s Loans 0.65
(0.53)
Firms with Low (Lagged) Financial Leverage 0.88
(0.40)
Firms with High (Lagged) Financial Leverage 0.59
(0.52)
Firms with Low (Lagged) Growth in Assets −1.94∗
(−1.91)
Firms with High (Lagged) Growth in Assets 3.75∗∗∗
(3.02)
Firms with Low Tobin’s Q 0.94
(0.73)
Firms with High Tobin’s Q −0.10
(−0.07)
Firms with Low Operating Profitability −0.077
(−0.06)
Firms with High Operating Profitability 2.07
(1.12)
Operating Profitability 10.7∗∗∗ 10.7∗∗∗ 10.7∗∗∗ 10.7∗∗∗ 10.4∗∗∗
(4.65) (4.68) (4.65) (4.62) (4.36)
Log of Assets 0.095 0.094 0.091 0.093 0.098
(0.68) (0.66) (0.64) (0.66) (0.70)
Tobin’s Q 0.014 0.014 0.025 0.016 0.017
(0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.07) (0.07)
Lagged Growth in Assets 7.96∗∗∗ 7.96∗∗∗ 7.57∗∗∗ 7.96∗∗∗ 7.94∗∗∗
(5.00) (5.00) (4.85) (5.02) (4.98)
Institutional Ownership 4.38∗∗∗ 4.39∗∗∗ 4.52∗∗∗ 4.39∗∗∗ 4.47∗∗∗
(4.15) (4.17) (4.38) (4.16) (4.28)
Ownership of Controlling Shareholder 3.21∗∗∗ 3.22∗∗∗ 3.16∗∗∗ 3.22∗∗∗ 3.26∗∗∗
(3.36) (3.39) (3.38) (3.36) (3.43)
Family Controlled Firm −0.080 −0.080 −0.091 −0.073 −0.090
(−0.35) (−0.34) (−0.41) (−0.32) (−0.39)
Size of Board −0.016 −0.015 −0.023 −0.015 −0.020
(−0.33) (−0.32) (−0.49) (−0.31) (−0.42)
Business Group Firm 0.033 0.033 −0.016 0.034 0.014
(0.15) (0.15) (−0.08) (0.16) (0.07)
Lagged Financial Leverage 4.76∗∗∗ 4.77∗∗∗ 4.96∗∗∗ 4.76∗∗∗ 4.78∗∗∗
(6.88) (6.84) (7.43) (6.93) (6.93)
Constant −1.76∗ −1.77∗ −1.62 −1.77∗ −1.74∗
(−1.80) (−1.81) (−1.63) (−1.81) (−1.78)
Fixed Effects Industry-Year Industry-Year Industry-Year Industry-Year Industry-Year
Observations 2,287 2,287 2,287 2,287 2,287
Adj. R2 0.137 0.137 0.142 0.137 0.138
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Table 2.13: Share pledges and expropriation from the firm
The following table estimates the effect of share pledges on expropriation of resources form
the firm. The dependent variable is 1 if firm defaults on its debt during the next year and 0
otherwise. The values of coefficients are expressed in percentages for the ease of interpretation.
Specification (2) employs the Ohlson’s O-score model of default prediction while the following
specifications use the model to control for the usual predictors of default. The observations
comprise Firm-Year combinations. The OLS regressions use Huber-White standard errors that are
robust to heteroskedasticity. The standard errors for OLS regressions are clustered at industry-year
level. z-statistics for logit and t-statistics for OLS regressions are provided in the parenthesis. For
logit models, average marginal effects are provided in place of the coefficients.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Firm with Pledged Shares 1.19 0.83 −0.49 −1.61
(1.61) (1.14) (−0.80) (−1.20)
Encumbrance 6.71∗∗∗ 4.07∗∗∗ 10.68∗∗∗ 15.61∗∗∗
(6.73) (4.23) (4.71) (5.05)
Firm with Pledged Shares: Personal Loans −0.23 −2.61∗∗
(−0.19) (−2.24)
Encumbrance: Personal Loans 4.80∗∗∗ 20.51∗∗∗
(2.96) (4.16)
Firm with Pledged Shares: Firm’s Loans 2.44 3.44
(1.37) (1.02)
Encumbrance: Firm’s Loans 0.44 5.39
(0.16) (0.73)
Encumbrance: Personal Loans at Firms with 11.80
High Ownership by Controlling Shareholders (1.14)
Encumbrance: Personal Loans at Firms with 16.9∗∗∗
Low Ownership by Controlling Shareholders (3.82)
Encumbrance: Firm’s Loans at Firms with 11.60
High Ownership by Controlling Shareholders (1.31)
Encumbrance: Firm’s Loans at Firms with 8.98
Low Ownership by Controlling Shareholders (0.80)
Firms with Low Ownership 1.12∗∗
by Controlling Shareholders (2.37)
Adjusted Size 0.18 −0.07 0.001 2.51∗ 0.47 0.44 0.29
(0.85) (−0.34) (0.00) (1.72) (1.62) (1.79) (1.15)
Leverage Measure 6.35∗∗∗ 5.94∗∗∗ 8.44∗∗∗ 8.58∗∗∗ 5.28∗∗ 7.98∗∗∗ 7.94∗∗∗
(3.57) (3.42) (5.59) (4.44) (2.09) (7.39) (7.16)
Working Capital Measure −1.19 −1.98 −1.09 −7.09∗ −4.64 0.73 −0.21
(−0.54) (−0.92) (−0.33) (−1.73) (−1.45) (−0.21) (−0.06)
Inverse Current Ratio −0.06 −0.36 0.24 1.36 0.15 2.00 1.97
(−0.07) (−0.50) (0.20) (1.06) (0.15) (1.36) (1.34)
Return on Assets 0.10 3.74 −24.30∗∗∗ −24.91∗∗ −10.66 −25.98∗∗∗ −24.7∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.31) (−3.65) (−2.22) (−0.68) (−3.14) (−2.95)
Funds to Debt Ratio −19.73∗∗∗ −16.07∗∗∗ 4.09∗∗∗ 5.49∗∗∗ −7.54 5.26∗∗∗ 5.11∗∗∗
(−3.05) (−2.67) (5.23) (4.45) (−1.00) (5.56) (5.20)
Discontinuity Correction for Leverage Measure −1.03 −1.24 0.14 1.97 −1.60 −1.07 −1.02
(−1.22) (−1.49) (0.08) (1.16) (−1.47) (−0.49) (−0.47)
Discontinuity Correction for Return on Assets 0.18 −0.18 1.28 2.88 −0.25 1.30 1.41
(0.20) (−0.20) (0.67) (1.51) (−0.23) (0.67) (0.76)
Change in Net Income −1.00∗ −1.20∗∗ −2.45∗∗∗ −2.04∗∗∗ −0.553 −1.50 −1.49
(−1.67) (−2.04)∗∗∗ (−3.41) (−2.92) (−0.71) (−1.44) (−1.46)
Constant −3.34 −18.87∗∗∗ −6.75∗∗∗ −5.61∗∗∗
(−1.57) (−2.92) (−3.80) (−2.92)
Observations 4,773 4,773 4,773 4,773 4,773 2,017 2,017 2,017
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.094 0.158 0.193 0.0719 0.240 0.251 0.090 0.089
Fixed Effects None None None Ind-Year Firm,Year None Ind-Year Ind-Year
Model Logit Logit Logit OLS OLS Logit OLS OLS
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   CHAPTER 3: SHARE PLEDGES AND MORAL
HAZARD
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Insiders often offer their shares in the firm to lenders as collateral for securing loans. A large
body of anecdotal evidence suggests that share pledges create moral hazard for insiders.
The influence of insiders in the decision-making at their firms implies that the moral hazard
created by share pledges pose a material risk to all stakeholders of these firms. Share pledges
have been associated with notable cases of earnings mismanagement and imprudent risk-
taking at firms across the world. Enron and WorldCom in the U.S., Satyam Computers in
India, and Steinhoff in South Africa are a few such notable instances where insiders had
pledged their shares.
Stock market regulators across the world have warned against the moral hazard created
by share pledges by insiders. In January, 2006, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
published a report criticized the practice of pledging of shares by the insiders. SEC mentioned
that pledging of shares for personal loans has the potential to influence performance and
decisions of insiders. SEC also stated that the share pledges of the ex-CEO of WorldCom may
have led to the demise of the company and later that year instituted disclosure guidelines
regarding share pledges by insiders for all publicly listed firms. Similarly, the fraud at
Satyam Computers led to implementation of disclosure guidelines in India. The stock market
regulator in India has also warned that large scale pledging of shares may pose a risk to
market stability. The sale of pledged shares on margin calls during sever downturns may
exacerbate the situation.
The notable cases of moral hazard have been mostly associated with share pledges by
insiders that were used to obtain personal loans. In general, it is wrongly assumed that
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insiders pledge shares only to offer collateral for their personal loans. Insiders also pledge
their shares to offer collateral for loans availed by the firm. Singh (2017) demonstrates that
the two types of share pledges have contrasting effects on firm value and performance. Share
pledges for personal loans allow insiders to retain the profits from appreciation in the stock
price of the firm but protect them against losses when the stock price declines. The creation
of share pledges for personal loans attracts negative announcement returns and destroys firm
value. These share pledges lead to expropriation by controlling shareholders if they hold low
levels of ownership in the firm. On the contrary, the creation of share pledges for firm’s loans
attracts positive announcement returns and increases firm value. Share pledges for firm’s
loans conveniently transfer the ownership of equity of the controlling shareholder to the lender
in the even of default by the firm. These share pledges provide the much needed bargaining
right to the lenders against the large shareholders and discipline these shareholders against
strategic defaults. The disciplinary mechanism strengthens creditor rights and alleviates
borrowing constraints for firms. As a result, these share pledges provide firms with better
access to debt funds, opportunity to capitalize on valuable growth opportunities and improve
their valuation. The precise effects of share pledges are determined by the type of pledge
and the intensity of pledging by controlling shareholders.
Firms require minute adjustments in their reported earnings to convert small losses to
small profits and hence the tendency to report disproportionately high incidences of small
profits compared to the incidences of small losses breaks geographical barriers. Hayn (1995)
explains the incentives for firms to avoid reporting small losses. Burgstahler and Dichev
(1997) emphasizes that managers’ efforts to minimize the cost to stakeholders may lead to
small loss avoidance. The reporting of losses invites negative stock price reaction and destroys
firm value. Moreover, this has adverse consequences for the reputation of the insiders. The
reporting of losses reflect poorly on the professional capabilities of the managers and harms
their career prospects. Furthermore, losses indicate that the firm has not been generating
sufficient financial resources to make interest and dividend payments to its investors. As
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a result, lossmaking firms experience relatively poor access to external finance. Kahneman
and Tversky (2013) demonstrates that people incurring even small amounts of losses feel
disproportionately high amounts of pain. This behavioral response for utility maximization
is an alternate channel that explains the tendency of small loss avoidance by firms.
Share pledges for personal loans may further incentivize insiders to avoid losses and
hence firms with share pledges may show higher inclination to report small profits. These
share pledges subject insiders to the risk of margin calls in the event of adverse reaction to
reporting of losses. In order to avoid defaulting on margin calls, insiders are forced to arrange
for financial resources during bad states of the economy. The defaults on margin calls are
disclosed publicly by the stock exchanges and reflect poorly on the controlling shareholders.
These defaults signal that the controlling shareholder does not have the financial capability to
save his shares from forced liquidation. This signal may attract the interest of investors who
would be interested in taking over the control of the firm and may threaten the continuation
of control rights of the existing controlling shareholders. It is not far fetched to see that share
pledges for personal loans may also lead to a decrease in small loss avoidance. Some insiders
may utilize these share pledges as a tool to monetize their equity in the firm. As a result,
they may feel less motivated to influence the firm to avoid small losses after pledging their
shares for personal loans. Share pledges for firm’s loans may also create strong incentives
for insiders to use their influence over the firm in order to avoid the reporting of losses. The
lender conveniently acquires the ownership of pledged shares when the firm defaults on these
loans. As a result, defaults by firms have the added risk of loss of control for the controlling
shareholder. In some cases, the report of losses may trigger technical defaults. In principle,
the reporting of losses suggests that the firm is not creating enough wealth to repay its debts.
As a result, the existing lenders may refuse to rollover the loan facilities and the prospective
lenders may not prefer to provide fresh loans to the firm. This may force the firm into default
and lead to a change of the controlling shareholder.
The study finds that firms where controlling shareholders pledge their shares show in-
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creased aversion to report small losses and report small profits instead. Small losses and
small profits are defined as quarterly losses and profits that are smaller than 0.25% of firm’s
assets. In comparison to the firms where controlling shareholders never pledged their shares,
the firms where controlling shareholders pledged their shares atleast once show markedly
higher tendency to report small profits than small losses. Subsequently, I separate the earn-
ings releases for firms where insiders had pledged their shares once or more in to quarters
where shares were pledged and not pledged, respectively. This strategy mitigates the con-
cerns that the firms that reported small losses may be different from the firms that reported
small profits. I find that small loss avoidance is concentrated in the periods when controlling
shareholders pledge their shares. The mean of quarterly ratio of firms reporting small profits
to small losses is 3.63 when controlling shareholders had pledged shares and 2.87 when they
did not pledge shares and the difference is statistically significant.
Share pledges may influence insiders to shift the aggregate risk-taking levels at the firm.
Share pledges for personal loans create a wedge between cashflow and control rights of the
insiders by providing them with downside protection (refer to Section 3 for details). These
share pledges may influence insiders to take decisions that are extremely risky. The firm
would suffer in case the downside risks materialize but share pledges for personal loans
would protect insiders against losses. The effect would be pronounced if stock markets fail
to discriminate between value accretive and value destructive risks. On the other hand, the
insiders who use these share pledges to diversify their personal wealth away from the firm
may reduce their efforts to monitor the firm. As a result, the management may prefer a
quiet life and avoid taking corporate risks. Similarly, share pledges for firm’s loans may
also affect the risk-taking ability of firms in opposite directions. These share pledges make
control rights of controlling shareholder contingent on default on the loan by the firm. As a
result, these controlling shareholders may nudge these firms to take less risky projects and
reduce the probability of failure. However, these share pledges would guarantee the loss of
control rights for controlling shareholders who have pledged almost their entire ownership to
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guarantee the loans to the firm, more so if the firms are not generating resources required
to repay the debt. In such precarious situations, these share pledges may create incentives
for controlling shareholders to force firms to take extremely high levels of risk.
The study finds that the two types of share pledges have contrasting influences on the
aggregate risk-taking ability of firms. Similar to Acharya, Amihud, and Litov (2011), the
study uses standard deviation of industry-adjusted return on assets to measure the risk-
taking at firms. The use of firm fixed effects accounts for the entrenched unobservable
characteristics of firms. On average, share pledges predict a minor decline in risk-taking
ability of firms. However, while separating the two types of share pledges the study finds
large effects on the ability of firms to take aggregate cashflow risks. Share pledges for personal
loans lead to a decline in risk-taking ability of firms and the effect increases with the intensity
of pledging my controlling shareholders. A one standard deviation increase in intensity of
pledging (shares pledged / shares owned) by controlling shareholders lowers the aggregate
risks at the firm by 7%. Share pledges for firm’s loans are associated with lower levels
of aggregate cashflow risks at moderate intensities of pledging by controlling shareholders.
However, aggregate risks increase sharply if controlling shareholders pledge 80% or more
of their shares, which would ensure a transfer of their control rights. Furthermore, these
firms are not profitable. This evidence suggests that controlling shareholders gamble for
resurrection to retain their control rights. On average, high risk-taking leads to higher
cashflow for firms and hence increases the probability of avoiding defaults during extremely
adverse scenarios.
The paper contributes to the emerging literature that evaluates the effects of share pledges
on earnings management. Singh (2018) shows that share pledges lead to earnings manage-
ment through manipulation of discretionary accruals in the U.S. Chan et al. (2018) find
evidence to suggest that firms in Taiwan launch share repurchases when their controlling
shareholders pledge shares in order to help them avoid margin calls. Gopalakrishnan, Jacob,
and Pandey (2018) examine credit risk choices of banks in India and find that lenders face
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the consequences of moral hazard when they lend to firms where shares have been pledged
by their controlling shareholders. The present article proposes that share pledges modify the
incentives of insiders and contribute to small loss avoidance.
This study is the first to separate share pledges for personal loans from firm’s loans and
present the complete picture of their effect on the aggregate risk-taking ability of firms.
Academic studies have explored the relationship between share pledges and corporate risk-
taking and found divergent results. Anderson and Puleo (2015) randomly selects 500 of
S&P 1500 firms and suggests that share pledges lead to an increase in idiosyncratic volatility
of the stock and hence increase firm-specific risks. In contrast, Dou et al. (2019) studies
share pledges in Taiwan and claim that share pledges diminish risk-taking ability of firms.
However, these studies assume that all share pledges are collateral for personal loans and
have similar effects on the risk-taking at firms.
The use of hand-collected data from India has several advantages. The regulations in
India offer a unique opportunity to segregate share pledges for personal loans from share
pledges for firm’s loans. In addition, the study benefits from the identification of controlling
shareholders that are classified as “promoters” in India. Therefore, the study does not use
ownership levels to measure both ownership rights and control rights. Promoters are either
the entrepreneurs of the firm, or entities and their associates that can appoint the majority
of directors on the board. In essence, promoters are the controlling shareholders who control
the firm either directly or indirectly through cross-holdings, ownership pyramids, etc.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data collection
exercise and the methodology for estimating accruals. Please look at Section 1.2 of Chapter
1 for the mechanics of share pledges in detail. The section also uses a simple numerical
example to illustrate how share pledges protect the wealth of insiders during the periods of
share price decline. Section 3.3 presents the empirical evidence and is followed by Section 3.4
that concludes the paper.
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3.2 DATA AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION
Data
The consideration set for this study comprises firms listed on National Stock Exchange 
(NSE) from 2009 to 2015.20 At the start of the study in January 2009, 1161 firms were 
trading on NSE. The dataset excludes the firms with less than $10 mn market capitalization 
during the first week of January 2009. This filter omits 17% of the firms from the initial 
consideration set. The government of India does not pledge its ownership in firms. So, the 
firms controlled by the government and the subsidiaries of these firms are excluded, leading 
to further reduction of 6% of firms in the dataset. Next, financial firms and the five firms 
that did not have a Promoter are discarded, which leaves the dataset with 692 firms at the 
beginning of the study. Firms that were listed on NSE at a later date and met the selection 
criteria are included in the study, increasing the dataset to comprise 978 firms by 2015.
I hand-collect share pledge disclosures along with their time stamps from the websites of 
the stock exchanges. Capitaline is the primary database used by lenders and equity investors 
in India. The study uses this database to identify the approximate dates of disclosure of 
share pledge transactions. After identifying the approximate dates of disclosure, I locate 
the exact announcement releases on the stock exchange websites and download them. Then, 
I read these announcements to collect the relevant information. Most of the firms in the 
dataset are listed on both Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and NSE. So, the share pledge 
disclosures are collected from both BSE and NSE websites and the repeat announcements 
and other discrepancies in disclosures are cleaned from the data.
Prowessdx database of Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy, the standard database 
used in academic studies in India, is used for accounting, ownership and share price data of 
firms. The accounting data corresponds to standalone firms and the accounting ratios are 
winsorized at their 2.50 and 97.50 percentile values. Capitaline and Prowessdx databases do
20The study excludes firms that are listed on Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) but not on NSE since most
of these firms are small and thinly traded.
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not have a common identifier, so firms are matched by their names across the two databases.
Firms are classified into their respective industries on the basis the National Industrial Clas-
sification Code 2008 (NIC-2008) available in Prowessdx. NIC-2008 is the latest industrial
classification published by the Central Statistical Organization, which is responsible for co-
ordination of statistical activities in India.
The earnings surprise is obtained from the international segment of IBES database. IBES
database provides forecasts for annual earnings expectations and quantifies the mean of the
earnings surprise depending on the quantum of reported earnings. The study uses the mean
earnings surprise for the database to study the announcement returns to share prices. IBES
provides the dates of board meetings that announce earnings. I find earnings releases for
559 firms, which comprises approximately 57% of total count of unique firms in the databse.
The study calculates stock price reaction to these announcements on the day of the release
and the four subsequent days.
Construction of explanatory variables
The paper uses two explanatory variables throughout the empirical analysis – “Firm with
Pledged Shares” and “Encumbrance”. Firm with Pledged Shares is the indicator variable
that takes the value of 1 for firms where controlling shareholders have pledged their ownership
and 0 otherwise. Encumbrance is the ratio of shares that have been pledged by the controlling
shareholder to the shares owned by her and measures her intensity of pledging. This variable
demonstrates the impact of the shift in incentives of the controlling shareholders. These
explanatory variables are created separately for the two types of share pledges. To mitigate
the concerns of endogeneity, the study controls for the important characteristics that differ
significantly across firms with pledged shares and those without.
Identification of the nature of share pledges
As mentioned earlier, the pledge of shares can be offered by controlling shareholders
either to avail personal loans or to provide collateral for loans availed by the firm. A change
in regulations in November 2011 is utilized to identify whether the subsequent share pledge
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transactions were for personal loans or loans to the firm. This regulation mandated listed
firms to disclose the names of lenders to the new share pledge transactions. In India, banks
are not permitted to lend against share pledges for personal loans. If a bank accepts a
pledge of controlling shareholder’s shares, then the loan has to be given to the firm. The
share pledges serve as additional collateral for the loan. Hence, the share pledge transactions
where a bank was mentioned as the lender are classified as transactions for firm’s loans. On
the other hand, the non-bank financial companies can lend against share pledges for both
personal loans and loans to the firm. However, these lenders focus on retail loans and have
negligible presence in lending to firms.21 So, the share pledge transactions where the lender
was a non-bank entity are classified as transactions for personal loans. It is possible that a
few of the share pledges accepted by non-bank financial companies are for the purpose of
firm’s loans and not personal loans to the controlling shareholder. This may bias the study
against finding divergent results across the two types of share pledges.
The regulations require controlling shareholders to disclose their total quantum of share
pledges at the end of each quarter. But, controlling shareholders are not obliged to report
separately the share pledges for personal loans and firm’s loans. Moreover, the type of
share pledge transactions remains undisclosed if they were created prior to November 2011.
Therefore, the study can not use the cumulative disclosures of share pledge transactions
to arrive at the total quantum of share pledges for firm’s loans and personal loans. This
creates difficulty in distinguishing between the effects of the two types of share pledges on
firm performance. However, the creation, release an default transactions of share pledges
identify whether the share pledge is for personal loans or firm’s loans. This information is
21In India, deposits are the low-cost source of funds for lenders. The government provides deposit in-
surance to banks but not to non-bank lenders. This has forced non-bank lenders to depend on wholesale
finance and operate at a substantially higher cost of funds when compared to banks. The non-bank lenders
find it difficult to compete with banks in funding corporate loans and hence focus on financing high-yield
retail loans. Moreover, during the period of study, banks had access to superior recovery provisions under
Sarfaesi Act. In the event of default, banks were allowed to take possession of the secured assets, liquidate
these assets, take over the firm and change the management. The non-bank lenders did not have a recourse
to Sarfaesi Act and avoided lending to firms. They preferred lending against share pledges for personal loans
where collateral could be promptly liquidated upon default.
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available since November 2011 is utilized to work around this issue.
The study uses disclosures of share pledge transactions to create three categories of firms
beginning December 2011: firms where shares were never pledged, firms where shares were
pledged for personal loans only and firms where shares were pledged for firm loans only. A
firm is classified as having share pledges for personal loans if all share pledge transactions of
the firm after December 2011 were for personal loans only. In addition, the firm should have
been free of share pledges at some point of time after December 2011. This filter removes
any possibility of misclassification by including information about all the shares pledged
by controlling shareholders. For example, we can imagine a scenario where a controlling
shareholder had pledged 40% of her ownership for personal loans at the end of December 2011
and was free of encumbrance at the end of December 2013. The share pledge transactions
from December 2011 to December 2013 would include information on all her share pledges
during this period. If all these transactions were for personal loans, then it would establish
that during this period the firm had share pledges for personal loans only. Similarly, firms
with share pledges for firm’s loans only are identified. Lastly, firms that never disclosed any
share pledge transactions are called firms where shares were never pledged.
3.3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
3.3.1 Small Loss Avoidance
Hayn (1995) showed the presence of a kink in earnings distribution around zero earnings -
the number of firms reporting small profits is substantially higher than the number of firms
reporting small losses. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) states that earnings management to
avoid losses is pervasive in the U.S. Their study claims that 30-44% of firms with small
premanaged-losses manage earnings to create small profits. Firms that face higher costs of
reporting losses have greater incentives to report small profits. Prior literature identifies
transaction costs and behavioral biases as the two prominent explanations for why earnings
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are managed. Transactional motive states that firms declare marginal profits to decrease the
costs imposed in business transactions. Profitable firms receive better terms of trade from
their business counterparts and investors and thus maximize the wealth of stakeholders.
The second explanation is based on prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 2013), which
shows the strong behavioral tendency of moving from a relative or absolute loss to a gain.
The evidence in the present study is more in agreement with the first explanation. Share
pledges pose tangible costs to the insiders in terms of margin calls and loss of reputation.
Furthermore, reporting of losses suggest lack of resource generation by the firm to pay the
investors and hence adversely affects the availability of external finance. The resultant default
on loans guaranteed by the equity of controlling shareholders may force these shareholders
to relinquish their control rights.
Table 3.1 compares the descriptive statistics of firms with share pledges with firms with-
out share pledges. Both group of firms have similar age and control of ownership. The
median firm is part of a business group and not controlled by a family. Both groups have
similar asset base and have been growing their business at similar rates. Furthermore, firms
in both groups take similar levels of aggregate cashflow risks, measured in terms of the stan-
dard deviation of industry-adjusted Return on Assets. Firms without share pledges have
moderately higher profitability and Q. Overall, there are no extreme differences in the two
groups of firms.
Figure 3.1 presents the earnings distribution for the entire dataset of firms. The distri-
bution corresponds to 23.654 quarterly earnings releases from 2009 to 2105. Earnings are
normalized by the assets of the firms. The kink in the distribution is visible at the threshold
of zero earnings. The count of earnings releases that reported small profits is 1997 while
only 694 declarations reported small profits. The study creates the ratio of cumulative small
profits to small losses by dividing the total count of small profit declarations with the total
count of small loss declarations. Similarly, the quarterly ratio of small profits to small losses
divides the count of firms that declared small profits with the count of firms that reported
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small losses for each quarter. The cumulative ratio of small profits to small losses is 2.88
and the quarterly ratio of small profits to small losses is 3.13 for the entire dataset. This
represents similar levels of small loss avoidance when compared to the firms in the U.S.
In the next step, the dataset is divided in two groups of distinct firms - where shares
were never pledged by insiders and where shares were pledged by insiders once or more.
The top two graphs in Figure 3.2 compare the earnings distributions of these two groups of
firms. Firms where insiders had pledged their shares once or more show a distinctly higher
tendency to report small profits than the rest of the firms. However, this comparison is
between two different sets of firms. The difference in small loss avoidance can be attributed
to the differences in firms where controlling shareholders pledged shares in comparison to
firms where they did not pledge shares. Durtschi and Easton (2005) asserts that issues with
selection of firms contribute to the observed differences in reporting small losses. Similarly,
Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna (2003) makes considerable amounts of effort to compare firms
that report small losses with firms that report small profits. To mitigate these concerns, I
study small loss avoidance within the group of firms where insiders pledged their shares once
or more.
The earnings distribution of the group of firms where shares were pledged once or more is
further segregated in to two subgroups: the quarters when controlling shareholders pledged
their shares and the quarters when controlling shareholders did not pledge their shares.
Controlling shareholders who had pledge their shares once or more had kept their shares on
pledge about half the time from 2009 to 2015. The bottom two graphs compare the earnings
distribution for the same set of firms when their controlling shareholders had pledged their
shares against when they did not. The kink is concentrated in the periods when the shares
were pledged by the controlling shareholders and not when they kept their equity off the
pledge. This shows that the tendency to avoid losses is not specific to the fixed characteristics
of firms but varies depending on whether their controlling shareholders have pledged their
shares or not.
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Table 3.2 summarizes the ratios of small profits to small losses. The cumulative ratio of
small profits to small losses was 3.10 when shares were pledged by controlling shareholders.
This was significantly higher than 2.68 for reported earnings when shares were not pledged.
The average of quarterly ratio of small profits to small losses was 3.63 for firms where shares
were pledged and 2.87 for firms where shares were not pledged. The difference is statistically
significant (t = 2.20). Table 3.3 explores if the tendency to avoid small losses depends on
the intensity of pledging by controlling shareholders. The results from both cumulative and
quarterly ratios of small profits to small losses suggest that small loss avoidance is much
more prominent in firms where insiders pledge their shares at less than the median levels
of encumbrance. In other words, firms show heightened propensity to report small profits
when their controlling shareholders pledge less than 30% of their ownership in firm. At higher
levels of pledging, the propensity to report small profits wanes. The cumulative ratio for
firms with lower than the median encumbrance was 3.72, which is substantially higher than
2.72 for firms with higher than the median encumbrance. Similarly, the quarterly ratio at
5.00 for firms with smaller than the median encumbrance is much higher than 3.51 for firms
with higher than the median encumbrance. The difference is statistically significant with p
value of 1%. The effective encashment of large portions of equity of controlling shareholders
at high levels of encumbrance may be responsible for the low levels of small loss avoidance.
The association between small loss avoidance and share pledges is not an artifact of
measurement error or sampling issues. The study does not use Earnings Per Share (EPS)
to avoid issues with rounding-off of decimal points. The small profits and small losses are
calculated by normalizing the reported earnings. The study obtains similar results using
Market Capitalization as denominator in place of Total Assets. The tests include firms
listed on NSE (approximately 1200 firms) and not only on BSE (approximately 4000 firms,
mostly small and illiquid) to avoid selection issues on account of the preponderance of small
firms. Furthermore, earnings distributions are compared across the same set of firms to
mitigate sampling issues.
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Next, the study controls for the earnings expectations and explores investor reaction to
earnings surprises. The earnings surprise is measured by the average earnings surprise in
the IBES international database and corresponds to the annual earnings forecasts. Table 3.4
summarizes the earnings surprise dataset. Firms are adept at beating the average earnings
expectations with 94% earnings leading to a positive earnings surprise. Similar to the findings
of Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn (2002) for the U.S., I find that earnings surprises reveal valuable
information for investors and attract announcement returns in India. Stock price of the
firm appreciates by 0.50% during the week if firm manages to beat the average earnings
expectations. However, the earnings misses attract stronger investor reaction with the stock
price falling by 1.02%.
Table 3.5 explores earnings surprises separately for firms where controlling sharehold-
ers had pledged their shares and the rest. Earnings disappointments are more frequent at
firms where insiders pledge their shares and comprise 8% of earnings releases. This suggests
that analysts do not discount their expectations appropriately for firms with share pledges.
Interestingly, the patterns of investor reaction are different at firms where controlling share-
holders pledged shares when compared to firms where shares were not pledged. Firms with
share pledges are rewarded less when they beat earnings expectations. The announcement
returns to beating expectations is only 0.23% for these firms and 0.67% for the rest. But,
these firms are punished more if they do not meet earnings expectations. The announcement
returns at -1.50% are meaningfully lower than -0.32% for the rest of the firms. This evidence
suggests that, unlike analysts, investors suspect poor quality of earnings when controlling
shareholders pledge their shares.
3.3.2 Corporate risk-taking
The literature in corporate governance presents contrasting evidence on the effects of investor
protection on aggregate risks at firms. Acharya et al. (2011) shows that stronger creditor
rights are associated with lower risk-taking ability of firms. In contrast, John, Litov, and
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Yeung (2008) argues that better investor protection could lead corporations to undertake
riskier investments. Investor protection may also have non-monotonic effects on the risk-
taking ability of firms. Adler (1991) suggests that strong creditor rights may incentivize
firms to take more risks as the firm approaches default.
Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) finds that stronger creditor rights curtail the abil-
ity of large shareholders to opportunistically expropriate firm value and alleviate borrowing
constraints of firms. On the contrary, Vig (2013) finds that in India, improvement in the
security enforcement rights of secured creditors lowered the usage of secured corporate debt.
Singh (2017) finds that share pledges for firm’s loans alleviate borrowing constraints and
firms with superior growth opportunities use the incremental borrowing to capitalize on
their growth opportunities. In contrast, share pledges for personal loans do not influence the
borrowing capacity of firms.
Duchin, Goldberg, and Sosyura (2016) demonstrates that insiders influence corporate
risk-taking to protect their private benefits. I hypothesize that this behavior will be promi-
nent in firms where controlling shareholders have pledged their equity. Share pledges for
personal loans may lead to weak monitoring by controlling shareholders and lower firm’s
risk-taking ability, particularly at high levels of encumbrance. Share pledges for firm’s loans
may also alter the ability of firms to take cashflow risks. A default on these pledges can
swiftly take away control rights from the controlling shareholders. In order to avoid such
defaults, these controlling shareholders may influence firms to reduce cashflow risks. In con-
trast, these share pledges may also increase the ability of firms to take business risks. The
collateral of controlling shareholders’ equity increases the bargaining power of lenders in the
event of default. This can diminish the extraction of private benefits by controlling share-
holders and enhance the risk-taking ability of the firms. Moreover, in a scenario where the
firm is approaching default, the highly encumbered controlling shareholder may force the
firm to generate profits by taking excessive cashflow risks.
Table 3.6 compares firms with share pledges for personal loans to those with share pledges
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for firm’s loans. Both groups have similar asset size, operating profitability, and aggregate
risk-taking ability. Firms with share pledges for firm’s loans are younger and the median firm
is associated with a business group while the median firm with share pledges for personal
loans is a standalone firm. The tests use firm fixed effects to account for these and other
characteristics that are specific to firms.
The tests utilize standard deviation of industry-adjusted operating return on assets as the
measure of aggregate cashflow risks. The standard deviation of industry-adjusted quarterly
return on assets for the next four quarters is the dependent variable. Industries are identified
by their 2 digit SIC. The quarterly returns on assets for firms are winsorized at the 2.5% level
in both tails of the distribution. The average value of the dependent variable is 2.6. The
change in the average risk-taking ability of firms is calculated by dividing the coefficients in
Table 3.7 with the average value of the dependent variable. Bartlett and Partnoy (2018) show
that simplified estimates of Tobin’s Q may not be an appropriate measure firm valuation.
Following their advice, the study uses market value of the firm as an alternate control variable
and obtains similar results.
I find that on average, share pledges are associated with minor of risk avoidance by
firms. The coefficients in specification (2) suggests that over the next year, the firms with
pledged shares take about 2% less aggregate risks, which denotes decrease of 2% of the mean
of aggregate risk-taking measure. The use of industry*quarter fixed effects yields similar
results, but is omitted due to space constraints. Specification (3) uses within firm variation
and finds that one standard deviation increase in encumbrance is associated with a decline
in risk-taking ability of firms by 2% over the next year. It is noteworthy that the increase
in encumbrance for personal loans has opposite effect on the risk-taking ability of firms,
when compared to the increase in encumbrance for firm’s loans. Specification (4) suggest
that firms with personal loans demonstrate moderately lower risk-taking ability over the next
year and it further declines with increase in encumbrance. A one standard deviation increase
in encumbrance for personal loans is associated with a meaningful drop in risk-taking ability
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in range of 7% over the next year. On the other hand, the risk-taking ability of the average
firm with share pledges for firm loans is slightly higher over the next year and increases
steeply with increase in encumbrance. A one standard deviation increase in encumbrance
for firm loans is associated with a large increase in aggregate risks in range of 22%.
The coefficients on encumbrance variables suggest that share pledges have strong effects
of on the risk-taking ability of firms at high intensities of pledging. I further study the
sample of firms with high levels of encumbrance to understand the changes in the risk-
taking behavior. Specification (5) excludes the firms where shares were pledged for firm’s
loans at encumbrances less than 100%. This specification retains 27% of observations with
share pledges for firm’s loans. The results suggest that corporate risks increase by 32% over
the subsequent year when controlling shareholders pledge their entire ownership to guarantee
loans to the firm. Specification (6) excludes the firms where shares were pledged for personal
loans at encumbrances less than 75%. The results suggest that corporate risks increase by
32% over the subsequent year when controlling shareholders pledge 75% or more of their
ownership to obtain personal loans.
The study further explores the effects of the intensity of pledging on corporate risk-
taking. The non-linear relationship between encumbrance and corporate risk is mapped by
adding encumbrance2 and encumbrance3 as explanatory variables in specification (3). The
coefficients on the share pledge indicator and the three encumbrance variables are stored after
executing the regression. Then, the value of encumbrance is varied from 0% to 100% and the
changes in the dependent variable are plotted using the estimated coefficients. Figure 3.3
shows the results of the estimation procedure. As suggested by the specification (3), on
average share pledges have only a minor effect on corporate risk. Similarly, the relationship
between encumbrance and corporate risk is mapped for both types of share pledges using
specification (5). Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 compare the results for both types of share
pledges. The encumbrance for share pledges for personal loans mostly suppresses the risk-
taking ability and the effect becomes prominent at high levels of encumbrance. On the
106
contrary, as predicted by Acharya et al. (2011), share pledges for firm’s loans suppress
aggregate risks at moderate levels of encumbrance. But, in agreement with Adler (1991),
these share pledges lead to extremely high levels of risk-taking when controlling shareholders
pledge almost their entire ownership as collateral for loans to the firm. The contrasting effects
of the two types of share pledges create an impression that the average share pledge has only
a minor effect on corporate risk.
Overall, the evidence suggests that share pledges for personal use lead to reduction in risk-
taking ability of firms. This agrees with the lower monitoring by promoters and curtailment
of risks to avoid margin calls on these pledges. These promoters do not appear to take
advantage of their downside protection by influencing firms to take excessive cashflow risks.
On average, share pledges for firm loans lower the risk-taking ability of firms. This could be
driven by promoter‘s incentives to retain control by avoiding defaults on these loans. These
pledges lead to aggressive risk-taking at high levels of encumbrance, which is suggestive of
gambling for resurrection. On average, higher risks lead to higher profits for firms. During
situations of impending defaults, higher profits increase the likelihood for the firm to avoid
defaults and rollover debt facilities. As a result, controlling shareholders who have pledged
almost their entire ownership for firm’s loans may manage to retain control of the firm.
3.4 CONCLUSION
The incentives of insiders determine the decisions that they make on behalf of the firm.
Martin and Partnoy (2005) show that encumbered shares change the payoff function of the
shares and hence shift the incentives of shareholders. Poorly designed incentive structures
create moral hazard and result in serious lapses in corporate governance. Corporate frauds
and imprudent corporate risks are usually the outcome of perverse incentives of the insiders.
It is common for controlling shareholders to offer their equity in the firm as collateral to
raise loans. The business of lending against share pledges of insiders is not only restricted
to India, but is prevalent across countries. In May 2012, a sister concern of Institutional
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Shareholder Services (ISS), the largest proxy advisory firm in the world, reported that the
named executives or directors have pledged shares for loans at approximately 16% of the
companies in the Russell 3000 index. Similarly, I find that on average controlling shareholders
of about 35% of listed firms in India keep their shares pledged at any given point of time.
The study finds evidence to support the hypothesis that share pledges lead to small loss
avoidance at firms. This behavior is prominent at moderate levels of intensity of pledging by
controlling shareholders. Furthermore, share prices of firms with share pledges under-react
when they beat earnings expectations and over-react when they fail to meet expectations.
This evidence is the first to outline that share pledges are a motive at firms to avoid reporting
small losses.
Interestingly, share pledges have contrasting influence on aggregate corporate risks. Share
pledges for personal loans predict a decline in the risk-taking ability of firms. This evidence
supports the hypothesis that controlling shareholders use these share pledges as a tool to ef-
fectively monetize their equity in the firm and subsequently reduce their efforts in monitoring
the firm. On the other hand, share pledges for firm’s loans predict less risk-taking ability at
moderate levels of encumbrance but aggregate risks increase sharply at extremely high levels
of encumbrance. This evidence suggests that, in general, controlling shareholders take less
risks to protect their control rights when they use their ownership in firm to guarantee its
debt. But when firm is close to default, they gamble for resurrection in the hope to generate
enough returns to pay their lenders and retain their control rights.
Only a small segment of listed firms in India provide their investors with sufficiently
liquid derivative instruments for risk management. It may be worth exploring if the effect
of share pledges on corporate risks depends on the availability of derivative instruments.
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3.5 FIGURES AND TABLES
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics: Firms with pledged shares vs firms without
pledged shares
The table illustrates the descriptive statistics of the firms with pledged shares and those without
pledged shares. The data period corresponds to the fiscal years 2009 till 2015. The first and second
rows mention the mean and the median values, respectively, for each variable.
Firms without Firms with





Part of a Business Group 0.57 0.55
(1) (1)
Family Controlled 0.33 0.27
(> 20% ownership by the family) (0) (0)
Shareholding of Controlling Shareholder in the Firm 0.57 0.49
(0.57) (0.50)
Market Capitalization (log[INR bn]) 10.83 10.69
(8.73) (8.54)
Total Assets (log[INR bn]) 9.20 9.69
(9.07) (9.62)
Operating RoA 0.14 0.09
(0.03) (0.02)




Asset Growth during the Previous Year 0.14 0.14
(0.11) (0.09)
Aggregate Cashflow Risk (Standard Deviation of 0.02 0.02
Industry-adjusted RoA) (0.02) (0.01)
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Figure 3.1: Earnings distribution: Entire dataset
The following graph depicts earnings distribution for the dataset comprising 23,654 quarterly
earnings releases from 2009 to 2015. The earnings are normalized using total assets of the firm.
Each bin in the histogram corresponds to 0.25% of Return on Assets for the firm each quarter.
The mode in the histogram corresponds to the bin of small losses, that is, the losses less than
0.25% of firm’s total assets.
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Figure 3.2: Earnings distribution: Firms with pledged shares vs. firms without
pledged shares
The top two graphs compare earnings distribution for firms where shares were pledged atleast
once and the firms where shares were never pledged. The bottom two graphs analyze the earnings
distributions for firms where shares were pledged atleast once in detail. The two graphs separate
the quarters when shares were pledged by controlling shareholders from the quarters when shares
were not pledged.
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Table 3.2: Small Profit to Small Loss Ratios
The following table compares the ratios of small profits to small losses across firms where shares
were pledged and firms where shares were not pledged. The ratio of small profits to small losses is
created by dividing the count of firms that declared small profits to the count of firms that declared
small losses. The statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels are represented by ***,
** and *, respectively.
Cumulative Ratio Mean of Quarterly Ratios
Entire Dataset 2.88 3.13
a) Shares were pledged 3.10 3.63
b) Shares were not pledged 2.68 2.87
Difference (a-b) 0.42 0.76**
(2.20)
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Table 3.3: Small Profit to Small Loss Ratios: Role of the intensity of pledging
The following table compares the ratios of small profits to small losses across firms with different
intensities of pledging by controlling shareholders. The high encumbrance corresponds to higher
than the median intensity of pledging. Similarly, the low encumbrance corresponds to the lower
than the median intensity of pledging. The ratio of small profits to small losses is created by
dividing the count of firms that declared small profits to the count of firms that declared small
losses. The statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels are represented by ***, ** and
*, respectively.
Cumulative Ratio Mean of Quarterly Ratios
a) High Encumbrance 2.72 3.51
b) Low Encumbrance 3.72 5.00
c) Shares were not pledged 2.68 2.87
Difference: High Encumbrance (a-c) 0.04 0.64
(1.54)
Difference: Low Encumbrance (b-c) 1.04 2.13***
(3.14)
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Table 3.4: Announcement returns: Earnings surprise
The following table compares the announcement returns during the week starting the day of positive
and negative earnings surprises. The earnings surprise data is for annual forecasts comprising 559
firms and is sourced from the I/B/E/S international database. The statistical significance at the
1, 5, and 10 percent levels are represented by ***, ** and *, respectively.
Observations Announcement Returns
Positive Surprise 1872 0.50%




Table 3.5: Announcement returns: Earnings surprise and share pledges
The following table compares the announcement returns during the week starting the day of positive
and negative earnings surprises at firms where shares were pledged with firms where shares were
not pledged. Panel A corresponds to positive earnings surprise announcements and Panel B to
negative earnings surprise announcements. The earnings surprise data is for annual forecasts and
is sourced from the I/B/E/S international database. When compared with firms without share
pledges, firms with share pledges under-react when earnings surprise is positive and overreact when
earnings surprise is negative.
Panel A: Positive Earnings Surprise
Observations Announcement Returns
With Share Pledges 757 0.23%
Without Share Pledges 1115 0.67%
Difference -0.44%
Panel B: Negative Earnings Surprise
Observations Announcement Returns
With Share Pledges 67 -1.50%
Without Share Pledges 45 -0.32%
Difference -1.18%
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Table 3.6: Descriptive statistics: Firms with share pledges for personal loans vs
firms with share pledges for firm’s loans
The table illustrates the descriptive statistics of the firms with pledged shares for personal loans
and those with pledged shares for firm’s loans. The first and second rows mention the mean and
the median values, respectively, for each variable.
Firms with Share Pledges Firms with Share Pledges





Part of a Business Group 0.39 0.73
(0) (1)
Family Controlled 0.40 0.12
(> 20% ownership by the family) (0) (0)
Shareholding of Controlling Shareholder 0.50 0.58
(0.49) (0.56)
Market Capitalization (log[INR bn]) 10.60 11.06
(8.58) (8.36)
Total Assets (log[INR bn]) 9.57 9.52
(9.73) (9.83)
Operating RoA 0.03 0.02
(0.03) (0.03)




Asset Growth during the Previous Year 0.10 0.14
(0.18) (0.11)
Aggregate Cashflow Risk (Standard Deviation 0.02 0.02
of Industry-adjusted RoA) (0.02) (0.02)
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Table 3.7: Corporate risk and share pledges
The following table shows the effects of share pledges of both types on the aggregate cashflow
risktaking ability of firms. The dependent variable is the standard deviation of industry-adjusted
quarterly Return on Assets for the next four quarters. The results outline the contrast in the
effects of the two types of share pledges on the aggregate risk-taking ability of firms. The statistical
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels are represented by ***, ** and *, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pledged Firm -0.048 -0.036 0.042
(-0.87) (-0.62) (0.83)
Encumbrance -0.41** -0.27** -0.19**
(-2.17) (-2.18) (-2.18)
Pledged Firm: Personal Loans 0.13 0.13 -0.72***
(0.68) (0.68) (-3.12)
Encumbrance: Personal Loans -0.62*** -0.63***
(-2.45) (-2.43)
Pledged Firm: Firm Loans -0.52 0.86*** -0.50
(-1.33) (6.94) (-1.33)
Encumbrance: Firm Loans 1.41** 1.38**
(2.17) (2.24)
Insider Ownership No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Financials No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Governance Indicators No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects None None Firm, Firm, Firm, Firm,
Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter
Cluster Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry
Observations 19,855 18,995 18,995 6,316 6,262 5,980
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Figure 3.3: Intensity of pledging and corporate risks
The following graph maps the nonlinear effects of encumbrance on corporate risk. Apart from
the control variables, the share pledge indicator, encumbrance, encumbrance2 and encumbrance3
variables are used in the regression specification (3) of Table 5. After estimating the coefficients
of the above mentioned variables, the value of encumbrance is varied from 0% to 100% to map
the effect of encumbrance on corporate risk. The dependent variable is the standard deviation
of industry-adjusted quarterly Return on Assets for the next four quarters. X axis denotes
encumbrance of the controlling shareholders.
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Figure 3.4: Intensity of pledging and corporate risks: Share pledges for personal loans
The following graph compares the nonlinear effects of encumbrance of share pledges for personal
loans on corporate risk. Apart from the control variables, the share pledge indicator, encumbrance,
encumbrance2 and encumbrance3 variables for both types of share pledges are used in the
regression specification (4) of Table 7. After estimating the coefficients of the above mentioned
variables, the value of encumbrance is varied from 0% to 100% to map the effect of encumbrance
for share pledges for personal loans on corporate risk. The dependent variable is the standard
deviation of industry-adjusted quarterly Return on Assets for the next four quarters. X axis
denotes encumbrance of the controlling shareholders.
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Figure 3.5: Intensity of pledging and corporate risks: Share pledges for firm’s loans
The following graph compares the nonlinear effects of encumbrance of share pledges for firm’s
loans on corporate risk. Apart from the control variables, the share pledge indicator, encumbrance,
encumbrance2 and encumbrance3 variables for both types of share pledges are used in the
regression specification (4) of Table 7. After estimating the coefficients of the above mentioned
variables, the value of encumbrance is varied from 0% to 100% to map the effect of encumbrance
for share pledges for firm’s loans on corporate risk. The dependent variable is the standard
deviation of industry-adjusted quarterly Return on Assets for the next four quarters. X axis
denotes encumbrance of the controlling shareholders.
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